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David J. Mullan*

Recent Developments in
Nova Scotian Administrative
Law

I. Introduction
In 1976, in the first of these surveys, I dealt exclusively with Nova
Scotia decisions involving the substantive grounds of judicial
review - jurisdictional error, error of law on the face of the record
and breach of the rules of natural justice.' Remedies were scarcely
mentioned for the very good reason that in the period then under
review there were few, if any cases, raising important remedial
problems. Now, just over a year later, the situation is the reverse.
Most of the interesting judicial review cases of the last eighteen
months in Nova Scotia have been ones involving remedial
problems. Indeed, in one or two instances, these difficulties were
quite novel in Canadian administrative law jurisprudence. Accordingly, the bulk of this survey article will be devoted to those cases.
However, I would remiss if I failed to discuss those few important
substantive issues that surfaced during the year and they will be
dealt with in the second part of the article.
II. JudicialReview in Nova Scotia -Remedial Alternatives
(a) Effect of the Quashing ofa Decision by Certiorari
In the first of these Nova Scotia survey issues of the Dalhousie Law
Journal, much attention was paid in both the article on
Administrative Law 2 and that on Labour Law 3 to the difficulties that
the Nova Scotia Labour Relations Board was having with the courts
*David J. Mullan, Visiting Professor of Law, Queen's University. I acknowledge
the assistance of my colleagues, Professors Stanley Sadinsky, Mark Weisberg and
John Whyte, in the development of a number of the ideas and arguments contained

in this article. I am also heavily indebted to Mr. David Potts, LL.B (Dalhousie),
1976, with respect to the section on habeas corpus with certiorariin aid. My own
knowledge in this area owes much to an unpublished paper which he wrote for

Professor W. J. Ortego's course in Criminology in 1974 and also to the many
discussions that we had about that paper and the decision in R v. Lapierre (1976),
15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (S.C., A.D.) which is commented upon in this article.
1. (1976), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 870

2. Id. at 871-83
3. Brian G. Hansen, John MacPherson and Larry Steinberg, Recent Developments
in Labour Law in Nova Scotia (1976), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 791 at 797-819
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over its certification procedures. These continued subsequently and,
in Little Narrows Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board
(Nova Scotia), Cowan C.J.T.D. held that there was no authorization
in the Trade Union Act for the holding of pre-hearing votes by the
Board. 4 This procedure had been adopted by the Board following
the decision of the Appeal Division in W. H. Schwartz & Sons Ltd.
v. Bread, Cake, Biscuit, Crackers, Candy, Confectionery &
Miscellaneous Workers' Union, Local 446,5 a decision discussed
fully in the last survey. 6
Little Narrows Gypsum raises some nice statutory interpretation
questions but these have now become academic as a result of
subsequent amendments to the Trade Union Act itself. 7 However,
this case did not end with the quashing of the Board's decision to
certify the union as a bargaining unit and the decision of Hallett J. in
Little Narrows Gypsum Co. Ltd. v. LabourRelations Board (Nova
Scotia No. 2)8 raises a significant remedial issue: What is the effect
of the quashing of a decision on an application for relief in the
nature of certiorari? [Ed. note: The decision of Hallett J. in the
Little Narrows case was reversed by the Nova Scotia Court of
Appeal after this comment was written. The judgment of
MacKeigan J.A. bears out many of the points made here about the
effect of an order in the nature of certiorari. sa]
After Little Narrows Gypsum (No. 1), counsel for the Labour
Relations Board requested Cowan C.J.T.D. to remit the matter back
to the Board for reconsideration. This request was refused. 9
Undaunted, the Board indicated that it would proceed to rehear the
application, this time presumably according to the Act. The ability
4. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 385; 73 D.L.R. (3d) 161 (sub nom. Re Little Narrows
Gypsum Co. Ltd.) (S.C., T.D.)
5. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 606; 65 D.L.R. (3d) 506 (S.C., A.D.)
6. Supra, note I at 871-83 and note 3 at 797-819
7. S.N.S. 1977, c. 70 (assented to by the Lieutenant Governor on May 19, 1977
and in force immediately). The new procedure, provided for in an amended section
24, calls for the Board to take a vote every time an application for certification is
made (subs. 1). The section then provides for the situations in which the vote will
be counted by Board (subs. 7) and the situations in which the vote may be
disregarded in the certification decision (subs. 9, 10 and 11).
8. Unreported decision of Hallett J. of the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of
Nova Scotia, delivered: April 15, 1977 (S.H. No. 13900)
8a Labour Relations Board (Nova Scotia) v. Little Narrows Gypsum Co. Ltd. and
IUOE, Local 721 B: Dec. 30, 1977 (S.H. No. 13900)- unreported.
9. This application was made separately after the decision was handed down and is
referred to in Hallett J.'s judgment. Supra, note 8 at I.
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of the Board to do this was contested by the company, which then
made an application for prohibition to the Supreme Court to prevent
the rehearing.
Relief was granted by Hallett J.. The rather brief judgment,
which is bereft of any authority, seems to be based on two separate
grounds. First, the judge seems to hold that the only way a matter
can be reheard legitimately, without the filing of the application for
certification all over again, is where the applicant has sought and
been awarded mandamus to compel a rehearing in conjunction with
certiorarlto quash the original decision 10 or, implicitly, where the
judge has specifically remitted the matter back to the tribunal for
rehearing. 11 Secondly, he seems to be saying that the tribunal
should not be rehearing this matter again anyway.
•. . [Tihere is on the record a patent lack of support for the
Union ....
the application is now almost seven months old...
the Board's practice of requiring petitioners to attend . . .. is
onerous . . . .the expense of re-hearing this application that on
its face is likely to fail . . . the Board's persistence in processing
this application upon the avowed principle that12it is simply doing
its duty on the facts of this case is not credible.
This recital speaks to an absence of good faith on the part of the
Board and an abuse of its own processes.
Let me now deal with each of these reasons in turn.
Hallett J. referred to the apparent lack of authority in Nova Scotia
to support the right of the tribunal simply to proceed again on the
basis of the original application. 13 He then appeared to suggest that
the jurisdiction to deal with the application for certification was
exhausted by its initial decision.
duty and exercised the jurisdiction
The Board performed its 14
required of it under the Act.
10. Id. at 2

11. Id. at 1. He notes the refusal of Cowan C.J.T.D. to remit the matter back to the
Board for reconsideration. However, there is nothing in the judgment ot indicate
that he would have had any objection if the Chief Justice had in fact done this even
though mandamus was not sought in the original proceedings. I have discussed the
subject of this type of action in situations where mandamus is not sought in the first
of these surveys (supra, note I at 895-97), in discussing the decision of the Appeal
Division in Walker v. Keating (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 1; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (sub
nom. Re Walker and West Hants MunicipalSchool Board) (S.C., A.D.).
12. Supra, note 8 at 2-3
13. Id. at2
14. Id. It is interesting to contrast the decision in this case with that of Verchere J.
of the British Columbia Supreme Court in Re Lornex Mining CorporationLtd. and
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The absence of judicial or statutory authority to support the
Board's action should not, of course, be necessarily fatal given that
there is no authority- against resuming the proceedings. What,
therefore, was required was a consideration of the fundamental
nature of the remedy of certiorari. The historical procedure for
certiorari,' 5 and the one continued today in the new Nova Scotia
Rules of Civil Procedure, is for the record of the inferior tribunal to
be certified and sent to the reviewing court for scrutiny. ' 6 If one of
the available grounds for review is made out then the decision or
order is quashed.
Note that it is the decision or order that is quashed, not the
proceedings themselves. That this is so becomes clear when one
examines the role of certiorariin two situations. First, it is trite law
that when an order is given in excess of jurisdiction, the court may
in certain instances sever the offensive part of the order and quash
it, leaving the valid part intact. 17 Secondly, where a decision is
reviewed for non-jurisdictional error of law on the face of the
record, there is clear authority for the proposition that the tribunal
may reconsider the matter without a new application being filed.
Indeed, in R. v. Northumberland Compensation Appeal Tribunal,
Ex parte Shaw, ' 8 the English Court of Appeal decision which
Buklva (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 70-5; [1976] 5 W.W.R. 554 (B.C.S.C.), where he
held that thefunctus officio rule did not apply in certain situations to the decisions
of statutory tribunals where there was no right of appeal. The matter in question
could be reopened for the purpose of considering new evidence, even in the
absence of express statutory authorization. It also seems to be clearly accepted that
a tribunal can unilaterally reopen a matter if it realizes that the first decision was
vitiated by a failure to adhere to the principles of natural justice. See De Verteuil v.
Knaggs, [1918] A.C. 557 (P.C.) (Trin.); Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40 at 79;
[1963] 2 All E.R. 66 at 80-1 (H.L. (E.)); Posluns v. Toronto Stock Exchange and
Gardiner, [1964] 2 O.R. 547 at 659-70; 46 D.L.R. (2d) 210 at 322-33 (H.C.),
affd [1966] 1 O.R. 285 at 304-06; 53 D.L.R. (2d) 193 at 212-14 (C.A.), affd
[1968] S.C.R. 330 at 337-41; 67 D.L.R. (2d) 165 at 170-74 (though this was
admittedly in relation to a non-statutory tribunal); Leary v. National Union of
Vehicle Builders, [1971] Ch. 34 at 47-49; [1970] 2 All E.R. 713 at 718-20 (Ch.
D.). In contrast, however, see R. v. Development Appeal Board, Ex parte
CanadianIndustries Ltd. (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 727; 71 W.W.R. 635 (sub nom.
CanadianIndustriesLtd. v. Development Appeal Board of Edmonton) (Alta. S.C.,

A.D.).
15. See S. A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd. ed.
London: Stevens & Sons, 1973) at 337. See also 2 Chitty's GeneralPracticeof the
Law (1836) at 353-54.
16. See Rule 56.07
17. See de Smith, supra note 15 at 91-92 and 380
18. [1952] 1 K.B. 338; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122 (C.A.)
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"revived" review for error of law on the face of the record, there
are the following two statements by Denning L.J. (as he then was):
The King's Bench does not substitute its own views for those of
the tribunal, as a court of appeal would do. It leaves it to the
tribunal to hear the case again, and in a proper case may
command it to do so. 19
and
The decision must be quashed and the tribunal will
then be able to
20
hear the case again and give the correct decision.
Of course, if the reason for quashing the decision or order is that
the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or person
then the whole basis of the application is destroyed. However, this
is obviously not the case with intra-jurisdictional error nor would
there appear to be any reason in principle for distinguishing between
such errors and procedural deficiencies or excesses of jurisdiction in
fulfilling a correctly assumed jurisdiction. The quashing of the
decision in such cases does not affect the initial assumption of
jurisdiction or the original initiation of the matter.
What is also significant theoretically is that the quashing of the
decision or order means that there never in law has been a
completed exercise of the jurisdiction. The decision of the tribunal,
which seemed to deal with a matter finally, is for legal purposes a
"nothing", or nullity, after the quashing. Hence, the argument that
the jurisdiction is exhausted once a decision is made does not stand
up, given the effect of a judicial quashing.
It is true that mandamus is sometimes sought along with
certiorari;certiorarito quash a decision and mandamus to compel
its reconsideration in accordance with the law. 2 1 In this case,
however, the applicant for relief, the company, was scarcely likely
to seek mandamus. Its objective was almost certainly to avoid or
delay certification. Moreover, the purpose of seeking mandamus as
well as certiorariin such cases is to compel the tribunal to do its job
again - this time, correctly. This compelling remedy is scarcely
necessary given an obviously willing tribunal. Also, there is no
warrant in any of the cases for believing that mandamus, as well as
compelling the reconsideration of the matter, has the effect of
19. Id. at 347; [1952] 1 All E.R. at 127
20. Id. at 354; [1952] 1 All E.R. at 132
21. e.g. Battaglia v. Workmen's CompensationBoard (1960), 24 D.L.R. (2d) 21;
32 W.W.R. I (B.C.C.A.)
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restoring to life an otherwise exhausted original application which
was dealt with finally by the original tribunal decision. Mandamus
assumes the existence of a duty the performance of which has been
requested properly and which is presently due and owing. Without
an application presently existing in proper form there is simply no
basis for the grant of the remedy.
22
In the last of these articles, commenting on Walker v. Keating,
I commended the Appeal Division for adding
...a new and desirable dimension to the law of certiorari
by not
23
only quashing a decision but ordering its remission.
It was this which Cowan, C.J.T.D. refused to do in Little Narrows
Gypsum (No. 1). Why he refused, we are not told by Hallett J.
However, for the reasons stated above, I think a very strong
theoretical argument can be made for saying that his failure to do so
does not affect the right of the tribunal to proceed again on the basis
of the original application. Moreover, there are also practical
reasons for this. Persons who commence proceedings before
administrative tribunals should not be prejudiced by errors
committed by those tribunals in exercising their jurisdiction, at least
not to the extent of having to go to the time, trouble and expense of
recommencing the proceedings from scratch again. It makes much
more sense to salvage whatever can be salvaged from the original
proceedings once the ultimate decision or order has been quashed.
This has particular significance in the labour relations certification
process where the work necessary for the filing of an application is
considerable. Of course, allowing the good part to be salvaged and
the application to proceed means that the opponents of any
application will have to go through part of the process again but, in
many instances, they too may be saved inconvenience by not
insisting that the whole process be recommenced.
This, of course, leads into the second basis of Hallett J's
judgment; the assertion that the Board was in effect abusing the
powers conferred on it by the Trade Union Act in persisting in
rehearing this matter. Because of its intimate relationship with the
remedial issue, I will consider it here rather than in the section of the
article dealing with substantive law.
Nowhere, in the course of his decision does Hallett J.
22. (1973), 6 N.S.R. (2d) 1; 42 D.L.R. (3d) 105 (sub nom. Re Walker and West
Hants MunicipalSchool Board)(S.C., A.D.)
23. Supra, note I at 896

Administrative Law 473

characterize this basis of judicial review. However, what the
reasons stated by the judge amount to are an assertion that the Board
was using its powers for improper purposes by going ahead with a
hopeless application for certification.
Using statutory authority for improper purposes has always been
an accepted ground of judicial review. 24 However, recently there
has been some evidence of the emergence of a new ground on which
prohibition is available - abuse of process. 2 5 The original modem
proponent of this basis for review was Berger J. of the British
Columbia Supreme Court who in one case prohibited criminal
proceedings for abuse of process, which he also characterized as a
breach of the rules of natural justice. This was in context of a Crown
Prosecutor breaking a promise not to prosecute someone in return
for information. 26 The historical precedents cited for this as a
separate ground of review or as part of the rules of natural justice are
not convincing, 2 7 yet the arguments for its recognition are arguably
considerable.
24. See e.g. Roncarelli v. Duplessis [1959] S.C.R. 121; 16 D.L.R. (2d) 689;
Smith and Rhuland Ltd. v. The Queen, [1953] 2 S.C.R. 95; [1953] 3 D.L.R. 690;
107 C.C.C. 43
25. This can be related to the issues of substantive due process which I discuss
infra in dealing with the topic of review for inconsistency.
26. (1974), 22 C.C.C. (2d) 268 (B.C.S.C.). In fact the genesis of this ground of
review is to be found in one of his earlier decisions where the possibility was
considered and rejected on the facts. See Re Regina Croquet, [1972] 5 W.W.R.
285; 8 C.C.C. (2d) 241; 21 C.R.N.S. 232 (B.C.S.C.). On appeal in Croquet, the
majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal left this issue for further
consideration. See [1973] 5 W.W.R. 654; 12 C.C.C. (2d) 331; 23 C.R.N.S. 274
27. Abuse of process was not, of course, a novel argument as far as the criminal
process was concerned. What was somewhat unusual was the attempt to link it to
breach of the rules of natural justice and the availability of prerogative relief. Of the
authorities cited by Berger J.,the only one of any real assistance to the precise
matter in hand was the decision of R. ex re Fraserv. Halpin, [1933] 1 D.L.R. 781;
[1933] 1 W.W.R. 255; 59 C.C.C. 230 (Alta. S.C., A.D.), but, even there, relief
was refused. Since this note was first written, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada inRourke v. The Queen (1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193; 16 N.R. 181; [1977]
5 W.W.R. 487; 35 C.C.C. (2d) 129; 38 C.R.N.S. 268 (S.C.C.), has been reported
and the judgment of Pigeon J. (with whom Martland, Ritchie, Beetz and de
Grandpri J.J. concurred) seems to say quite clearly that the courts have no
jurisdiction, whether by way of certiorariprohibition or otherwise to stay criminal
proceedings regularly instituted for abuse of process. See 76 D.L.R. (3d) at 209; 16
N.R. at 185; [1977] 5 W.W.R. at 505; 35 C.C.C. (2d) at 145; 38 C.R.N.S. at 272.
Quaere whether this prevents the use of abuse of process arguments in any criminal
proceedings. Kenneth L. Chasse in an annotation at 38 C.R.N.S. 270-71 suggests
that the ratio of the case may be confined to stays of the whole proceedings rather
than the stay of interlocutory matters. Another possible argument is that the
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In the present context, however, the real question is whether,
whatever the theoretical basis for intervention, the reasoning of
Hallett J. in awarding prohibition on this ground is convincing. At
the outset, it must be noted that the courts are generally very
reluctant indeed to attribute bad faith or improper motives to a
tribunal. 29 Unlike an allegation of bias which depends upon
appearances to objective obeservers and which may be quite
unintentional on the part of the decision-maker himself, bad faith or
improper motives in the exercise of statutory authority constitutes
an extremely serious allegation against a statutory authority. It
connotes, in this context, that the Board is either deliberately out to
subject the company to procedures which it knows are doomed to
failure or, alternatively, that it intends to make an attempt to certify
this union by the use of any technicality it can against the real
wishes of the employees.
Most regrettably, the judgment provides little convincing
evidence that either of these things is true. Given the first issue that
decision simply relates to the oppressive initiation of proceedings as opposed to the
oppressive conduct or continuation of proceedings. Whether these represent
realistic distinctions or not, the decision has obviously thrown into considerable
doubt this emerging ground of judicial review and the use of the prerogative writs
for this purpose in the criminal law area. Outside of the criminal process, however,
it still presents a possible ground of review, supplementing the present
acknowledged authority of the courts to prohibit or enjoin proceedings for bad faith
or a reasonable apprehension of bias. It is also interesting to note that, before
Rourke, quite a lot of authority had sprung up in support of Berger J., both on the
issue of the availability of abuse of process arguments in relation to the criminal
process and, in some cases, on the availability of prerogative relief on that basis.
See the judgment of Laskin C.J.C. (with whom Judson, Spence and Dickson J.J.
concurred): 76 D.L.R. (3d) at 202; 16 N.R. at 194-95; [1977] 5 W.W.R. at 496; 35
C.C.C. (2d) 138; 38 C.R.N.S. at 282-83. See, however, Re Forrester & The
Queen (1976), 73 D.L.R. (3d) 736; [1977] 1 W.W.R. 681; 33 C.C.C. (2d) 221; 37
C.R.N.S. 320 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); Re Cariaand The Queen (1975), 29 C.C.C. (2d)
513 (B.C.S.C.); Re Stewart and The Queen (No. 2) (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 281 at
285 (Ont. C.A.), where Arnup J.A. expresses considerable doubt about the
availability of certiorarito control abuse of the criminal process, despite the
submission of a list of some seventy cases by counsel for the appellant applicant.
28. For example, if a prosecution or laying of an information is delayed unduly for
the sole purpose of making the defence more difficult, there is arguably room for
judicial enjoining of the continuation of those proceedings, irrespective of whether
they are still technically within the relevant statutory provisions, Interestingly, in
Rourke, id., Laskin C.J.C. was not willing to go as far as Pigeon J. and reject out
of hand the possibility of judicial intervention on the ground of abuse of process
constituted by this kind of delay. He also discusses at length the utility of the
concept of abuse of process in other contexts.
29. "Bad faith" as a ground of review is discussed by de Smith, supra, note 15 at
293-94.
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arose in this case, the facts as stated by the judge are equally
consistent with the Board thinking itself legally obliged to continue
to deal with the original application, even after the quashing of the
original certification order. Indeed, the Board may well have
suspected the company of trying to jeopardize and delay this
application for certification. Now, it may well be that there was
direct evidence before the Court to suggest that the Board was
acting for improper motives which the judge did not mention
specifically. Instead, all that he seems to rely upon to draw the
inference of improper motives is a set of facts which are susceptible
to an equally convincing alternative explanation. If there was no
other evidence, then clearly the Board should have been given the
benefit of the doubt on this issue and, if that evidence did exist, then
it deserved to be detailed and elaborated upon in the course of the
judgment instead of being present only by innuendo. Not to do this
is to fly in the face of a long-standing practice when such allegations
are made.
(b) Stay of Administrative ProceedingsPending JudicialReview or
Statutory Appeal
One of the arguments apparently made in Little Narrows Gypsum
(No. 2), to justify the Board's position was that an analogy could be
drawn between the ability of the tribunal to proceed with a matter,
notwithstanding that an application for review had been made to a
court, and the argument that a tribunal could rehear a matter on the
basis of the original application despite the quashing of its
decision. 30 Like Hallett J., I find the argument difficult to see.
However, it does lead conveniently into another remedial problem
which confronted the Nova Scotia courts in the period under review;
that of the ability of the courts to stay the proceedings of statutory
authorities pending judicial review or the exercise of a statutory
appeal right to the courts.
In 1963, Laidlaw J.A. in the Ontario Court of Appeal decision of
R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Ex parte Ontario Food
TerminalBoard, stated that, where a question of jurisdiction or pure
law was raised before a tribunal, the tribunal should cease its
consideration of the matter and allow it to be determined by a
court. 31 Whether this was intended as a statement of law or a piece
30. Supra, note 8 at 2
31. [1963] 2 O.R. 91 at 93; 38 D.L.R. (2d) 530 at 532 (C.A.)
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of advice to tribunals is not completely clear. However, whatever its
32
status, subsequent authorities make it clear that it is not the law
and, indeed, one case goes so far as to suggest that it is not part of
the role of the courts to give such advice to tribunals. 33 Such laying
down of guidelines was described by Arnup J.A., of the same
Court, as "not only unwise but unwarranted" because it related to a
matter over which the tribunal had been given exclusive jurisdiction
34
- its own processes.
This statement suggests that not only should tribunals not be
obliged to adjourn proceedings once an application for judicial
review is made but that the courts should not have any reviewing
power over the discretion of the tribunal to adjourn or not. Indeed,
in that case, Arnup J.A. went on to hold that the Ontario courts do
not have authority to grant stays of the proceedings of statutory
35
authorities pending judicial review.
Interestingly, the opposite conclusion was reached by Jones J. of
the Trial Division of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in 1974. This
recently-reported decision raises an important procedural issue and I
wish to discuss it from two viewpoints, first, the law relied upon by
Jones J. and, secondly, the policy considerations attaching to the
issue.
Canadian Automatic Sprinkler Association v. Nova Scotia
Labour Relations Board3 6 involved an application for the stay of
accreditation proceedings before the Nova Scotia Labour Relations
Board pending the disposition of an application for orders in the
nature of certiorariand prohibition. In reaching the conclusion that
he had jurisdiction to order a stay of these proceedings, Jones J.
32. See e.g. Re Cedarvale Tree Services Ltd. andLabourers' InternationalUnion
of North America, Local 183, [1971] 3 O.R. 832 at 838-42, particularly at 840; 22
D.L.R. (3d) 40 at 41-50, particularly at 48 (C.A.). Arnup J.A., delivering the
judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal in the case, referred particularly to the
judgment of McRuer C.J.H.C. in R. v. OntarioLabour RelationsBoard, Exparte
Taylor, [1964] 1 O.R. 173; 41 D.L.R. (2d) 456 (H.C.), affd [1964] 1 O.R. 270;
42 D.L.R. (2d) 320 (C.A.) (Note, in the light of the discussion of the status of
boards to argue before courts discussed, infra, it is interesting that Arnup J.A. had
no problem at all in allowing the Board to be heard on this procedural issue; [1971]
3 O.R. at 832; 22 D.L.R. (3d) at 46).
33. Re Cedarvale Tree Services, id. at 840-41; 22 D.L.R. (3d) at 48-9
34. Id. at 841; 22 D.L.R. (3d) at49
35. Id. at 842; 22 D.L.R. (3d) at 50. Quaere the effect of section 4 of the Judicial
Review ProcedureAct, S.O. 1971, c. 48. This provides for the grant of interim
relief pending the determination of an application for judicial review and clearly
has the potential to justify stays of administrative proceedings.
36. (1974), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 89 (S.C., T.D.)
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relied upon a provision in the Judicature Act and two precedents
allegedly upholding the inherent power of the courts to grant such
applications.

37

Section 38(8) of the Nova Scotia Judicature Act 38 provides as
follows:
The Court in the exercise of the jurisdiction invested in it in every
proceeding pending before it shall have power to grant and shall
grant either absolutely or on such reasonable terms and
conditions as to the Court seems just, all such remedies
whatsoever as any of the parties hereto appear to be entitled to in
respect to any and every legal or equitable claim properly brought
forward by them respectively in the proceeding so that as far as
possible all matters in controversy between the parties may be
completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal
proceedings concerning any of such matters determined.
There is no specific mention of a stay of proceedings in these
words. However, Jones J., while acknowledging that the section
seemed directed primarily towards the remedies that may be granted
on the disposition of an action, thought it broad enough to
cover stays of proceedings pending judicial review. 39 It is,
however, somewhat difficult to see this, particularly given the last
part of the section, starting with "so that". This seems to speak to
the final disposition of the matter putting an end to all aspects of the
dispute between the parties and, apparently, qualifies the rest of the
provision. Of course, an argument could be made in relation to an
application for prohibition that a stay is available because, if that is
not granted, the tribunal proceedings may be concluded by the time
of the hearing of the prohibition application. This would mean that
prohibition would no longer be available and certiorarito quash the
decision would have to be sought. In other words, a stay is arguably
necessary to allow the application for prohibition finally to
determine the matter and avoid further legal proceedings.
Interestingly, there is an almost identical provision in the Ontario
JudicatureAct 40 and this was not referred to by Arnup J.A. in Re
37. Id. at 90-92
38. S.N.S. 1972, c.2
39. (1974), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 89 at 91
40. R.S.O. 1970, c. 228, s. 18(8). Both sections are based on the English Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, s. 24(7), now Supreme Court
of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 &" 16 Geo. V., c. 49, s. 43. Note that 2
Tie Supreme Court Practice1966 (London: Sweet, Maxwell) states, at para. 3367,
that the section was designed to enable all divisions of the English High Court to
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Cedarvale Tree Services Ltd. and Labourers' International Union
of North America, Local 183, 4 ' the decision in which the Ontario
Court of Appeal decided that there was no authority in that province
for the granting of a stay of proceedings pending a judicial review
application. The authority cited for this was Re Holman & Rea, 4 2 a
1912 decision of the Ontario Divisional Court, and this in turn relied
on In re Miron v. McCabe, 43 an 1867 Ontario decision which
contrasted the specific English provision with the lack of any
express authority in Ontario.
Cedarvale Tree Services is not mentioned in Jones J.'s judgment.
However, he does refer in passing to another Ontario Court of
Appeal decision, 4 4 Talsky v. Talsky, 4 5 for the proposition that the

courts have an inherent power to issue such stays besides the
authority conferred by section 38(8). However, Talsky was
concerned with a different problem; the staying of further
proceedings pending an appeal from the High Court to the Court of
Appeal. All of the authorities cited for the proposition that the
courts have an inherent jurisdiction were in fact appeal, not review
situations. 4 6 Indeed, given that the judgment was delivered by
Arnup J.A., it is very difficult to argue that the Court intended to
overrule CedarvaleTree Services by implication.
The authority principally relied upon by Jones J. for the inherent

power of the court to grant such applications is even more seriously
open to question. This was the decision of the Saskatchewan Court
of Appeal in Blackwoods Beverages Ltd. v. Dairy Employees,
Truck Drivers and Warehousemen, Local No. 834.47 Here, a stay of
give all of the remedies that could be given by any other division

- not to create
new remedies.
41. [1971)3 O.R. 832; 22 D.L.R. (3d) 40 (C.A.)
42. (1912), 27 O.L.R. 432 at 439; 9 D.L.R. 234 at 237-38; 21 C.C.C. 1I at 15
(H.C.)
43. (1867),4 P.R. (Ont.) 171 at 177
44. (1974), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 89 at 92
45. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 148; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 516 (C.A.)
46. Id. at 151-54; 39 D.L.R. (3d) at 519-22. Those authorities are: Mitchell v.
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York (1917), 38 O.L.R. 543; 34 D.L.R. 22 (H.C.,
A.D.); Baldwin v. O'Brien (1917), 40 O.L.R. 287 (H.C.); Tinsley v. Toronto
Railway Co. (1908) 12 O.W.R. 511 and 581 (H.C.);Buxton v. Carriss(1958), 13
D.L.R. (2d) 671; 25 W.W.R. 225 (B.C.C.A.); Bassle Creek Toasted Corn Flake
Co. v. Kellogg Toasted Corn Flake Co. (1923), 55 O.L.R. 127 (H.C.)
47. (1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 529; 18 W.W.R. 481 (sub nom. Re Blackwoods
Beverages Ltd. and Dairy Employees, Truck Drivers and Warehousemen, Local
No. 834 (Man. C.A.)
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proceedings was granted pending the disposition of an application
for the quashing of a reinstatement order. However, rather than
being a case of the exercise of inherent powers, the Court relied
specifically4 8 on a provision in the Crown Procedure Rules of
Saskatchewan which makes the English Crown Office Rules
applicable if there is no equivalent Saskatchewan provision. 4 9 These
English rules did provide for stays 50 and there is no Nova Scotia
equivalent. That this is the basis for stays in Saskatchewan is also
made clear in the subsequent decision of R v. Board of Governors of
University Hospital, Exparte Marian.51
There is, however, some support for the position of Jones J. to be
found in the decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Hannon v.
Eisler,52 which Arnup J.A. refused to follow in Cedarvale Tree
Services. 53 This is not referred to by Jones J. but, in delivering
judgment, Coyne J.A. disagreed with Re Holman & Rea and said
that, even if it were not restricted to criminal charges, it did not
apply in Manitoba by virtue of an unnamed statute and the rule of
"implied, incidental and auxiliary powers". 54 This last statement
would seem to suggest the existence of an inherent power to grant
stays of proceedings.
Before turning to a discussion of the policy issues surrounding
this debate, let me deal with other possibilities for preventing the
continuation of proceedings pending judicial review and also
clarify, as far as possible, the position concerning appeals from
statutory authorities to the courts.
One method of obtaining a stay might of course be to seek an
interlocutory injunction. However, two problems raise themselves
here. Interlocutory injunctions are normally supplementary of an
action for an injunction 55 and there remains some considerable
48. Id. at 533-34; 18 W.W.R. at486
49. Then Rule46
50. R.S.C. Ord. 53, r. 1(5)
51. (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 324 at 328; 74 W.W.R. 55 (sub nom. Marian v. Board
of Governors of University Hospital) at 58-59 (Sask. Q.B.). On appeal this issue
was not dealt with. See (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 767; [1971] 1 W.W.R. 58 (Sask.
C.A.)
52. (1955), 62 Man. R. 442; [1955] 1 D.L.R. 183; 13 W.W.R. 565 (C.A.)
53. [1971 ] 30.R. 832 at 842; 22 D.L.R. (3d)40 at 50
54. (1955), 62 Man. R. 442 at 455; [1955] 1 D.L.R. 183 at 195; 13 W.W.R. 565

at 579
55. See e.g. Stein v. City of Winnipeg (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 223; [1974] 5
W.W.R. 484 (Man. C.A.); Jack's Enterprises Ltd. v. Saskatchewan Licensing
Commission (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 493 (Sask. Q.B.) rev'd on facts (1970), 17
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doubt as to whether an injunction can be sought, instead of
prohibition and certiorari, with respect to judicial or quasi-judicial
tribunals. 56 Secondly, the common law rule about not combining
prerogative and non-prerogative relief in the same proceedings
would seem to preclude the grant of such interlocutoryrelief where
the principal remedy being sought is prohibition or certiorari.57
Nevertheless, if the authority is not a judicial or quasi-judicial one,
the interlocutory injunction, as a supplement to seeking of an
injunction, is obviously a viable possibility. Furthermore, the
provisions of the 1972 Nova Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure,
allowing for the combining of all forms of relief in the one
proceeding, may well have opened up the possibility for the
obtaining of an interlocutory injunction even where the principle
58
relief being sought is prerogative in nature.
Where what is being sought is the restraining of execution of a
decision pending the hearing of an application for relief in the nature
of certiorari,prohibition is a possibility, provided the tribunal is not
consideredfiunctus officio. 5 9 However, this makes little sense in a
regime where there is no difference between the time that you have
to wait for the hearing of a certiorari application and that for
D.L.R. (3d) 370 (Sask. C.A.). See also Gourietv. Union of Post Office Workers,
[1971] 2 W.L.R. 310; [1977] 1 All E.R. 696 (C.A.), rev'd [1977] 3 W.L.R. 300;
[1977] 3 All E.R. 70 (H.L. (E.)), for a discussion on the availability of an
interlocutory injunction in declaratory proceedings. See MacLean v. Liquor
Licence Board of Ontario (1975), 9 0.R. (2d) 597; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 237 (Div. Ct.),
where an interlocutory injunction was given in proceedings, seeking declaratory
relief and damages.
56. See e.g. "B" v. Minister of Manpower & Immigration, [1975] F.C. 602; 60
D.L.R. (3d) 340 (sub nom. Re B and Commission of Inquiry re Department of
Manpower and Immigration); Hollinger Bus Lines Ltd. v. Ontario Labour
RelationsBoard, [1952] O.R. 366; [1952] 3 D.L.R. 162 (C.A.)
57. See I. Zamir, The DeclaratoryJudgment (London: Stevens & Sons, 1962) at
96; Klymchuk v. Cowan (1964), 45 D.L.R. (2d) 587; 47 W.W.R. 467 (Man.
Q.B.). See, however, Robert F. Reid, Administrative Law and Practice (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1971) at 400; National Indian Brotherhood v. CTV Television
Network Ltd. (No. 1), [1971] F.C. 127 (Interlocutory injunction sought without
objection as supplement to mandamus proceedings, through refused on the merits)
58. See Lord Nelson Hotel Ltd. v. City of Halifax (1972), 4 N.S.R. (2d) 753; 33
D.L.R. (3d) 98 (S.C., A.D.). The ramifications of this decision are discussed in
detail in David Mullan, the DeclaratoryJudgment: Its Place as an Administrative
Law Remedy in Nova Scotia (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 91 at 91-100.
59. For an interesting contrast on whether a tribunal is functus officio for the
purposes of prohibition, compare Sadique v. Minister of Manpower and
Immigration, [1974] 1 F.C. 719; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 131 (T.D.) with Kalicharanv.
Minister of Manpower and Immigration, [1976] 2 F.C. 123; 67 D.L.R. (3d) 555
(sub nom. Re Kalicharanand Minister of Manpower and Immigration) (T.D.).

Administrative Law 481

prohibition. Moreover as prohibition is a final remedy, depending
on the same grounds as certiorari,it is obviously the remedy to seek
initially without certiorari in a situation where prohibition
applications are dealt with more quickly than those for certiorari.
However, this possibility has raised itself in the context of the
FederalCourtAct 60 where, on at least one occasion, prohibition has
been sought from the Trial Division of the Court pending the
disposition of an application to the Federal Court of Appeal under
section 28 of the Act to review and set aside a decision. Wardair
CanadaLtd. v. C.T.C. 6 1 involved an attempt to prevent the C.T.C.
proceeding with a review hearing pending the determination of a
section 28 application. Walsh J. of the Trial Division noted that the
Federal Court Rules made no specific provision for the grant of a
stay and basically then 1held that prohibition could not be used to
make up for this gap iIn the Rules.6 2 He also held that, even if
prohibition was available in such cases, it was a matter of discretion
and that, in the circumstances, the C.T.C. Review Committee had
63
exercised its discretion to continue properly.
Subsequently, in Penner v. Representation Commission for
Canada, an interlocutory injunction was sought from the Trial
Division for the same purpose. 6 This time the denial of relief was
placed on a broader basis, namely, that as the award of an
interlocutory injunction involved at least some consideration of the
validity of the decision subject to the section 28 application it was
almost certainly precluded from Trial Division scrutiny by virtue of
section 28(3) which provides:
Where the Court of Appeal has jurisdiction under this section to
hear and determine an application to review and set aside a
decision of order, the Trial Division has no jurisdiction to
entertain any proceeding
in respect of that decision or order
65
[emphasis added].
60. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1
61. [1973]F.C. 597 (r.D.)
62. Id. at 602-03. See, however, the recent decision of Re Madden & The Queen
(No. 2) (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 385 (Ont. H.C.), where prohibition was granted to
stay criminal proceedings before a County Court Judge, pending the outcome of
certiorariand mandamus applications.
63. Id. at 603
64. [1977] 1 F.C. 147 at 149-50 (T.D.). See also Tsakiris v. Minister of
Manpower and Immigration (1977), 15 N.R. 224; 73 D.L.R. (3d) 157 (sub nom.
Re Ministerof Manpowerand Immigration and Tsakiris) (C.A.)
65. Note, Walsh J. also had the argument before him in the Wardair case but
decided not to rest his decision upon it. See [1973], F.C. 597 at 599 and 602
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This, of course, does not preclude the possibility of an interlocutory
injunction where the decision or proceedings in question are not
subject to exclusive, original Court of Appeal jurisdiction.
As far as statutory appeals are concerned, Rule 62.10 of the Nova
Scotia Rules of Civil Procedure would seem to open up the
possibility of an application to stay execution of a tribunal decision
or order pending the disposition, by the Appeal Division of the
Nova Scotia Supreme Court, of appeals from statutory authorities.
Rule 62 covers both appeals from other courts and "tribunal
appeals" and, unlike two other provisions in Rule 62, Rule 62.10
appears to make no differentiation between appeals from other
courts and appeals from tribunals. 66 A similarly broad interpretation
has in fact been given by the Ontario Court of Appeal to the Ontario
equivalent, R 506. This was in the decision of Re Occhipinti and
67
DisciplineCommittee of the OntarioCollege of Pharmacy.
Of course, not all statutory appeals in Nova Scotia are to the
Appeal Division.68 If the appeal is to the Trial Division, the
situation is a little less clear. Rule 62.01 defines "Court" to mean
the Appeal Division for the purposes of Rule 62. However, the
opening words of the Rule, "unless the context otherwise requires"
potentially opens up Rule 62.10 for application to statutory appeals
to the Trial Division. If not, the only other possibility rests in the
inherent power of the Court for which ample authority was given in
Talsky v. Talsky (No. 2), the Ontario decision of Arnup J.A.
referred to earlier. 69 Ontario Rule 506 did not apply here as the
issue was the power of the High Court of Ontario to stay one of its
own decisions pending an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.
On many occasions, when prohibition is sought, the statutory
tribunal will of its own motion call a halt to its proceedings pending
the disposition of the judicial review application. A typical example
66. See e.g. Rules 62.02, 62.03, 62.04, 62.07, 62.12

67. [1970] 1 O.R. 741 (C.A.). Note also section 25(1) of the Statutory Powers
Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 47. This provides that an appeal from a tribunal
coming under Part I of that Act to a court or other appellate tribunal operates as a
stay unless the appeal body otherwise orders. However, section 25(2) provides that
this provision does not apply to judicial review proceedings. Note, however,
section 4 of the JudicialReview Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c. 48, which allows for
interim relief (Supra, note 35)
68. See e.g. section 15, Boxing Authority Act, S.N.S. 1973, c. 3; section 35,
Medical Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 15; section 18, Public Accountants Act, R.S.N.S.
1967, c. 245
69. (1974), 1 O.R. (2d) 148; 39 D.L.R. (3d) 516 (C.A.)
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is provided in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Bell v.
Ontario Human Rights Commission. 70 There, Professor Tar71
nopolsky halted his inquiry under the OntarioHuman Rights Code
so that the courts could rule on whether or not he had jurisdiction
over the property which was the subject matter of the inquiry. There
are obvious reasons for doing this. If, in fact, there is no
jurisdiction, then to have proceeded will not only have been a waste
of the tribunal's time but also will have put the parties to
unnecessary expense and trouble.
In the OntarioFood TerminalBoard case, the justification for the
rule that the tribunal should stop was that tribunals really have no
authority to determine questions of law, including questions of
jurisdiction, so that, once an objection is raised, the proceedings
should halt till a superior court has cleared the right of the tribunal to
continue. 72 However, in Bell73 and in other cases, 74 the right of the
tribunal to come to at least preliminary or tentative conclusions even
on jurisdictional issues has been established clearly. Indeed, at
times the courts will -refuse to deal with an application for
prohibition because of a lack of timeliness or prematurity in the
proceedings. 75 In other words, even if a jurisdictional question is
raised, the courts may require a proper record before they will deal
with the issue and, particularly, if there are disputed facts, the
courts will await the tribunal's finding before adjudicating. This, of
course, suggests that at times tribunals also should recognize the
prematurity of an application for prohibition and refuse to stay
further proceedings, at least until such time as the reviewing court
70.
71.
72.
did

[1971]S.C.R. 756; 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1
Then S.O. 1961-62, c. 93
[1963] 2 O.R. 91 at 93; 38 D.L.R. (2d) 530 at 532 (However, Laidlaw J.A.
acknowledge their ability to make these findings provided no objection was

made).
73. [1971] S.C.R. 756 at 771; 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 16 (per Martland J., delivering
the judgment of the majority)
74. See once again Re Cedarvale Tree Services Ltd., [1971] 3 O.R. 832; 22
D.L.R. (3d) 40 (C.A.)
75. This is referred to in passing in Bell by Martland J. See [1971] S.C.R. 756 at
775; 18 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at 19, where he states that because a neat question of law in
an uncontradicted factual setting was before the Court, arguments of prematurity
were not available. However, it is clear that he would have decided differently if
there was conflicting testimony which the Board of Inquiry had not yet ruled upon.
See also Re Dilts and University of Manitoba Faculty Association (1973), 43
D.L.R. (3d) 401; [1974] 1 W.W.R. 22 (subnom. Dilts v. ManitobaLabourBoard)
(Man. C.A.)
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will be able to determine the jurisdictional issue on the basis of a full
record.
It is also clear, that applications for review are on many occasions
tactical, with delay of the administrative process the prime
consideration. If tribunals were obliged to halt their proceedings
every time an objection was made to their jurisdiction or
procedures, a very powerful weapon indeed would be placed in the
hands of those seeking to frustrate the particular legislative purpose
e.g. proper consideration of an application by a trade union for
certification as a bargaining agent under the Trade Union Act. For
this reason, particularly, there can be little doubt that the courts
have been right to leave the issue up to the discretion of the tribunal,
at least initially.
The real question, however, is whether that exercise of discretion
should be subject to judicial scrutiny, whether by way of an
application for a stay or otherwise. The general policy of Canadian
remedial law on this point is reflected in the availability of
interlocutory injunctions to stop a wide range of conduct pending
trial of the principle action. 76 The basis for the availability of this
relief makes a lot of sense. If a person has a primafacie arguable
case and would suffer irreparable damage if the interlocutory
injunction was not awarded then there would seem to be every
reason in sound policy for the protection of his interest. This is
particularly so if that interest outweighs the interests of others
involved and there can be some financial adjustment made for losses
suffered by others as a reuslt of the interlocutory injunction if the
principle action is eventually unsuccessful. While these considerations may not fit all that neatly into the context of administrative
tribunal decision-making, they certainly do suggest a basis for the
development of principles of court intervention. What are the costs
of delay? What is the likelihood of success of the application for
judicial review (or the statutory appeal, for that matter)? Is the
applicant acting in a bonafide manner?
To a limited extent, this kind of analysis can be seen in the
judgment of Jones J. in the Canadian Automatic Sprinkler
Association case. He refers to the lack of delay in the bringing of the
applications for prerogative relief and refers to the principle
76. See e.g. Asptogan Ltd. v. Laurence (1974), 10 N.S.R. (2d) 614 (S.C., A.D.);
Indal Ltd. and Brampton Aluminum Products Ltd. v. Halko (1976), 1 C.P.C. 121
(Ont. H.C.)
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applications as being meritorious, though without any
elaboration. 7 7 He then goes on to talk about the matter "materially
affect[ing] the rights of the applicant" and here the lack of
elaboration becomes most unfortunate. 78 In most cases, where
certiorari and prohibition are being sought, the rights of the
applicant are in issue. Indeed, it is sometimes asserted that they
must be, so that if this is all that is required, stays potentially could
79
be granted in every case and this would seem to go too far. Of
course, it may well be that there was evidence here of particularly
damaging consequences if a stay was not granted; a detriment which
outweighed all the interests of others involved. Unfortunately, we
are not told and I would suggest that without a proper judicial
development and articulation of principles in this area, this
otherwise legitimate development of the common law by Jones J.
could result in incredible confusion and inconsistency.
This same lack of sophisticated treatment of the topic emerges
from R. v. Board of Governors of University Hospital, Ex parte
Marian,80 a case involving the dismissal of a doctor from the hospital.
Here, it was suggested that it was the Court's duty to preserve the
applicant's rights till the application for certiorariwas dealt with,
the only qualification being one that was not met in that case - that
the applicant be acting bonafide and have an arguable case. 81 Once
again, however, there is no discussion of the actual balance of
convenience. What would the doctor in fact suffer if the stay was
not granted, particularly having regard to the fact that the decision,
if quashed, would be a nullity, meaning that he always was a
77. (1974), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 89 at 90
78. Id.
79. 1 refer here to the much-criticized but still used "rights" test of Atkin L.J. in
R. v. Electricity Commissioners, Ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee,
[1924] 1 K.B. 171 at 205 (C.A.). For a recent example of this, see Cluney v.
Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1975), 11 N.S.R. (2d) 256 (S.C., T.D.), commented
on in the first of these surveys, supra, note I at 899-902. This decision was
however reversed on appeal, 11 N.S.R. 247; 53 D.L.R. (3d) 468 (S.C., A.D.).
80. (1970), 13 D.L.R. (3d) 324; 74 W.W.R. 55 (sub nom. Marian v. Board of
Governorsof UniversityHospital) (Sask. Q.B.)
81. Id. at 328; 74 W.W.R. 55 at 59, citing Blackwoods Beverages Ltd. (No. 1)
(1956), 3 D.L.R. (2d) 529 at 533; 18 W.W.R. 481 at 486. Here, the stay was
refused because the court concluded that the function being exercised was purely
administrative and therefore not amenable to either certiorarior to arguments for
the application of the rules of natural justice (id. at 329-33; 74 W.W.R. at 60-65).
This was confirmed by the Court of Appeal: (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 767; [1971] 1
W.W.R. 58 (Sask. C.A.).
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member of the hospital entitled to his salary? 82 Were there any
interests of the hospital that deserved consideration?
The ability of the Nova Scotia courts to grant a stay in the
administrative process pending judicial review is basically a
desirable development in the law, albeit not one strongly supported
by either statute or precedent. What now remains is the
development of coherent criteria for deciding when relief of this
kind should be granted.
(c) Statutory Authorities - Their Status in Judicial Review
Applications and in Appeals Involving their Decisions
(i) Introduction
In Re Holman and Rea, a decision just discussed in the section on
stay of administrative proceedings, Middleton J. suggested that one
of the reasons for tribunals acceding to requests for stays of their
proceedings was that to do so was "more consistent with judicial
dignity". 83 He elaborated:
It would be more seemly for all tribunals charged with the
administration of justice to act in such a way as to avoid any
suspicion that the course adopted is in any way the result of
temper. 84.

This kind of thinking about the dignity and place of administrative
tribunals has also manifested itself recently in two Nova Scotia
decisions. At the end of the judgment of the Appeal Division in Re
City of Dartmouth,85 MacKeigan C.J.N.S. commented on the role
of counsel for the Public Utilities Board in that case which was an
appeal by way of case stated.
We should note our appreciation of the assistance rendered by
Mr. Duncan, counsel for the Board. I should gently suggest,
however, that our hearing him, and we could not have legally
refused to hear him, must not be construed as encouraging
Boards arid other tribunals to be separately represented by
counsel, except in a watching capacity, to defend the correctness
of their own decisions. Their independence and impartiality are
better protected and the Court more effectively assisted if, where
private parties may not adequately expose all aspects of the case,
82. Assuming, that is, that all his income came from salary. The paradigmatic case
is, of course, Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40; [1963] 2 All E.R. 66 (H.L. (E.)).
83. (1912), 27 O.L.R. 432 at 439; 9 D.L.R. 234 at 237; 21 C.C.C. 11 at 15 (H.C.)
84. Id.
85. (1976), 17N.S.R. (2d) 425 (S.C., A.D.)
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the public interest were represented on an adversary basis by
counsel for the Attorney General. A Board should not feel
compelled to support its own decision by separate counsel, any
more than should or do magistrates or judges when their
decisions come before us on stated case, certiorari, appeal or
otherwise. 86

Then, in Re Workmen's Compensation Board of Nova Scotia and
Treige, 87 Coffin J.A. had the following to say in refusing leave to
the Workmen's Compensation Board to appeal to the Appeal
Division from a decision of the Workmen's Compensation Appeal
Board:
There indeed seems something inherently wrong for a Board such
as this, which performs quasi-judicial duties, to act in an
adversary fashion to defend its decisions on appeal or, as here, to
try to reinstate its decision when it has been overruled by an
intermediate administrative tribunal. For the Board then to
prosecute or defend an appeal from its own decision seems
almost an incongruous as for a trial Judge or Magistrate to do so,
which, of course, would be unthinkable. 88
These statements raise three very closely related issues. First, can
an administrative tribunal appeal from the setting aside of reversal
of its decisions by either a superior court or, in the case of appeal,
by an appeal court or an intermediate tribunal? Secondly, what role
can an administrative tribunal play in appeal or review proceedings
in which it is a respondent or defendant? Finally, there is the issue,
suggested by MacKeigan C.J.N.S.'s judgment in the City of
Dartmouthcase, of the position of an administrative tribunal after it
has stated a case to a court. As with my discussion of stay of
proceedings I will first examine the existing law on these issues then
consider the policy issues which they raise.
(ii) Status of Tribunal as an Appellant
In Treige, the denial by Coffin J.A. of leave to appeal was couched
in the following terms.
The right of the [Board] to obtain leave to appeal has not been
established to my satisfaction and I would dismiss the
application. 89
86. Id. at 440
87. (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 693; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 246 (S.C., A.D. on leave to appeal)
88. Id. at 702-03; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 252-53
89. Id. at 702; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 252

single judge
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This suggests that the judge had not been shown sufficient reasons
to exercise his discretion in the Board's favour. However, the tone
of the rest of the judgment suggests quite clearly a rule of law that
the Board had no status to make such an appeal because it is not an
"aggrieved" person. 90
No Canadian authority is cited by the judge. Rather he relies
upon 9 ' a series of English cases generally involving English local
authorities endeavouring to appeal the reversal of their decisions by
summary jurisdiction courts. 9 2 To quote from S.M. Thio:
As the cases now stand, a local authority which has had its order
reversed, is not per se a 'person aggrieved' by the reversal.
However, if the reversal of the order casts a legal burden on the
local authority or reverses a legal obligation imposed on the latter
which was sought to be discharged through the order, the local
authority acquires the status of a person aggrieved' so as to be
entitled to appeal to the courts. 93
In terms of the exceptions stated by Thio, the award of costs by the
summary jurisdiction court has been held to be sufficient 94 as has
the court discharge of a council order directing a person to provide a
dustbin, which had the effect of reviving an implied obligation on
the part of the council itself to provide a dustbin as part of its
mandatory statutory duty to collect refuse. 95 Both these examples
seem somewhat artificial exceptions to the general rule. However,
coffin J.A. in Treige rejected what was a seemingly stronger
argument for the application of the exception namely, that the
increase of compensation awarded by the Appeal Board cast an
additional burden on the Board itself as custodian or trustee of the
Accident Fund which it administered. 96 This, according to Coffin
90. Id. at 698-702; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 249-52
91. Id. at 700-01; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 250-51
92. R. v. Nottingham Quarter Sessions, Ex parte Harlow, [1952] 2 Q.B. 601;
[1952]2 All E.R. 78 (Q.B.); R. v. London Sessions Appeal Committee, Exparte
Westminister City Council, [1951) 1 All E.R. 1032 (K.B.)
93. Locus Standi and Judicial Review (Singapore: Singapore University Press,
1971) at 225
94. Id. at 223, referring toR. v. Surrey QuarterSessions, Exparte Lilley, [1951] 2
K.B. 749; [1951] 2 All E.R. 659 (K.B.) This case is also referred to by Coffin J.A.
(14 N.S.R. (2d) at 701; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 251) as is another decision on this point:
R. v. Lancashire Quarter Sessions, Ex parte Huyton - with - Roby Urban
DistrictCouncil, [1955) 1 Q.B. 52; [1954] 3 All E.R. 225 (Q.B.)
95. Id. at 224, referring to R. v. Nottingham QuarterSessions, Ex parte Harlow,
[1952] 2 Q.B. 601; [1952)2 All E.R. 78. Coffin J.A. in fact acknowledges that this
case could help the Board's argument here. Indeed, it was raised by counsel for the
Board. (14 N.S.R. (2d) at 700; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 250)
96. (1976), 14N.S.R. (2d) 693 at 701; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 246 at 252
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J.A., "would be stretching the meaning of the cases beyond
reason". 97 Subsequently, he also stated that the Board, as a Crown
Agency, was perhaps in a somewhat different position from a
municipal authority because the Attorney-General was always
there, if only in theory, as the guardian of public interest. 98
Interestingly, about two months after the decision in Treige, the
Supreme Court of Canada dealt with this issue not in relation to an
appeal to the courts from the decision of an intermediate
administrative tribunal but rather in the context of an appeal by a
tribunal from the setting aside of one of its decisions by the Federal
Court of Appeal under section 28(1) of the FederalCourt Act.
This was the decision of a seven person court in Re Canada
Labour Relations Board and Transair Ltd. 99 There was already
Supreme Court of Canada authority for the proposition that a
tribunal could appeal an adverse order relating to its jurisdiction 10 0
and the issue in the case was what constituted jurisdictional error for
these purposes and indeed whether the right to appeal could be
extended further to non-jurisdictional errors of law.
Laskin C.J.C., who gave the majority judgment on the
substantive review issue, held that jurisdictional error included, as it
did in other contexts, breach of the rules of natural justice. 10
Moreover, he seemed to accept a general discretion on the part of
the courts to allow the tribunal to be heard on issues of
97. Id.
98. Id. at 703; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 253
99. [1977] 1 S.C.R. 722; 67 D.L.R. (3d) 421; 9 N.R. 181 (Laskin C.J.C.,
Martland, Judson, Ritchie, Spence, Pigeon and Beetz J.J.)
100. Labour Relations Board of Saskatchewan v. Dominion Fire Brick & Clay
Products Ltd., [1947] S.C.R. 336; [1947] 3 D.L.R. 1. This was also accepted by
the Ontario Court of Appeal in InternationalAssociation of Machinists v. Genaire
Ltd. and Ontario Labour Relations Board (1958), 18 D.L.R. (2d) 588; [1959]
O.W.N. 149 (sub nom R. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, Ex parte Genaire
Ltd.) Both these decisions are discussed by Laskin C.J.C. in Transairat 727-28; 67
D.L.R. (2d) at 424-25; 9 N.R. at 185-86 and also by Spence J. at 745-46; 67 D.L.R.
(2d) at 439; 9 N.R. at 203-04. It is significant that the Supreme Court of Canada in
the Dominion Fire Brick & Clay Products case seems quite clear that where
jurisdiction is concerned, that in itself is sufficient warrantfor allowing the tribunal
not only to defend but also to appeal agains an adverse decision. In such cases, the
award of costs against the tribunal by a reviewing or appellate court is in no way
determinative. See Kerwin J. (with whom Rinfret C.J. concurred) at 339; [1947] 3
D.L.R. at 2-3; Estey J. at 340; [194713 D.L.R. at 6-7.
101. [1977] 1 S.C.R. 722 at 728; 67 D.L.R. (3d) 421 at 424-26; 9 N.R. 181 at
185-88, with particular reference to Toronto Newspaper Guild v. Globe Printing
Co., [1953]2 S.C.R. 18; [195313 D.L.R. 561; 106 C.C.C. 225
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intra-jurisdictional law as well, particularly if they were linked with
a jurisdictional issue such as natural justice.1 0 2 As that was the case,
he was disposed to exercise his discretion favourably in this
0 3
instance. '
However, Laskin C.J.C. was in a minority on the procedural
issue, two members of the merits majority 10 4 siding with the merits
minority judgment delivered by Spence J. who held that not only
was the right to appeal confined to jurisdictional issues but that, for
these purposes, jurisdictional error did not include breach of the
rules of natural justice, whatever might be the position in other
contexts. ' 0 5 To allow the tribunal to argue about whether it had
fulfilled the requirements of natural justice "would not indicate the
impartiality of the Board or emphasize its dignity", by now a
familiar refrain in this area. 10 6 Actually, this reasoning contrasts
starkly with that of Laskin C.J.C. who said:
I do not regard the Board's participation as making it an
adversary party as if there were a lis between it and the
respondent Transair. Its counsel properly submitted to this Court
that the Board was seeking an elucidation of the scope of its
authority under its constituent statute, and it was to be expected
the questions at
that counsel would have to take a position 0on
7
issue if he was to be of any help to the Court. '
Of course, the decision in Transair does not resolve all
difficulties. If jurisdiction does not include natural justice, are there
any other matters now usually thought of as jurisdictional which are
excluded e.g. the tribunal asking itself or taking into account
irrelevant factors. ' 0 8 It also raises the question of the relationship
between appeals from judicial review and appeals from an
intermediate statutory appeal. Coffin J.A. seems to exclude any
possibility of a tribunal appeal in the latter situation, at least where
the intermediate appeal body is another tribunal rather than court.
102. Id. at 728; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 425; 9N.R. at 186
103. Id.
104. See the judgment of Beetz J. (id. at 756; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 448; 9 N.R. at
202). Pigeon J. concurred with Beetz J. (id. at 756; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 448; 9 N.R.
at 184). Only Judson J. concurred with Laskin C.J.C. on this issue (id. at 726; 67
D.L.R. (3d) at 439; 9 N.R. at 184
105. Id. at 747; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 439-40; 9 N.R. at 203-04
106. Id. at 747; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 440; 9 N.R. at 204
107. Id. at 730; 67 D.L.R. (3d) at 426; 9 N.R. at 188
108. See e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of
OperatingEngineers, Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425 at 435; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 at
344. See, however, notes 303-04, infra
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Can this be reconciled with Transair?Can any legitimate distinction
be drawn between the two situations? It is hard to think of any. Of
course, Coffin J.A. may simply not have considered the possibility
of such an intermediate appeal body having to resolve issues of
jurisdiction and, as a result, the ratio of Treige may arguably only
relate to appeals on the merits.
(iii) Status of Tribunal when Respondent or Defendant
In Transair, the following statement by Spence J. indicates that he
saw no difference between the role of an administrative tribunal as
appellant and its role as respondent or defendant:
The issue of whether or not a board has acted in accordance with
the principles of natural justice is surely not a matter upon which
the board, whose exercise of its functions is under attack, should
debate, in appeal, as a protagonist and that issue should be fought
out before the appellate or reviewing Court by the parties and not
by the tribunal whose actions are under review [emphasis
added] 10 9
Two months later, this seemed confirmed by another decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada (this time a nine person Court) again
involving the Canada Labour Relations Board but in the role of
respondent in an appeal against the refusal of judicial review. 110 De
Grandpr6 J. delivering the judgment of the Court held that the Board
really had no standing before the Court "inasmuch as the
jurisdiction of the Board as such has not been challenged". 1 1 '
However, it must be admitted that the second part of that same
sentence perhaps admits of the possibility of the Court in its
discretion agreeing to hear counsel for the Board:"

. .

. and counsel

appearing for the Board was not invited to address [the Court]". 112
The other interesting aspect of this case was that the issues of law
involved could quite easily have been rephrased in terms of the
Board having lost jurisdiction by asking itself the wrong question
but apparently this argument was not raised. 113
109. (1976), 67 D.L.R. (3d) 421 at 440; 9 N.R. 181 at 204. This was also the view
of Estey J. in Labour Relations Boardof Saskatchewan v. Dominion FireBrick &
Clay ProductsLtd., [1947] S.C.R. 336 at 340; [1947] 3 D.L.R. I at 6-7. See note
100, supra
110. Central Broadcasting Co. Ltd. v. Canada Labour Relations Board (1976),
67 D.L.R. (3d) 538; 9 N.R. 344 (S.C.C.)
111. Id. at 544; 9 N.R. at 35 2
112. Id.
113. The applicants in this case were seeking review under section 28 of the
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This disposition of the issue of the role of the tribunal as
respondent or defendant also served to confirm what Coffin J.A.
had said in Treige:
I leave aside matters where a board or Magistrate is questioned by
prerogative writ on purely jurisdictional matters and then must
appear or be represented before the reviewing Court. 114
In other words, where jurisdictional issues are involved the tribunal
as defendant or respondent can appear and take an active role. After
this, the only question perhaps left unresolved is the role of the
Board as respondent before an intermediate appeal tribunal but,
once again, there would appear to be no reason for differentiation.
(iv) Status of Tribunal Where Stating a Case
In Re City of Dartmouth,115 the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court was dealing with the hybrid situation of an appeal by
way of case stated. Each of the three questions of law directed to the
Court in the case stated was framed in terms of whether the Board of
Public Utilities "had authority" to do certain things. 1 16 Superficially anyway, that kind of question would seem to raise issues of
jurisdiction rather than intra-jurisdictional error of law. It so and, if
Transair and Central Broadcasting Co., the appeal cases, are
applied, then the Public Utilities Board would seem to have a clear
right to appear on the appeal and make submissions.
This, of course, was not contradicted by MacKeigan C.J.N.S. He
simply said that, while he could not legally refuse to hear counsel
Federal CourtAct, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1. The alleged basis of review was error of
law on the face of the record. Because there was no operative privative clause, it
was irrelevant for those alleging error whether these alleged errors were ones
affecting jurisdiction. However, they arguably were, at least in the sense of the
tribunal asking itself the wrong question. Indeed, that this was the basis in which
the case was argued is suggested strongly by de Grandpr6 J.'s reference to
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. InternationalUnion of OperatingEngineers,

Local 796 [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 and his statement that this case
did not come within the principles of Metropolitan Life (id. at 541; 9 N.R. at 349).
If true, this means that the plaintiff was arguing about a matter generally regarded
as jurisdictional (see notes 108, 303-04 and accompanying text) and, on the
Transairtheory, this should have given status to the Board. However, it is, I think,
too flimsy a basis for stating dogmatically that Central BroadcastingLtd. has
narrowed further the ambit of jurisdictional error for the purpose of the status of a
tribunal to appear and argue.
114. 14 N.S.R. (2d) 693 at 703; 72D.L.R. (3d) 246 at 253
115. N.R.S. (2d)425
116. Id. at 427
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for the Board, he did not think as a matter of practice that counsel
should be involved actively in the appeal. This "gentle" criticism
goes somewhat further than the Supreme Court of Canada which, in
the two appeal cases, made no suggestion that, even in cases raising
jurisdictional issues, it would be better if counsel for the Board was
not heard from.
The question of the role of a tribunal in a pure case stated
situation does not appear to have been considered recently, though it
is of interest that counsel for the National Energy Board took a
leading role in the case of In re CanadianArtic Gas Pipeline Ltd.,
both at the Federal Court of Appeal 1 7 and Supreme Court of Canada
levels. 118 This was the case in which the Board asked the Federal
Court under section 28(4) of the Federal Court Act whether its
chairman, Marshall Crowe, was disqualified from participating in
the pipeline inquiry because of a reasonable apprehension of bias. It
may well be that such active involvement would not have been
allowed had the proceedings been commenced after the decision in
Transair. The only possible distinction that could be made, I
suppose, is that there is less chance of the tribunal being perceived
to be other than impartial if it argues a case in court which the
tribunal itself has commenced than in a situation where it is
involved in proceedings commenced by one of the parties to a
hearing. However, this is somewhat artificial. For example, in the
Crowe case, the application by the Board was made to avoid the
possibility of those objecting to Crowe's presence seeking
prohibition or waiting till the hearing was over and applying to set
the decision aside. In other words, the application was forced by
some of the parties if not technically commenced by them.
(v) What Should the Law Be?
First, there does not appear to be any reason for differentiating
between the tribunal as stater of cases, appellant or
respondent/defendant. If it has a legitimate interest to protect by
appearing and arguing before a court, the legitimacy of that interest
should not really be affected by the context in which it is necessary
to pursue that interest. For example, if one admits that a tribunal has
117. [1976] 2 F.C. 20; 9 N.R. 150 (sub nom. Committee for Justice andLiberty v.
National EnergyBoard); 65 D.L.R. (3d) 660 (C.A.)
118. 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716; 9 N.R. 115 (both sub nom. Committee for Justice and
Liberty v. NationalEnergy Board(S. C.C.)
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the right to defend its jurisdiction as defendant or respondent in a
lower court, then it makes little sense to deny it the right to appeal
and appear if the lower court rules against it. To accept this is in a
way to treat the tribunal as a second class litigant. The contradictory
nature of such a rule is also borne out when it is realized that if the
first instance court rules in favour of the tribunal's jurisdiction, the
tribunal will in fact be able to appear before the appeal court should
the applicant appeal.
If this is accepted, then it comes down to a question of the type of
orders or issues that tribunals should be able to argue about.
Unfortunately, aside from appeals to the need for tribunals to appear
impartial and retain their dignity as quasi-judicial or judicial bodies,
there has been no close analysis of the issues that are involved here.
At base, the question has to be whether the tribunal is able to
contribute anything to the satisfactory resolution of issues that are
raised in review applications, on appeal or in proceedings by way of
case stated and the answer to that question seems fairly obvious.
The tribunal in most instances is going to be far more familiar with
its empowering statute and its history and purposes than the
reviewing court. It is also going to be far more familiar with the
legal issues that confront it in its day to day activities. As a result,
its explanation of why it assumed jurisdiction in a particular matter
or why it has given a section of its empowering Act a certain reading
is likely to be extremely useful to the court, if that court wants to be
able to perform its task in as informed a manner as possible. The
same is also obviously true of situations where procedural
unfairness is alleged. Given the flexibility of the rules of natural
justice and the search that is involved in trying to strike a balance
between the demand of those affected for procedural protections and
the tribunal's legitimate concern for efficient, effective decisionmaking, it surely seems incumbent on the court to allow the tribunal
to explain why certain procedures have or have not been adopted.
Of course, it might be argued that the tribunal can protect its
position by giving adequate reasons for all of its decisions but this
assumes that the issues raised before courts subsequently will all be
ones that the tribunal itself has had to confront and rule upon. While
this assumption will usually be correct in relation to the merits of the
matter and issues of law within the merits, it will certainly not
always be true of issues of jurisdiction and procedural fairness.
Frequently, these will not be raised at the tribunal hearing. In fact,
they may not even have been perceived at that time. The argument
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also assumes that the tribunal will always have time to give full
reasons for its decisions and this is not necessarily true either.
Moreover, in some situations, the reasons of tribunals, while
making sense to those involved in the process, may only be fully
comprehensible by an outsider when examined against the
background of extensive information about the statutory context and
past precedents and practices of the tribunal. In other words, what
may be full reasons for those who are parties to the decision may not
be for an outsider, such as a reviewing court, and to expect
administrative tribunals to always write their decisions for the
benefit of outsiders and particularly with regard to the possible
subsequent involvement of a reviewing court would be to decrease
the efficiency of the tribunal's work.
There are, however, occasions on which involvement by the
administrative tribunal other than nominally in subsequent judicial
proceedings would seem to be inappropriate. A clear example is
afforded by cases where matters of partiality or bad faith on the part
of the tribunal are alleged. Allegations of a lack of objectivity
because of concern with the actual or apparent state of mind of
the members of a tribunal are fairly obviously of a different order
than allegations of lack of jurisdiction, error of law or procedural
unfairness and, in such cases, whether, by virtue of a rule of law or
simply wisdom, it would seem better for the tribunal not to take an
active role. To assert vigorously no lack of partiality may have the
tendency to increase everyone's apprehensions about the tribunal's
partiality.
The cases in this area also fail to make any differentiation
between various types of tribunal. Instead, all judicial or
quasi-judicial tribunals tend to be equated with inferior courts and,
just because inferior courts do not appeal against reversals of their
decisions or contest appeal and review proceedings directed against
them except where jurisdiction is involved, it seems to be assumed
that tribunals should not do so either. However, inferior courts not
only exercise types of jurisdiction that superior courts are generally
familiar with but typically they are also dealing with disputes
involving a plaintiff and a defendant or a prosecutor and defendant
and applying reasonably well-defined legal principles. Now, there
are administrative tribunals that do that kind of thing and thus, for
example, it may be quite inappropriate for a disciplinary tribunal to
take an active role on an appeal to the courts from the merits of its
decisions. Normally, there will be a prosecuting authority who will

496 The Dalhousie Law Journal

be there to defend the finding of guilt. But this argument of judicial
dignity and impartiality and comparison with ordinary inferior
courts bears little or no relation to an administrative tribunal charged
with the development and implementation of policies under a very
broad statutory framework. In such cases, there would seem to be a
very good case for the tribunal to be able to defend even the merits
of its decisions in subsequent judicial proceedings.
In the two Nova Scotia decisions, the judges refer to the office of
the Attorney-General and suggest that the Attorney-General is the
proper person to make arguments on behalf of the public interest not the Board itself. 119 In particular, it seems to be suggested in the
Treige case that the Board's position could have been protected by
the launching of an appeal by the Attorney-General in the exercise
of his inherent rights. Such suggestions would seem to make a
charade out of this whole matter. If Mr. Duncan, a lawyer with the
Attorney-General's Department, as well as counsel to the Public
Utilities Board, had appeared in the City of Dartmouth case in his
former rather than his latter capacity, would that really have made a
substantial difference? If, in Treige, the Workmen's Compensation
Board had requested the Attorney-General's Department to launch
an appeal rather than doing so itself, would that have made a
substantial difference? It can be argued that the Attorney-General's
office is theoretically in a neutral position in relation to the Board
and it is always better to have the Board represented by independent
counsel rather than personally arguing its own cause but surely the
Board itself can instruct someone other than its own lawyer. The
position of the Attorney-General really only serves as a
smokescreen to the real issue. Should administrative boards be
entitled to have representation at court proceedings involving their
decisions and contest judicial review applications and statutory
appeals on a proper adversary basis?
Too often, complaints are heard about the insensitivity of courts
to the needs of the administrative process and the statutory context
in which that process has been developed. The formulation of a rule
which circumscribes the extent to which administrative tribunals
can appear and argue in court can only further that lack of
understanding, particularly as the number of statutory authorities
119. Re City of Dartmouth (1976), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 425 at 440; Re Workmen's
CompensationBoardof Nova Scotia and Treige (1976), 14 N.S.R. (2d) 693 at 703;
72 D.L.R. (3d) 246 at 253
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continues to proliferate. The tribunal's point of view deserves to be
put in virtually every case and put in a true adversary framework.
(d) JudicialReview in the Face of a Statutory Appeal
Statutory appeals, either to the courts or to intermediate
administrative tribunals, have been the focus of a perhaps surprising
number of significant cases in recent months in Nova Scotia. Yet
when one realizes that much of the courts' involvement with the
administrative process is in the context of statutory appeals it
appears that the only surprising thing about the amount of recent
litigation of this kind is that it took such matters so long to become
prominent in the law reports. I have already looked at two problems
relating to statutory appeals in this survey; 1 20 notably, the power of
the courts to grant a stay of proceedings pending the disposition of
an appeal and the status of the administrative tribunal itself before
the appellate body. However, in the period under review, the Nova
Scotia courts were also concerned with two of the more traditional
issues relating to statutory appeals - the availability of traditional
judicial review where there is a statutory appeal and the room for
intervention that exists by virtue of such appeals. The first issue will
be dealt with here and the second in the section on substantive law.
Re Burgess and Storage Transport Ltd. 12 1 involved an
application for an order in the nature of certiorariwith respect to a
decision of the Public Utilities Board in a motor carrier licensing
matter and one of the preliminary points that the trial judge,
Morrison J., had to consider was the effect of section 97 (1) of the
Public Utilities Act. 12 2 This provides:
An appeal shall lie to the Appeal Division of the Supreme
Court from any order of the Board upon any question as to its
jurisdiction or upon any question of law, but such appeal can be
taken only by permission of a judge of the said Court, given upon
a petition presented to him within fifteen days after the rendering
of the decision and upon such terms as the judge may determine.
It has not been the general practice of the Canadian courts to
refuse to consider the grant of a judicial review remedy when there
is a statutory right of appeal. 12 3 Indeed, in a number of contexts,
120.
121.
122.
123.
(3d)

Supra, at
and
(1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 258
See e.g. Re Elliott & Governorsof University ofAlberta (1973), 37 D.L.R.
197; [1973] 4 W.W.R. 195 (Alta. S.C., T.D.); Re McGavin Toastmaster Ltd.
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this attitude is easily supportable. For example, where the statutory
appeal is by way of trial de novo or rehearing it may not make much
sense to compel an affected person to use that route to have a typical
judicial review issue, such as natural justice, error of law or
jurisdiction, determined. 124 In such cases, judicial review will
almost certainly provide a more convenient and expeditious method
of determining the question than would the statutory appeal, which
is essentially designed for a complete reconsideration of the merits.
However, where the statutory appeal provision itself speaks
specifically to typical judicial review issues, it would seem to
indicate quite clearly that the legislature intended the courts'
intervention to be by way of statutory appeal rather than by judicial
review.
Section 97 of the Public Utilities Act is obviously such a
provision in that it speaks to questions of law and jurisdiction as
being the scope of the appeal provided. Significant also are the
leave and time-limit provisions of the section, as well as the fact that
the right of appeal is not to the Trial Division of the Supreme Court
but to the Appeal Division. All these features of the section give the
impression of a carefully thought out exclusive code for the scope of
judicial scrutiny of the proceedings of the Public Utilities Board.
The decision of the Appellate Division of the Alberta Supreme
125
Court in Re Chad Investments Ltd. in fact supports this approach.
There, the court was dealing with a similar statutory regime and an
attempt to secure judicial review by way of certiorari in
proceedings commenced after the limitation period for the statutory
& Poivlowski (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 370; [1972] 6 W.W.R. 643 (Man. Q.B.),
affd 37 D.L.R. (3d) 100; [1973] 5 W.W.R. 388 (Man. C.A.); R. v. Spalding,
[1955] 5 D.L.R. 374; 16 W.W.R. 157 112 C.C.C. 96; 22 C.R. 98 (B.C.C.A.); Re
Canadian Pacific Transport Ltd. and Loomis Courier Services Ltd. (1976), 72
D.L.R. (3d) 434; [1977] 1 W.W.R. 629 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Venables, Ex parte
Jones (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 355; 75 W.W.R. 354 (sub nom. Re Application of
Hooker Chemicals (Nanaimo)Ltd.) (B.C.S.C.)
124. On this point, see particularly the judgment of Hall J.A. in Re McGavin
Toastmaster, id. at 118; [1973] 5 W.W.R. at 407. A further consideration may be
the notion that, in the absence of a provision authorizing specifically appeals in
questions of jurisdiction, an appeal on a question of law does not include such an
appeal. "An error of jurisdiction makes the decision a nullity and you cannot
appeal from a nullity" or so the argument goes. This argument is discussed later.
See notes 297 and 298 and accompanying text
125. (1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 627; [1971] 5 W.W.R. 89 (Alta. S.C., A.D.). See
also Trach v. Bierschenk, [1971] 2 W.W.R. 79 and Re Witfing (1962), 32 D.L.R.
(2d) 477; 37 W.W.R. 612; 37 C.R. 319 (Sask. C.A.)
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right of appeal had elapsed. McDermid J.A. delivered the judgment
of the Court denying relief:
It is a wrongful exercise of judicial discretion, unless there are
special circumstances, to grant an order of certiorariwhere the
Farty aggrieved has been given an effective right of appeal
emphasis added] which the party has not taken advantage of and
which has expired. I think this is supported by the majority of the
authorities
Here the Legislature has given the right of appeal upon a
question of jurisdiction or law, but has provided that application
for leave must be made within 30 days after the making of the
decision, and that the Appellate Division shall hear the appeal as
speedily as possible. Under the Alberta Rules of Court an
application for certiorarimust be made within six months of the
decision. To grant certiorariin a situation such as this would, in
effect, circumvent the clear intention of the Legislature
that time
126
is a critical and important factor in planning matters.
Though McDermid J.A. related this part of his judgment to an
allegation of error of law on the face of the record, the reasons he
advances seem just as relevant with respect to allegations of
jurisdictional error. Moreover, the legislature's preference for a
limited right of appeal would seem just as pertinent during the thirty
days in which leave had to be sought as in the period after that time.
In Burgess, Morrison J. referred to 1 27 the Chad Investments
decision 128 but then indicated that when issues of jurisdiction are
involved he was more inclined to favour the availability of
29
certiorari,notwithstanding an unexercised statutory appeal right. '1
Presumably, his preference for this result is conditioned by a
concern that the important issue of jurisdiction should not be kept
away from the courts by a shorter than normal limitation period and
that the access of affected individuals to the court should not be
dependent on the grant of leave. Yet, in the last analysis, such a
result would seem to fly in the face of legislative intention and, if
so, is only supportable if there is in existence an overriding power of
review for jurisdictional error by the courts, an argument of highly
contentious constitutional validity. 130 What the result also speaks to
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 631; [197115 W.W.R. at93
(1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at 236
(1971), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 627; [1971] 5 W.W.R. 89 (Alta. S.C., A.D.)
(1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at 237-38
For recent discussions of this issue, see P. W. Hogg, Is JudicialReview of
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is the need for greater legislative clarity on the point. As with
traditional privative clauses, only the clearest possible language will
normally suffice to convince the courts that their traditional review
powers have been circumscribed legislatively.
Interestingly, however, Morrison J. did not base the existence of
a discretion to grant judicial review in the face of the appeal
provision entirely on this point. He also relied on' 3 ' the uncertainty
as to whether or not section 97(1) of the Public Utilities Act applied
to appeals from the Public Utilities Board exercising jurisdiction
under the provincial Motor Carrier Act and the federal Motor
Vehicle Transport Act.' 32 This point had been raised but not
determined in an earlier case'33 and Morrison J. made a plea that the
matter be decided on a reference to the Appeal Division by the
Public Utilities Board,' 34 though legislative clarification would
appear to be a more satisfactory way of determining the problem.
Presumably, this ground for considering the grant of certiorari
would have made some sense even if there was a general principle
that statutory appeal provisions with respect to law and jurisdiction
prevail over the availability of judicial review. Lack of legislative
clarity as to whether the appeal provision applies to a particular
situation should not prejudice affected persons and, given a
reasonable doubt as to the effect of the section, the applicant for
judicial review should not be gainsaid. In fact, the best approach for
the court to take in such cases would seem to be to allow the
application for judicial review to proceed but at the same time to
make a ruling on whether the appeal provision governs such
situations, that ruling to have prospective effect only on the right to
seek judicial review.
It is interesting, however, to contrast Re Burgess TransportLtd.
with the subsequent decision of the Appeal Division in Hatt v.
Hebb' 3 5 on this question of the availability of judicial review in the
Administrative Action Guaranteedby the British North America Act (1976), 54
Can. B. Rev. 716 and H. W. Arthurs, "The Dullest Bill": Reflections on the
Labour Code of British Columbia 280 at 329-39. However, see W. R. Lederman,
"The Supreme Court of Canada and the CanadianJudicialSystem in (1975), 13
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada, Series 4 at 221-24 and J. N. Lyon,
Note (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 465
131. (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at 236 and 238
132. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 190 and R.S.C. 1970, c. M-14
133. Re Hartlen'sPetroleum Transport Ltd. and Eastern Transport Ltd. (1964),

49 D.L.R. (2d) 83 at 87 (N.S.S.C., T.D.)
134. (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at 236
135. (1977), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 346 (S.C., A.D.)
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face of a statutory right of appeal. This case involved an attempt by
the appellant to secure mandamus to compel the Registrar of the
Court of Probate to grant letters of administration. There was some
doubt expressed about whether the Registrar had a discretion in this
matter 3 6 and, of course, if he did, mandamus would be an
inappropriate remedy since, except in the rarest of cases, it is not
available to compel the exercise of a discretion in a particular
way. 137 However, in a very short judgment affirming MacIntosh J's
denial of relief in this case, the Appeal Division preferred not to
deal with the case on this basis. 13 8 Rather, they held that mandamus
was not available because of the existence of a statutory right of
appeal under the Probate Act. 13 9 In doing so, they quoted from
MacIntosh J's judgment to the effect that "the granting of the
remedy of mandamus is discretionary and may be refused because
of another no less convenient and effective remedy such as an
140
appeal".
The existence of such a discretion with respect to the remedy of
mandamus is clearly supported by the authorities. 14 1 However, it
serves to point out an anomalous aspect of the present law with
respect to statutory appeals and their relationship with judicial
review. On the basis of Re Burgess TransportLtd., if the Registrar
had wrongly assumed jurisdiction, his decision could have been
quashed in certiorariproceedings, notwithstanding the existence of
a statutory right of appeal. However, reverse the situation and have
a wrongful declining or refusal of jurisdiction and the statutory right
of appeal has to be utilized. Surely, it would make more sense to
deny the prerogative remedy in each instance as long as the exercise
of the right of appeal is "no less convenient and effective". Beyond
this, of course, there may also be situations, as arguably in Re
Burgess Transport Ltd., where irrespective of questions of
136. Id. at347
137. Only in situations where there are but two courses of action open to a
particular decision-maker and to take one would be an exercise of power that would
be subject to review for abuse of discretion. See e.g. Padfield v. Minister of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, [1968] A.C. 97; [1968] 1 All E.R. 694 (H.L.

(E.))
138.
139.
140.
141.

(1977), 18N.S.R. (2d) 346 at 347
Id. at 347-48
Id. at 347
See de Smith, supra, note 15 at 502-03. However, as de Smith notes,

mandamus has in fact issued on many occasions despite the existence of a statutory
right of appeal
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convenience and effectiveness, the statutory appeal provision is
obviously intended to be the exclusive method of questioning a
tribunal's proceedings.
(e) ProceedingsAgainst the Crown Act -Scope
When the issue of the legality of action taken under a statute is
raised, the appropriate remedy to seek will often be a declaratory
judgment against the Attorney General. The Attorney General is
generally regarded as an appropriate person to name as defendant
when the Crown itself is being sued. 142 Furthermore, many
agencies of the Crown are not made suable entities by their
empowering statutes and, while the possibility exists that they will
be held to be suable by implication, the safer course is to sue the
4 3
Attorney General instead. 1
Thus, in two recent cases, MacNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of
Censors'4 4 and Bedford Service Commission and Cunningham v.
Attorney General of Nova Scotia, 145 the Attorney General, along
with others, was named as defendant in the first instance in a case
involving a challenge to the validity of legislation and, in the
second, in relation to the legality of certain government action over
the establishment of a rubbish dump.
In both cases, however, it was argued that the Nova Scotia
Proceedings Against the Crown Act 14 6 applied and that section 17
of that statute, requiring two months notice in writing of a
142. See the judgment of Hogg J. in Greenlees v. Attorney-General for
Canada[1945]O.R. 411 at 430; [1945] 2 D.L.R. 641 at 659 (H.C.). See also the
general discussion of the availability of declaratory relief against the Crown in P.
W. Hogg, Liability of the Crown (Melbourne: The Law Book Co., 1971) at 18-22
143. See the discussion of this in "B" v. Department of Manpower and
hnmigration [1975] F.C. 602; 60 D.L.R. (3d) 339 (sub norn. Re B and Commission
of Inquiry re Department of Manpower and Immigration) at 614-16; 60 D.L.R.
(3d) at 349-51 (T.D.). For the test as to whether a Crown agency is suable, see
MacLean v. Liquor Licence Board of Ontario (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 597 at 602-07;
61 D.L.R. (3d) 237 at 242-47 (D.C.)
144. (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 506; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 259 (sub nom. Re MacNeil v.
Nova Scotia Board of Censors) (S.C., T.D.), aff d (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 483; 53
D.L.R. (3d) 259 (S.C., A.D.), affd [1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (sub norn. Nova Scotia
Board of Censors v. McNeil); 5 N.R. 43; 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632; 12 N.S.R. (2d) 85.
In fact, in the Supreme Court of Canada, the issue was not dealt with directly,
Laskin C.J.C. saying that it was not serious enough to merit consideration: [197612
S.C.R. at 267; 5 N.R. at 44; 55 D.L.R. (3d) at 633; 12 N.S.R. (2d) at 86
145. (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 (S.C., T.D.). The decision in this respect was not
appealed. See (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 132; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 639 (S.C., A.D.)
146. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 239
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contemplated action against the Crown, had not been complied
with. These preliminary objections, of course, raised the question of
what constitutes "proceedings against the Crown" for the purposes
of the Nova Scotia statute.
Superficially, the Act would seem to constitute a complete code
for situations in which the Crown in right of Nova Scotia is being
sued. This is particularly emphasized by section 24(1) which
provides:
Except as provided in this Act, proceedings against the Crown
are abolished.
Nevertheless, in both cases, the Nova Scotia courts read the term
"proceedings against the Crown" narrowly. The starting point in
both instances was an examination of the ambit of the Act,
particularly as set out in sections 3 and 4.147 From these sections, it
is clear that the main purpose of the statute is to provide a method by
which the Crown in right of Nova Scotia could be sued in contract,
tort or in relation to property claims. In most jurisdictions this type
of legislation was intended to replace the previous cumbersome
Petition of Rights procedure and, to a large extent, this explains
provisions such as section 24(1). Nova Scotia, however, did not,
prior to the enactment of the Act in 1951, have even a Petition of
Right procedure and, as explained in Hart J's judgment in MacNeil,
the difficulties in the way of suing the Crown in contract and tort
were immense. 148 Against this background, the Act can be seen as
fulfilling a particular need and not as affecting a situation where the
Attorney General is named as a defendant in proceedings which
question the validity of action taken under a statute by the Crown or
one of its agents.
This is confirmed by the availability in other jurisdictions of
declaratory relief against the Attorney General as representative of
147. McNeil: See 9 N.S.R. (2d) at 508; 46 D.L.R. (3d) at 262 (S.C., T.D.); 9
N.S.R. (2d) at 487-88; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 262-63 (S.C., A.D.). Bedford Service
Commission: See 18 N.S.R. (2d) at 159. This section provides as follows:Subject to this Act, a person who has a claim against the Crown may enforce it
as of right by proceedings against the Crown in accordance with this Act in all
cases which;
(a) the land, goods or money of the subject are in possession of the Crown; or
(b) the claim arises out of a contract entered into by or on behalf of the Crown;
or
(c) a claim is based upon liability of the Crown in tort to which it is subject by
this Act.
148. 9 N.S.R. (2d) at 508; 46 D.L.R. (3d) at 262

504 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the Crown outside of the Petition of Right procedures. The
authorities are outlined in judgment of MacDonald J.A. in the
Appeal Division decision in MacNeil14 9 and most rely on the 1911
English Court of Appeal decision in Dyson v. Attorney General,150
where a declaration of right was granted with respect to demands
made by the Commissioners of Finance. The statutory basis for the
grant of relief in this case was what was then Order 25, rule 5 of the
Rules of the Supreme Court:
No action or proceeding shall be open to objection, on the ground
that a merely declaratory judgment or order is sought thereby,
and the Court may make binding declarations of right whether
any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not. 151
The Nova Scotia equivalent is today Rule 5.14 of the Civil
Procedure Rules.
Given this great weight of authority which supports the existence
of a separate cause of action, coupled with the obviously narrow
ambit of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act, the Nova Scotia
courts were quickly persuaded in both cases that the Act was not
intended to abolish this possibility by a sideswipe. In many ways,
this is highly desirable as there is no purpose to be served generally
in trying to fit legislation into a context for which it is not designed.
This is also confirmed by a consideration of the seeming reasons
for requiring two months' notice of intention to commence an action
against the Crown. Such provisions, which obviously give the
Crown a favoured position over other defendants, are generally
designed to give the Crown forwarning of a potential civil suit so
that evidence can be preserved. They ensure against a situation
where the claim is commenced but the writ not served in the hope
that defending the cause of action will thereby become more
difficult because of a lack of reasonably early notice. However, this
rationale, bears little relation to a situation where someone is seeking
a declaration as to the invalidity of action taken under a statute.
As in Dyson, such actions will often be in response to a demand
made by the Crown. Generally, the person affected will be
149. 9 N.S.R. (2d) at 489-92; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 263-66. They include Greenlees
v. Attorney-Generalfor Canada [1945] O.R. 411; [1945] 2 D.L.R. 641 and 808
(H.C.); Esquimalt & Nanaimo Railway Co. v. Wilson, [1920] A.C. 358; 50
D.L.R. 371; [191913 W.W.R. (P.C.) (B.C.)
150. [1911]1 K.B. 410 (C.A.). See discussion of this case in David Mullan, the
DeclaratoryJudgment: Its Place as an AdministrativeLaw Remedy in Nova Scotia,
supra, note 58 at 112-116
151. Now Order 15, r. 16
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commencing proceedings as soon as possible. This is exemplified
by the Bedford Service Commission case where the object of the
litigation was to forestall a government plan. Moreover, given that
such cases depend generally on the determination of questions of
law rather than fact, the preservation of evidence will seldom be a
consideration.
The only possible problem with the two decisions rests in some of
the language used to describe why these were not "proceedings
against the Crown". In both cases, it is stated that the proceedings
are concerned with the rights of the public. 15 2 However, just
because the public are interested in or affected by the decisions
under challenge, does not make the actions any the less proceedings
against the Crown. Similarly, in the Appeal Division in MacNeil,
MacDonald J.A., relying on other authority, made reference to the
fact that the rights of the Crown were only being affected
"indirectly". 153 This perhaps suggests that the Crown in such
cases, represented by the Attorney General, is only a nominal or
incidental defendant, but this is obviously not true in most
instances. A Crown agency is said to have acted unlawfully. A
Minister of the Crown is similarly challenged. The Lieutenant
Governor in Canada is said to have made ultra vires regulations. In
all these cases, the Crown is a real defendant and its actions are
affected directly by the outcome of the proceedings.
More accurately, the Act does not apply for the reason given
originally by Farwell L.J. in Dyson 15 4 and cited with approval later
in MacDonald J.A.'s judgment: the estate of the Crown is not
directly affected. ' 55 This also serves to emphasize that not all cases
152. McNeil; 9 N.S.R. (2d) at 508; 46 D.L.R. (3d) at 262 (T.D.). Bedford Service
Commission: 18 N.S.R. (2d) at 159
153. 9 N.S.R: (2d) at 490-91; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 264-65
154. [1911]K.B.410at421
155. 9 N.S.R. (2d) at 491-92; 53 D.L.R. (3d) at 265. It is worth noting that the
result in these two cases does not necessarily govern in other jurisdictions. For
example, the decision of the Ontario Divisional Court in MacLean v. Liquor
Licence Board of Ontario (1975), 9 O.R. (2d) 597; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 236 seems to
indicate clearly that notice would be required of intention to commence
proceedings by virtue of that province's Proceedings Against the Crown Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 365, ss. 7 and 18. See particularly: id. at 607; 61 D.L.R. (3d) at
247. How the difference in results can be justified, however, I do not know.
Indeed, the arguments accepted in Nova Scotia would appear to be even more
compelling in relation to the Ontario statute. In the Ontario Act, there is no
equivalent of section 24 of the Nova Scotia statute. Moreover, the equivalent of
section 3 makes it clear that the Act is aimed at those matters which had to be dealt
with by the petition of right procedure previously. Perhaps the only argument is that

506 The Dalhousie Law Journal

in which a declaration is sought against the Crown fall outside the
ambit of the Act. If the claim for a declaration in fact relates to the
estate of the Crown and is in effect an action in contract or tort, it
goes beyond being what is frequently called a "bare" declaration
and clearly comes within the scope of the Act.
(f) The Availability of DeclaratoryRelief
This discussion of the availability of a declaration against the Crown
outside the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and the Bedford
Service Commission case links nicely with a consideration of the
general principles governing the availability of declaratory relief
against statutory authorities. This was also an issue in the Bedford
Service Commission case as it was, perhaps more directly, in Shore
6
DisposalLtd. v Ed de Wolfe Trucking Ltd. 15
(i) Shore DisposalLtd. v. Ed de Wolfe Trucking Ltd.
The plaintiff in this case sought a declaration that the defendants
were violating the Motor Carrier Act by engaging in the collection
and disposal of garbage without a licence. It also sought to have the
alleged breaches of the statute enjoined. At first instance, Morrison
J. refused to grant an injunction because of the adequacy of
remedies in the statute itself. 15 7 However, he granted a declaration
MacLean involved a claim for damages as well as declaratory relief and that it is the
damages element of the claim that the court was concerned about in holding that the
notice provisions governed. However, the judgment is certainly not clear on this
point. Indeed, it suggests that it applies in whatever circumstances a Crown agency
is being sued.
156. (1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 538; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 218 (S.C., A.D.)
157. Unreported. See judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.S. (id. at 541-43; 72 D.L.R.
(3d) at 220). For other more recent decisions involving this same issue, see Beattie
v. Governors ofAcadia University (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 466; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 718
(S.C., A.D.) and Terrace View Apartments Ltd. v. Attorney General of Nova
Scotia, unreported decision of Jones J. of Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Trial
Division, delivered: July 6, 1977 (S.H. No. 15157). In Beattie, the Appeal
Division was dealing with actions for a declaration, an injunction, and damages
with respect to an alleged breach of the Human Rights Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 11. A
board of inquiry appointed under that Act had recommended a reference of the
issue to the Supreme Court for determination as to whether the Act applied.
However, this had not been acted on by the Attorney General. MacKeigan
C.J.N.S., in delivering the judgment of the Court, expressed grave doubts as to
whether relief was available. However, he did not decide the case on this point but
moved on to consider the merits. See 18 N.S.R. (2d) 466 at 471-72; 72 D.L.R. (3d)
718 at 722-23. See also the judgment of Cooper J.A. at 477; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 726.
Coffin J.A. concurred with MacKeigan C.J.N.S. (id. at 467; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at
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as requested. There was no appeal against the refusal of the
injunction. However, the defendants appealed against the grant of a
declaration and this was allowed.
724). Nevertheless, this would clearly seem to be an even more compelling case
than Shore Disposal. First, the plaintiff was a person who claimed the benefit of
direct protection under the Act. (To describe his claim as a "negative privilege" as
MacKeigan C.J.N.S. did, at 471; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 722, is scarcely illuminating
and potentially destructive of the whole purpose of human rights legislation).
Secondly, there were no proceedings pending before the Human Rights
Commission. The recommendation of its Board of Inquiry had been ignored. This
contrasts with Shore Disposal, where an application for a licence as well as a
prosecution were both pending. Perhaps the only justification for the attitude of the
Court may be that the Board of Inquiry did not fulfill its obligations under the
statute and that the appropriate remedy was mandamus to compel that completion.
This is perhaps suggested by Ryan v. Eaton, unreported decision of the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court, Trial Division discussed infra at footnote 327 and
accompanying text. However, given the lack of specificity of the obligations of a
Board of Inquiry under the Human Rights Act, difficulties could also be
encountered with this route. See Hall v. Administration of Family and Child
Welfare (1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 677; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 237 (sub nom. Re Hall and
Johnson) (S.C., A.D.), discussed in the last survey, supra, note 1 at 911-13. In
Terrace View, Shore Disposal was again relied upon, this time to prevent the
plaintiff company seeking a declaration as to the application of certain fire
prevention regulations and a counterclaim by the Attorney General for a
contradictory declaration as to applicability of regulations and an injunction
preventing the plaintiff company using its premises contrary to the regulations.
According to Jones J., the only way of testing the applicability of the regulations
was in the context of a criminal prosecution. (This, at least, is what appears from
the digest of the case in (1977), 4 Nova Scotia Law News, No. 2 at 1). In such a
case, it is very difficult to see how the court could deny the standing of the plaintiff
company to seek a declaration and, more particularly, the Attorney General
wishing to know the scope of the regulation. See de Smith, supra, note 15 at 441-43
and the discussion, infra, particularly on the discretions of the Attorney General
wishing to know the scope of the regulation. See de Smith, supra, note 15 at
441-43 and the discussion, infra, particularly on the discretions of the Attorney
General. It is also to be contrasted with the statements of Laskin J. (as he then was)
in Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 at 148-49; 1 N.R.
225 at 230-31; 43 D.L.R. (3d) I at 8-9, where he rejected the prosecution argument
as defeating the claim to declaratory relief in constitutional matters. Since that
time, the philosophy of Thorson has been adopted by the Nova Scotia courts in a
number of non-constitutional cases. See e.g. Re Brodee and City of Halifax (1974),
9 N.S.R. (2d) 390; 46 D.L.R. (3d) 528 (S.C., T.D.), rev'd (but not on this point)
(1974), 9 N.S.R. (2d) 380; 47 D.L.R. (3d) 454 (S.C., A.D.); Wilin Construction
Ltd. v. Dartmouth Hospital Commission (1977), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C., T.D.);
Fraserv. Town of Neiv Glasgow (1976), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 79 (S.C., T.D.). See also
Stein v. City of Winnipeg, (1974), 48 D.L.R. (3d) 223; [1974] 5 W.W.R. 484
(Man. C.A.) and Re Doctor's Hospital and Minister of Health (1976), 12 O.R.
(2d) 164; 68 D.L.R. (3d) 220; 1 C.P.C. 164 (Div. Ct.) for other seeming adoptions
in a non-constitutional case. See, however, Rosenburg v. Grand River
ConservationAuthority (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 496; 69 D.L.R. (3d) 384; 1 C.P.C.
(C.A.); Rothmans of PallMall CanadaLtd. v. M.N.R. (No. 1), [1976] 2 F.C. 500;
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When a continuing breach of the law is occurring and the
enforcement authorities are refusing to take action, a number of
remedial possibilities suggest themselves for the private citizen.
These are: 1. Private prosecution; 1 58 2. An injunction to restrain
the breach of the law; 159 3. A declaration as to the breach; 160 4.
Mandamus to compel the enforcement authorities to enforce the
law.161 Each of these remedial alternatives is surrounded by a
number of technical difficulties which may make them generally
inappropriate or unavailable in the particular case. However, if
those technical difficulties are swept away, at least for the moment,
the basic question that is raised in this class of case is the role of the
private prosecutor. Should private citizens be able to secure
enforcement of the law and, if so, by what means? This, of course,
suggests an issue of general principle about law enforcement.
Traditionally, Canadian law has always tolerated a certain level of
private statutory law enforcement but it is clearly beyond the scope
of this article to deal with all the parameters of that situation.
However, I will attempt to identify some of the general principles
behind this toleration which may help in dealing with a particular
statutory context. Given the structures created by this particular
Act, is there any room for private enforcement and, if so, of what
kind?
In the Shore Disposal Ltd. case, the Appeal Division probably
did not have to face the question directly. Relief by way of a
declaration has always been regarded as discretionary' 6 2 and there
67 D.L.R. (3d) 505 (sub nom. Re Rothmans of Pall Mall Ltd. and MNR (C.A.).
This also is discussed, infra, in relation to Shore Disposal. See particularly notes
186, 200 and 222
158. For a discussion of the law relating to private prosecutions in Canada, see
Peter Bums, PrivateProsecutionsin Canada:The Law and a Proposalfor Change
(1975), 21 McGill L.J. 269
159. There are grave problems in the way of private citizens attempting to enjoin
criminal conduct in civil proceedings. For a recent discussion of the issues
involved, see Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 310;
[1977] 1 All E.R. 696 (C.A.), rev'd [1977] 3 W.L.R. 300; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70
(H.L. (E.). This case is discussed, infra, at footnote 186 and accompanying text.
See also F. H. Lawson, Remedies of English Law (Hamondsworth: Penguin,
1970) at 218; de Smith, supra, note 15 at 392
160. See also Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, id. See also de Smith,
supra, note 15 at 446-48 and 457-60
161. For unsuccessful attempts but where the possibility was admitted, see R. v.
Commissionerof Police of the Metropolis, ExparteBlackburn, [1968] 2 Q.B. 118;
[1968] 1 All E.R. 763 (C.A.); R. v. Commissioner of Policefor Metropolis, Ex
parteBlackburn (No. 3), [1973] Q.B. 241; [1973] 1 All E.R. 324 (C.A.)
162. See de Smith, supra, note 15 at 431
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were two facts present in this case that would have given the Court
ample scope for denying relief on the basis of judicial discretion
without deciding on the availability of a declaration as a matter of
principle. First, an information had been laid against the defendant
63
in Provincial Magistrate's Court for breaches of the Act.'164
Secondly, the defendants had also now applied for a licence.
Indeed, MacKeigan C.J.N.S., in judgment with which MacDonald
J.A. concurred, ultimately seems to base his decision on these facts:
It is better, however, to base our judgment on the principle that
the Court, in proceedings where the plaintiffs are virtually private
prosecutors, should not grant a declaration that the defendant has
committed an offence. Such a declaration is gratuitous and
almost impertinent advice to the summary conviction Court and
to the Public Utilities Board ....165
However, this came only after a lengthy discussion and a quite clear
rejection of the plaintiff's status to seek such a remedy. 166 It was
also linked to arguments that to award a declaration "may also in
effect be an injunction, disregard of which may put upon the
defendant penalties harsher than the Legislature ordained"' 1 67 and
that basic freedoms would be infringed if the protection of the
criminal process were denied by in effect laying a criminal charge in
68
a civil court. 1
Cooper J.A., the third member of the Court, also referred to the
initiation of criminal proceedings and the application for a
licence 169 but he too paid most attention to the question of the status
of the applicant and the place of the Board as "exclusive master of
170
licensing".
As already mentioned, there would have been nothing controversial about the case if it were simply an instance of the exercise of
judicial discretion in refusing a remedy. However, the issue of
principle that is raised by this case is a fascinating one meriting
close examination. At the outset, therefore, it is appropriate to
identify in more detail the various reasons why in this context that
issue was decided against the plaintiff.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

(1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) at 549; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 225
Id.
Id. at 550; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 225
Id at 544-49; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 221-25
Id. at 550; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 225
Id.
Id. at 559; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 231
Id. at 554-58; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 228-31
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1. The plaintiffs did not have any private right that 7has
been
1
interfered with nor had they suffered special damage. 1
2. Equitable relief is not available to restrain criminal conduct
unless the statute is construed as giving a private right of action.
In fact, to grant a declaration would have been in effect to
enjoin the conduct complained of and would therefore have
been no different from granting an injunction. Moreover, the
principles on which declaratory
and injunctive relief are given
72
are virtually identical. 1
3.

The statute did not give a private right of action here because of
the presence of the Licensing Board as an effective prosecutor
and regulator, the absence of any vested right to a licence in the
plaintiff, and the possibility for criminal proceedings in another
court. 173

In these reasons, much obviously depended upon the finding that
the plaintiffs did not have any interest in the matter that
distinguished them from the rest of the public. Given that they were
business rivals of the alleged unlicensed carrier, this immediately
raises questions. It also leads into a more fundamental inquiry as to
why members of the public, whether specially affected or not,
should not be able to seek observance of criminal laws in the civil
courts.
On the question of special status, it is indeed true that the Motor
Carrier Act provides that the grant of a licence does not confer any
perpetual or exclusive right. 174 It also provides that a public hearing
need only be held on an application for a licence in the discretion of
the Board. 175 Licences can also be cancelled or suspended in the
discretion of the Board.'176 However, it is also equally clear from
the statute that present licensees are not without some sort of status
under the Act. Not only do applications for licences have to be
advertised 177 but the Board is obliged to consider objections by
existing licensees 17 8 and, in doing so, to consider the effect that the
171. Id. at 544-47; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 221-24 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.); id. at
555-59; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 229-31 (per Cooper J.A.)
172. Id. at 542-43 and 548; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 220-21 and 224-25 (per MacKeigan
C.J.N.S.); id. at 554; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 228 (per Cooper J.A.)
173. Id. at 549-50; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 225-26 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.); id. at
555-59; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 229-31 (per Cooper J.A.)
174. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 190, s. 8(l) (Relied upon by MacKeigan C.J.N.S.); id. at
544; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 222
175. Sections 10(2) and (3)
176. Sections 15 and 16
177. Section 10(1)
178. Section 1I(a)
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grant of the licence would have on existing services. ' 79 Moreover,
as we have already seen in discussing the Burgess TransportLtd.
case, 180 a competitor may have a statutory right of appeal against
the grant of a licence on questions of law and jurisdiction and also
can seek the preogative writs. These factors would all seem to
indicate that, theoretically as well as realistically, the holder of an
existing licence is in a different position than the ordinary member
of the public.
Of course, recognition of this does not automatically answer the
question which is always asked in cases of this kind: Does the Act
confer a right of civil action even on persons affected? In other
words, where declaratory relief is being sought in relation to the
commission of a criminal or regulatory offence, the problem is not
dealt with simply as a question of standing in the normal sense of
that word. It is not just a situation of having to decide whether the
plaintiff is affected by the activity in question. Rather, the plaintiff
would seem to have to go beyond this and, directly or by inference
from the statute, establish a positive right to intervene and attempt
to secure observance of the statute. Special status may help but is
not necessarily sufficient.
In this instance, the statute itself afforded very little assistance to
the plaintiff. In fact, for the Appeal Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court, it spoke against his claim. The Court obviously
viewed the Act as creating a regulatory regime over an activity
which in all respects was under the control of the Nova Scotia
Public Utilities Board. 18 1 It was to decide which licences would be
granted and then, by the exercise of discretion in relation to
prosecutions, would decide the extent to which those licences would
be protected against competition, not only in the context of
applications for other licences but also in relation to prosecutions for
breaches of the Act and its regulations. The extent of control by the
Public Utilities Board is also exemplified by the broad discretion as
to cancellation, suspension and renewal 182 and by section 28
authorizing the Board to enquire into possible breaches of the Act.
In other words, the structure of the statute provides considerable
179. Section I I(b)
180. (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 (N.S.S.C., T.D.). Discussed supra at footnote
121 and accompanying text.
181. (1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 538 at 549 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.) and 557 (per
Cooper J.A.); 72 D.L.R. (3d) 219 at 225 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S. and 229-30
(per Cooper J.A.)
182. Sections 15 and 16
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warrant for believing that all matters in relation to motor carriers in
the province are within the exclusive ambit of the Board. Added to
this is the argument, referred to by the Court, 18 3 that it is somehow
or other inconsistent to allow equitable remedies to be sought from
the ,Supreme Court when the only judicial remedy provided by the
Act is a criminal proceeding before a Provincial Magistrate's Court.
As against these arguments, there are however a number of points
that can be made. First, the Act does not restrict the category of
person who may commence a prosecution against a person allegedly
breaching the Act and, as a result, there seems little doubt that a
private prosecution could be commenced. 184 So, to this extent
anyway, enforcement of the Act is not completely in the hands of
the Public Utilities Board. Secondly, notwithstanding the fact that
the Act only talks about prosecutions launched in a Provincial
Magistrate's Court, the Attorney-General of the Province or a
private individual with the Attorney-General's support could
undoubtedly seek declaratory and even injunctive relief in the
Supreme Court and this is acknowledged by MacKeigan,
C.J.N.S.185
Given both these factors, it is relevant to ask just how strong the
presumption against a civil action by a private individual should be
in this kind of situation. Interestingly, this question was
subsequently faced by the English Court of Appeal in the important
decision of Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, decided in
early 1977.186 This was an attempt by a private individual to obtain
a declaration and injunction with respect to threatened breaches of
183. (1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 538 at 550 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.) and 557 (per
Cooper J.A.); 72 D.L.R. (3d) 219 at 225-26 (per MacKeigan, C.J.N.S.) and 230
(per Cooper J.A.)
184. See Burns, supra, note 158 at 276-78, dealing with summary conviction
offences
185. (1976), 16 N.S.R. (2d) 538 at 542-43; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 219 at 220-21
186. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 310; [1977] 1 All E.R. 696 (C.A.). [Since this article was
written, Gouriet has been reversed by the House of Lords. See [1977] 3 W.L.R.
300; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70 (H.L. (E.)). Basically, the decision to reverse stemmed
from the House of Lords' conviction that in matters involving public rights and the
prevention of public wrongs, the Attorney General was the only one who could sue
to protect the public interest. Individuals could not sue on behalf of the public but
only if they have actually suffered or will suffer damage directly as a result of the
wrong. In delivering one of the judgments, Lord Wilberforce described the
Supreme Court of Canada decision in Thorson v. Attorney General of Canada,
[1975] 1S.C.R. 138; 1N.R. 225; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1as recognizing this position but
adopting a different rule for constitutional matters. (id. at 311; 3 All E.R. at 82).
None of the other Law Lords mentioned the Canadian authority, which had been
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the Post Office Act by members of the defendant union. What made
the case so controversial was that the Court was here faced with
proceedings in which the Attorney General had refused to give his
support to the action and it was argued that, after that refusal, the
Court could not proceed. All three members of the Court of Appeal
agreed that they could not question the Attorney General's
discretion directly. 187 However, they also accepted that they had a
discretion to grant declaratory relief in cases of this kind. 18 8 On the
question of an injunction, Lord Denning M.R. clearly thought that
such relief was available but no longer necessary on the facts of the
case. 18 9 Lawton L.J. seemed similarly inclined. 190 Ormrod L.J.
rejected the possibility, however. 191 All three judges placed
considerable emphasis on the public interest in the preservation of
the Rule of Law and also the fact that the plaintiff was here
intervening to protect the interest of the public as a whole in the
maintenance of the mail service and the observance of that statute
creating duties to deliver the mail. 19 2 They also noted the
availability of the private prosecution route for individual citizens
when breaches of the Act occurred. 193 In fact, in the mind of Lord
Denning M.R., 194 one of the strongest precedents for allowing the
action for a declaration to proceed was the judgment of the Supreme
195
Court of Canada in Thorson v. Attorney Generalof Canada.
relied upon by Lord Denning M.R. in the Court of Appeal. See [197712 W.L.R. at
329; [1977] 1 All E.R. at 716. For Canada, the question remains whether Thorson
and the principles enunciated therein are in fact confined to constitutional litigation,
a matter of continuing dispute. For Shore Disposal, it can be reiterated that the
plaintiffs were in fact asserting a personal interest rather than the public interest,
though it was not accepted by the Appeal Division]
187. [1977] 2 W.L.R. at 328 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 335 and 337 (per
Lawton, L.J.); at 340 (per Ormrod L.J.); [1977] 1 All E.R. at 716 (per Lord
Denning M.R.); at 721 and 723 (perLawton L.J.; and 726 (per Ormrod L.J.)
188. Id. at 328-29 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 338 (per Lawton L.J.) at 345; (per
Ormrod L.J.); [1977] 1 All E.R. at 716 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 724 (per
Lawton L.J.); at 731 (perOrmrod L.J.)
189. Id. at 331-32; [1977] 1 All E.R. at718-19
190. Id. at 339-40; [1977] 1 All E.R. at 725-26
191. Id. at 345-46; [1977] 1 All E.R. at731
192. Id. at 326-26 (perLord Denning M.R.); at 334 (per Lawton L.J.); at 344-45
(per Ormrod L.J.); [1977] 1 All E.R. at 714 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 720-21
(per Lawton L.J.); at 730 (perOrmrod L.J.)
193. Id. at 331 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 334 (per Lawton L.J.); at 345 (per
Ormrod L.J.); [1977] 1 All E.R. at 718 (per Lord Denning M.R.); at 721 (per
Lawton L.J.); at 730 (perOrmrod L.J.)
194. Id. at 329; [1977] 1 All E.R. at 716
195. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; 1 N.R. 225; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1
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Gouriet reflects a totally different attitude towards the question of
public intervention in the law enforcement process than does Shore
Disposal Ltd. Technically, of course, it might be argued that the
case is distinguishable in that the plaintiff had endeavoured to
secure the assistance of the Attorney General first, something which
did not happen in Shore Disposal. However, if that is ignored as
well as the discretionary reasons for denying relief which were
identified earlier, there is not much difference between the two
cases. As in Shore Disposal, the only indication in the empowering
statute in favour of private law enforcement was the availability of
the private prosecution route. Of course, it might be argued that
failure to deliver the mail much more directly affects the public as a
whole than a garbage collector operating without a licence, but
against this, there is the fact that it was not an ordinary member of
the public who was seeking relief in the Shore Disposal case but a
business competitor.
One cannot, in fact, criticize the decision in Shore Disposal Ltd.
from the point of view of precedent. There are a number of
decisions (mostly English) supporting both the approach and the
result' 96 . Indeed, if there is to be any criticism on this score it might
be with the English Court of Appeal in Gouriet, where the judges
tended to concentrate on the decisions relating to the
Attorney-General's discretion rather than on those with respect to
injunctions and declarations sought by private individuals to restrain
criminal conduct. 197 Nevertheless, there was sufficient ambiguity in
those authorities to have caused the Nova Scotia Court to deal with
the basic policy issue in more depth.
Certainly, it can be argued that the criminal law process and the
protection it affords should not be able to be circumvented by
resorting to civil remedies. Nevertheless, there are other ways of
answering such arguments such as exercising discretion against the
grant of declaratory and injunctive relief if the commission of an
offence is not patently clear. Furthermore, it is never a particularly
196. See the judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.S. (16 N.S.R. (2d) at 542-44 and
545-49; 72 D.L.R (3d) at 220-21 and 222-25) particularly
197. To be fair to the Court of Appeal, they recognized the difficulties involved in
securing declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to criminal conduct and
made it quite clear that, as far as plaintiffs on behalf of the public interest were
concerned, they were dealing with a highly unusual situation in that the Attorney
General was both refusing to proceed in his personal capacity and denying his
support to the plaintiffs in relator proceedings.
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appealing argument to say that an injunction or declaration may be a
more harsh remedy than criminal sanctions for breach. What this
amounts to, of course, is tacit approval of a system of administering
criminal justice where periodic fines or short terms of imprisonment
are but licence fees for continuing breaches of the law. While this
obviously is a practice in some areas, it scarcely enhances the
reputation of the courts for it to be given as a reason for not granting
injunctive or declaratory relief. Moreover, the availability of that
kind of relief at the suit of the Attorney General obviously means
that there is no general policy of the law against the remedy.
In Thorson, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged that, in
constitutional matters at least, the private individual has a role to
play and in appropriate cases can seek a declaratory judgment as to
the unconstitutionality of legislation. 198 He is no longer in that
context regarded automatically as a mere busybody or troublemaker. Those who in fact are busybodies can be dealt with by
judicial discretion. The question that now arises is how far the
principles accepted in that case apply in other contexts. Gouriet
suggests that they are of general application. 19 9 Shore Disposal
Ltd., by its result if nothing else, is negative, 20 0 though perhaps in a
strange sort of way the fact that the plaintiff was a business
competitor rather than just a member of the public, lessened the
chances of success. By focusing on his status as a business
competitor, the Appeal Division overlooked the possibilities for
even unaffected members of the public to intervene suggested by
198. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138; 1 N.R. 225; 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1
199. See, in particular, Lord Denning's use of Thorson in a non-constitutional
(validity of legislation case) ([1977] 2 W.L.R. 310 at 329; [1977] 1 All E.R. 696 at
716). This must of course now be read subject to the House of Lords' reversal of
the Court of Appeal's decision and, in particular, Lord Wilberforce's rejection of
any application of Thorson outside the constitutional area. ([1977] 3 W.L.R. 300 at
311; [1977] 3 All E.R. 70 at 82)
200. In this respect, it must be compared with the judgment of MacKeigan
C.J.N.S. in the Bedford Service Commission casE, whe'e he indicated some
criticism of the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in Rosenburg v. GrandRiver
Conservation Authority (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 496; 69 D.L.R. (3d) 384; 1 C.P.C. I
which also thought that Thorson was restricted to constitutional cases. See (1976),
18 N.S.R. (2d) 132 at 142-45; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 639 at 644-45. Of course, other
aspects of the statutory regime were obviously highly significant in the Shore
Disposal case. However, the lack of any attempt to relate the limited rights of
access accepted in the decisions discussed in Shore Disposal to the greater rights of
access suggested in the Bedford Service Commission case is the disappointing
feature of this decision. See also notes 157, 186 and 222 for other references to
subsequent treatment of the Thorson decision in non-constitutional cases
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Thorson and other authorities.
Ultimately, this is not in fact an argument against the result
reached in Shore Disposal Ltd. The issue is in fact a very difficult
one from a policy point of view and there is undoubtedly
considerable weight in some of the factors discussed by the Appeal
Division in the case, particularly the availability of alternative
enforcement techniques in the statute itself and the degree of control
possessed by the regulatory authority. What is unfortunate,
however, is the failure of the Appeal Division to place the issue
raised in its broadest but true context, that of the role of private law
enforcement in Canadian law, and to discuss it in relation to the
other situations where we presently tolerate private law enforcement, as exemplified by the decision on Thorson and the availability
of private prosecutions for summary conviction offences.
ii) Bedford Service Commission v. Attorney General of Nova
20 2
Scotia
According to MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in Bedford Service Commission
v. Attorney-General of Nova Scotia, the question to be asked in
deciding whether or not someone has standing is:
Does this plaintiff have the right to take this action against this
defendant? 20 3
He then used this test as a taking off point for considering whether
the plaintiffs had an arguable or, as he described it, "justiciable"
case, 20 4 and, on examining the matters raised in the statement of
claim, found that they did not. 205 The allegations of illegality which
he found in that statement of claim were said to be in fact
... non-legal matters of morality, politics, the propriety of
wisdom or
administrative processes (where not illegal), or the
20 6
fairness of governmental action (where not illegal).
These reasons would of course have afforded ample justification
for striking out the statement of claim as revealing no reasonable
201. Gouriet in the House of Lords will obviously provide considerable
ammunition against these broader claims in future
202. (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 (S.C., T.D.), rev'd 18 N.S.R. (2d) 132; 72
D.L.R. (3d) 639 (S.C., A.D.), rev'd (1977), 19 N.S.R. (2d) 310; 14 N.R. 413

(S.C.C.)
203.
204.
205.
206.

18 N.S.R. (2d) at 146; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 645
Id. at 147-55; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 646-51
Id. at 155; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 651
Id. at 147; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 646
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cause of action. However, that was not the ostensible object of the
applications inter partescommenced in this case. As revealed in the
judgment of MacIntosh J., those applications involved attempts to
have the Attorney General of Nova Scotia removed from the action
because the Proceedings Against the Crown Act had not been
complied with and also various of the plaintiffs removed from the
20 7
action as not having capacity or status.
The issue therefore becomes whether, in relation to the
allegations of lack of status or capacity, it was appropriate for the
Appeal Division to become involved in the potential merits of the
allegations. In reviewing the decision of the Appeal Division in this
case, the Supreme Court of Canada quite obviously thought that it
was not. 20 8 However, in a way the Supreme Court of Canada itself
may have been responsible for the path that the Chief Justice of
Nova Scotia took.
In McNeil v. Nova Scotia Board of Censors, Laskin, C.J.C.
made the following statement in the course of deciding whether
McNeil, a private citizen, had standing to challenge the validity of
legislation on constitutional grounds:
In granting leave, this Court indicated that where, as here, there
is an arguable case for according standing, it is preferable to have
all the issues in the case, whether going to procedural propriety or
to the merits, decided at the same time. A thoroughgoing
examination of the challenged statute could2 09have a bearing in
clarifying any disputed question on standing.
At first instance, in the Bedford Service Commission case,
MacIntosh J. expressed the view that this direction in Thorson was
not mandatory, that it would be a considerable time before the meritscould be tried, and that fairness to the parties dictated that these
preliminary objections be dealt with separately and at that time. 210
MacKeigan C.J.N.S., while not quoting this extract from
McNeil, obviously seems to have been influenced by it in the way in
which he defined the question to be asked in standing cases. If he is
correct, a preliminary objection to a plaintiff's or applicant's
standing would in fact raise, inter alia, the same questions as a
motion to strike out the statement of claim as disclosing no cause of
action. Have these people an arguable case on the merits? The
207.
208.
209.
210.

(1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 156
(1977), 19N.S.R. (2d)310; 14 N.R. 413
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 at 269; 12 N.S.R. (2d) 85 at 87; 5 N.R. 43 at45
(1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 158
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question that now must be asked is whether the Supreme Court by
reversing MacKeigan's judgment, has in fact retreated from its
position in McNeil that the merits of the case are relevant in
deciding whether to accord standing.
It is important to realize that in McNeil, the Supreme Court of
Canada was dealing with someone who did not have standing under
the normal or traditional tests; he was not specially affected or
suffering personal damage beyond that suffered by the public at
large. It was therefore in the context of deciding, as a matter of
discretion, whether to accord standing to someone who did not
come within the normal rules that the Court declared that a
consideration of the merits was relevant. Now, it may be that what
the Appeal Division did in the Bedford Service Commission would
have passed muster if the plaintiffs, as persons without the
traditionally required status, were seeking an exercise of judicial
discretion in their favour. However, it is abundantly clear from the
judgment of MacKeigan C.J.N.J. that he himself was not treating
the case on that basis.
Some questions had obviously been raised by counsel about
whether the liberalization of the standing rules by Thorson and
McNeil had any application outside of the constitutional arena and
in particular where the validity of administrative action was being
challenged on other than constitutional grounds. However, that
brought forth the following response from MacKeigan C.J.N.S.
In the present case we need not decide whether the broader rule
extends beyond constitutional challenges of provincial or federal
legislation to attack on the legal validity of other acts of public
bodies, including municipal legislation, since the plaintiffs here
have interests
which may be specially affected in a substantial
2 11
way.

He then went on to formulate the question that had to be asked:
"Does this plaintiff etc." In other words he was attempting to apply
the test to persons who in his view came within the category
traditionally regarded as having standing and thereby was in fact
engaged in rewriting the normal standing rules.
It is also interesting that, at an earlier stage, the Court, through
the Chief Justice, had seen itself as having authority to deal with
whether there was an arguable cause of action here irrespective of
issues of standing and without the issue having been raised by
211. 18 N.S.R. (2d) 132 at 146; 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 645. See notes 157 and 198 for
discussion of the acceptance of Thorson and McNeil in non-constitutional settings
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counsel. After oral argument had been completed on the appeal, the
Chief Justice sent a memorandum to counsel asking them to respond
in writing on the issue of whether the declarations sought raised an
arguable cause of action. This matter had not been raised at the oral
hearing. That had been confined to argument on whether the
Bedford Service Commission had standing in the traditional sense.
To quote from that memorandum:
This appeal requires us, I suggest, not only to answer the initial
questions raised by counsel, but also to consider which of the
declarations sought can be properly
2 12 permitted to be asked and
against which parties respectively.
It is suggested that such an approach is not only highly unusual
but also inappropriate. First, by raising matters that counsel for the
appellant chose not to raise or neglected to raise, the Court not only
took away the normal degree of procedural control possessed by the
213
litigants but also left itself open to allegations of partiality.
Secondly, the respondent in this case, in being asked to respond to
the Chief Justice's memorandum in writing within seven days, was
seemingly deprived of his normal right to present oral argument.
Thirdly, the Appeal Division, by raising this issue for the first time
and indicating its intent to rule on the matter, in fact converted itself
into a court of first impression.
One expects that the Supreme Court of Canada was not unaware
of this in allowing the appeal, though the very brief judgment of the
Court mentions none of these factors.2 14 However, another reason
was given for allowing the appeal which relates to the way in which
the Appeal Division acted. The appellants only appealed against the
failure of the trial judge to deny status to the Bedford Service
Commission. There was no appeal against the decision of the trial
judge in relation to the plaintiff Cunningham, as the representative
212. This procedure is not referred to in MacKeigan C.J.N.S.'s decision nor
in the Supreme Court of Canada decision. However, a copy of it was made
available by counsel for the plaintiffs. It was received in their office on September
30, 1976.
213. Perhaps one justification for judicial intervention of this kind is to save the
parties the time and trouble of expensive litigation and to prevent scarce judicial
resources being used in settling matters that could be much more simply resolved
on another basis. Quaere whether this ever justifies the unilateral striking out of an
action as revealing no reasonably arguable case when that issue has riot been raised
by the application of one of the parties
214. The Supreme Court of Canada judgment was very brief; only a page in both
the Nova Scotia Reports and the National Reporter. (1977), 19 N.S.R. (2d) 3 10 at
311-12; 14 N.R. 413 at414-15 (S.C.C.)
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in a class action. Indeed, her personal capacity to bring the cause of
action was not even in question. Given that Cunningham was not
heard on the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that the Appeal
Division could not strike out the action entirely as against all
parties. 215 Despite the fact that Cunningham and the Bedford
Service Commission were represented by the same counsel, there
would seem no doubt that the Supreme Court of Canada was
correct. To allow a cause of action to be struck out in these
circumstances without notice to one of the litigants would seem to
be completely wrong in principle.
In all of this, the initial questions as to the standing of the Bedford
Service Commission and Cunningham, in her own right and in a
representative capacity, tended to become lost. In fact, given that
there was no challenge to the personal capacity of Cunningham, it is
rather difficult to see why this case was even appealed to the Appeal
Division, once the Proceedings Against the Crown Act argument
was lost and not appealed. The strength of the case in no way
depended on who was the plaintiff. However, in the last analysis,
there can be little quarrel with the Supreme Court of Canada's ruling
that the Bedford Service Commission, given its statutory position,
particularly in relation to garbage disposal, had a sufficient interest
to bring the proceedings. Indeed, this was accepted at all three
levels. 2 16 Of somewhat more interest is the unappealed ruling of
MacIntosh J. that Cunningham, a resident of the Bedford district,
could bring a class action on behalf of all other residents of the
2 17
district.
In Nova Scotia, the availability of class actions is governed by
Rule 5.09(1) of the Civil Procedure Rules. This provides:
Where numerous persons have the same interest in a proceeding
....

the proceeding may be begun and, unless the court

otherwise orders, continued, by or against any one or more of
them as representing all or as representing all except one or more
of them.
The major problem with class actions has always been the
establishment of whether the members of the class have the requisite
215. Id.
216. (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 160-61 (S.C., T.D.); 18 N.S.R. (2d) 132 at
146; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 639 at 645 (S.C., A.D.); (1977), 19 N.S.R. (2d) 310 at 312;
14 N.R. 413 at 415 (S.C.C.)
217. (1976), 18N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 161-63
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"common" or "identical" 2 18 interest and, in this instance, the class
was defined in the headings as all members of the district "whose
interests are, or might be adversely affected" by the decision under
challenge. 21 9 This, according to the trial judge, was "too vague and
wide",220 so he ordered that the statement of claim be amended by
the removal of the offending words, leaving the class as all
members of the district. Of course, rather than narrowing the class,
this had the effect of widening it, though it did have the merit of
making it clearer. However, given that all members of the class are
required to have a common interest and given that that interest must
be one which creates standing to seek declaratory relief, the
amendment is very puzzling. Does it mean that all members of the
class have a common interest and standing to seek declaratory
relief, whether or not they are affected adversely? Or, does it mean
that the trial judge considered that all members of the District were
adversely affected by the decision?
If the former is the case, then the Court has accepted a very
liberal standard for according standing in cases of declaratory
actions concerned with unlawful administrative action. Normally,
the plaintiff in such proceedings is required to be "peculiarly
affected". 2 2 1 Of course, in Canada, in the arena of constitutional
litigation, this has changed recently and Macintosh J's reference to
the Thorson and McNeil decisions may indicate that he sees them as
having relevance in other than constitutional cases, something
which has been rejected in a number of other decisions. 2 22 It is also
2 23
possible that, contrary to the generally accepted theory,
MacIntosh J. considered that, in aggregate, the members of the
district had a claim even though individually none of the group or
class would have had sufficient standing.
Indeed, even if the judge considered that all members of the class
were "adversely affected", his recognition of the class is indicative
218. In all the common law jurisdictions of Canada except Alberta, the language
of the equivalent rule uses the word "same". In Alberta the rule (Alberta R. 42),
the word used is "common". However, in a recent decision, Goodfellow v. Knight
(1977), 2 Alta. L.R. (2d) 17; 2 C.P.C. 209 (S.C., T.D.), Laycraft J. (at 212)
decided that this made no difference in substance to the law in Alberta.
219. (1976), 18N.S.R. (2d) 155at 161
220. Id.
221. See de Smith, supra, note 15 at 453
222. (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 162. See notes 159 and 198 for further
discussions of this issue
223. See e.g. Cowan v. CBC, [1966] 2 O.R. 309 at 315; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 578 at
584 (C.A.)
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of a liberal approach to questions of standing to seek declaratory
relief. The requirement of "peculiarly affected" has at times been
used to mean that the plaintiff must be affected in a different way
from other members of the community to which he belongs 224 and
this, of course, is anathema to a situation where the whole group
would have standing. In such cases, the Attorney General was
viewed as being the appropriate prosecutor of the group's
interest. 22 5 Such an approach is, of course, very confining indeed in
relation to the use of the declaratory action both as an individual and
as a group remedy and the general tendency today is to be less
rigorous. 226
The judgment in fact eschews any attempt at analysis of the
nature of the interests for which the group or class was allowed to
seek protection here. Three, in particular, were identified as having
been presented by the plaintiffs:
1. Special susceptibility to damage;
2. Interference with the public right to the observance of the law;
with the private right to the enjoyment of
3. Interference
22 7
property.
To these arguments, the judge responded:
In: this day of public awareness and public concern by informed
citizens, it would hardly be in keeping with the demands of
justice if our Courts adopt a restrictive interpretation relative to
the carriage of class actions. The growth of bureaucratic controls
of
in our society demands an increasing awareness by our Courts228
the possibility of infringements upon the rights of our citizens.
This approach, which may be heralded as a eminently sensible one,
also avoids two difficult problems in the whole area of class actions.
The second interest identified by the plaintiff naturally raised once
more the issue of the availability of group action to protect public
rights, the traditional role of the Attorney General. The second and
third suggest that the members of the group will have a cause of
action in nuisance if their fears of the effect of that rubbish dump are
well-founded. However, the role of class actions in nuisance has
224. De Smith, supra, note 15 at 453
225. Id. at 401-03 and 452
226. Id. at 453. See also previous discussions in this article as to the effect of
Thorson and McNeil in non-constitutional matters and, particularly, notes 159 and
198 and accompanying text.
227. (1976), 18 N.S.R. (2d) 155 at 162
228. Id. at 162
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always been controversial. 22 9 For example, in Preston v. Hilton, a
1920 Ontario High Court decision, it was held that class actions
were not possible in nuisance.
There is no community of interest here. In this case each person
whom the plaintiff claims to represent has a distinct and separate
cause of action . . . for the special injury or damage, if any,
which that person may sustain by reason of the alleged nuisance
or threatened nuisance. It is only because of that special injury
that the individual can sue at all. To the extent that the injury
affects each one as a member of the public, relief can be obtained
at the suit of the Attorney General. That the plaintiff cannot avoid
this rule, by claiming to represent all those members of the public
who are affected by the wrongful act is established by Parsonsv.
City of London, [1911] 3. O.W.N. 55.230
In other words, the Ontario judge viewed the action in private
nuisance as being a highly individual one and the rule that the
Attorney General is normally the appropriate plaintiff in cases of
public nuisance as not capable of circumvention.
Of course, the mere fact that there are serious difficulties in the
way of bringing a class action with respect to a nuisance or
threatened nuisance, whether private or public, does not necessarily
mean that class actions are unavailable where the direct challenge is
to the legality of administrative action, which may incidentally
result in a nuisance. This brings the discussion full circle since the
next inquiry is as to the interests which the action for a declaration
of invalidity aims at protecting. More particularly how rigid is the
requirement that the plaintiff be "peculiarly affected", because
taken literally those two words might be read as indicating that the
action for a declaration is as highly individual or personal in this
context as that in private nuisance.
Obviously, the problems raised by class actions in the area of
unlawful administrative action deserve and undoubtedly will receive
greater judicial consideration than Macintosh J. gave them in the
Bedford Service Commission case, though ultimately the flexible
approach that he adopted may prevail. In conclusion, though, I
cannot forebear from asking, perhaps rhetorically, what was sought
to be achieved, perhaps beyond an emotional impact, by bringing a
class action in this case. Unless Cunningham had standing herself,
229. See e.g. J.P.S. McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions and the
Environmental Battle - Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds (1972), 10
Osgoode Hall L.J. 505 at 518-19
230. (1920), 48 O.L.R. 172 at 180; 55 D.L.R. 647 at 654 (H.C.)

524 The Dalhousie Law Journal

the class, almost certainly, did not and, to quote from a recent
article where the popularity of the declaration as a class remedy is
discussed:
Unfortunately, this popularity quite often occurs when it is
needed least, for in a majority of the situations when class
plaintiffs obtained declaratory relief, it was clear that the same
results could have been achieved had the individual representative chosen, instead,23to
1 sue only in his personal capacity, and not
on behalf of a class.
As mentioned earlier, the addition of a class action to
Cunningham's personal action in this case added nothing to the
chances of ultimate success in this case. Indeed, it led to some
avoidable litigation by way of a preliminary application.
(g) Habeas Corpus with Certiorariin Aid in CriminalProceedings
In R. v. LaPierre,23 2 the Appeal Division was concerned with a
number of aspects of the availability of habeas corpus with
certiorariin aid in Nova Scotia in criminal proceedings and, more
particularly, as a device to quash a committal for trial after the
preliminary hearing of a criminal charge.
The court, in a unanimous judgment delivered by MacDonald
J.A., held that the remedy ceased to be a possibility after the
presentment of a true bill or bill of indictment by the grand jury
against the accused. 233 The reasoning on which this result was
based was to the following effect:
The presentment of such indictment by the grand jury after
having heard the evidence
gives this indictment an independent
2 34
vitality of its own.
In this situation, to quash the committal for trial "would avail him
naught".2 5 For this proposition, MacDonald J.A. relied upon R. v.
Morin,2 36 a 1917 decision of the Quebec Court of King's Bench and
R. v. Nyczyk, 2 37 a 1919 decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal,
though at the same time noting some authority of a more recent
231. John A. Kazanjian, Class Actions in Canada (1973), 11 Osgoode Hall L.J.
397 at 430
232. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 (S.C., A.D.)
233. Id. at366-371
234. Id. at371
235. Id.
236. (1917), 28 C.C.C. 269 (Que. K.B.)
237. (1919), 30 Man. R. 17; [1919] 2 W.W.R. 661; 31 C.C.C. 240 (C.A.)
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vintage to the contrary. 2 38 He also discussed the role played by grand
juries in the Province of Nova Scotia and, in particular, the fact that
they apply virtually the same test as does a magistrate in deciding
whether or not to commit an accused for trial. 23 9 Of course, this
theory makes less sense in those provinces where the grand jury has
been abolished and where the presentment of an indictment is based
240
directly on the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing.
There, it is a little more difficult to argue that the indictment stands
on its own feet and, if the foundation is invalid, then this may well
also affect the indictments. In fact, this was the situation in one of
the cases cited by MacDonald J.A. 24 1 in the course of his judgment;
R. v. Sednyk, a decision of Freedman J. (as he then was) of the
Manitoba Queen's Bench.242
As the grand jury had returned a true bill in this case, that meant
that Lapierre's application was dismissed. However, because this
ground had only been raised at the Appeal Division level,
MacDonald J.A. went on to deal with the matters considered by the
trial judge and, in particular, the foundation for and scope of
habeas corpus with certiorariin aid in Nova Scotia. 243
One of the major debates in the whole area of judicial review of
preliminary hearings and committals for trial relates to the scope for
intervention and, in particular, whether the Supreme Court can
intervene and review for an absence of evidence. There has been a
plethora of conflicting writing in this area, 244 including an article in
238. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 at 366, citing R. v. Sednyk (1956), 18 W.W.R.
180; 115 C.C.C. 128; 23 C.R. 340 (Man. Q.B.) and R. v. Robert (No. 1) (1910),
17 C.C.C. 194 (Que. K.B.)
239. Id. at 368-70
240. By virtue of section 507(l) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34,
grand juries are no longer necessary in any of the provinces and territories other
than Nova Scotia.
241. (1976), 15N.S.R. (2d) 361 at366
242. (1956), 18 W.W.R. 180; 15 C.C.C. 128; 23 C.R. 340
243. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 at 371-80
244. See e.g. R. E. Salhany, Review of Committalfor Trial (1965-66), 8 Criminal
L.Q. 31, particularly at 34-35; B.M. Haines, Committals and Certiorari
(1965-66), 8 Criminal L.Q. 141, particularly at 150; E. Patrick Hartt, Habeas
Corpus and Certiorariin CriminalCases, [1961] L.S.U.C. Special Lecture Series
(Remedies) 313; Edward Koroway, HabeasCorpus in Ontario (1975), 13 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 149, particularly at 166-73; Robert J. Sharpe, The Law of HabeasCorpus
(Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1976) at 74-79; D. A. Cameron Harvey, The Law of
Habeas Corpus in Canada (Toronto: Butterworths, 1974) at 20-21 and 103-24;
Gilles Utourneau, The Prerogative Writs in Canadian Criminal Law and
Procedure (Toronto: Butterworths, 1976) at 141-47 and 291-301
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the pages of this journal, 245 and it usually runs the gambit from
those who see no theoretical differnce between review of
committals for trial on habeas corpus alone, certiorari alone or
habeas corpus with certiorarian aid to those who see differences
between all three. To some extent, this is the result of difficulties
over what materials can be placed before the court in each of these
three types of proceedings.2 6 The matter is also complicated by
virtue of the fact that the general law outside of the criminal area
relating to review for an absence of evidence is in a state of
considerable confusion. 247 I do not intend to retread that same
ground. Suffice it to say that the courts of Ontario seem to have
circumvented any debate about the availability of review of a
committal for trial for an absence of evidence by relying upon a
pre-Confederation statute which is said to establish a statutory form
of habeas corpus with certiorariin aid with considerable scope for
judicial review on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 248
This statute, which remains in force in Ontario by virtue of
section 129 of the British North America Act 2 49 and the inaction of
the federal government, 25 0 is entitled An Act for More Effectually
securing the Liberty of the Subject and the particularly pertinent
provision is section 5 under which the court may
245. Robert J. Sharpe, Habeas Corpus in Canada (1975), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 241,
particularly at 251-57
246. Discussed id. at 262-66. See also Harvey, supra, note 244 at 106-112;
Letounier, supra, note 244 at 294 at 294-301. See also, the discussion of this issue
in Mitchell v. The Queen, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 570; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 77; 6 N.R. 389;
[1976) 1 W.W.R. 577; 24 C.C.C. (2d) 241;Re Pereiraand Minister of Manpover
andImmigration (1976), 14 O.R. (2d) 355; 73 D.L.R. (3d) 673 (Ont. C.A.). Both
these cases involved the effect of the FederalCourt Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1,s.
28 on the availability of habeas corpus with certiorariin aid, with respect to
federal statutory authorities
247. See D. W. Elliott, "No Evidence": A Ground of Judicial Review in
CanadianAdministrativeLaw? (1972-73), 37 Sask. L. Rev. 48
248. 1866 (Can.), c. 45. See Ex parte McGinnis, [1971] 3 O.R. 783; 4 C.C.C.
(2d) 262 (H.C.); R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297; 31 C.R.N.S. 239 (Ont.

C.A.)
249. 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3; R.S.C. 1970, App. 11, No. 5, s. 129. This leaves intact
pre-confederation statutes, subject to repeal etc. by the British Parliament in the
case of English statutes and by the appropriate legislature (Parliament or provincial)
in other cases
250. Since Re Storgoff, [1945] S.C.R. 526; [1945] 3 D.L.R. 673; 84 C.C.C. I it
has been clear that Parliament has exclusive jurisdiction to legislate in relation to
habeas corpus in a criminal matter and could therefore repeal the provincial
pre-confederation statutes relating to habeas corpus in criminal matters, if it
wanted to. See Ltourneau, supra, note 244 at 77-78, 261-262; Harvey, supra,
note 244 at 3-5
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.. . direct the issuing of a writ of certiorari .

. .

. directed to the

person or persons by whom or by whose authority any such
person is confined or restrained of his liberty . . . requiring him
to certify and return . . . the evidence, depositions, convictions,

and all proceedings had or taken, touching or concerned with
confinement or restraint of libery, to the end that the same may be
viewed and considered by such judge or court, and to the end that
the sufficiency thereof to warrant such confinement or restraint,
may be determined by such judge or court.
Robert J. Sharpe has argued previously in the Dalhousie Law
Journal that this section viewed properly is no more than a
codification of the common law. 25 1 Be that as it may, the provision
has also been seen as a device for circumventing some troublesome
authority (at least for defence lawyers) that only issues of
jurisdiction can be reviewed on habeas corpus, even with common
law certiorariin aid, and that a complete absence of evidence on a
matter within the magistrate's jurisdiction is not a jurisdictional
error. 2 52 Further, it is seen as justifying a broader level of review
than is usual under the "no evidence" test in that it speaks to an
inquiry as to sufficiency rather than an inquiry as to whether there
253
was any evidence at all.
251. Supra, note 245 at 256
252. See, particularly, Exparte McGinnis, [1971] 3 O.R. 783; 4 C.C.C. (2d) 262
(H.C.), where Wright J. held that the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
Pattersonv. The Queen, [1970] S.C.R. 409; 9 D.L.R. (3d) 398; 72 W.W.R. 35; 2
C.C.C. (2d) 227; 10 C.R.N.S. 55, did not affect the law of Ontario with respect to
habeas corpus with statutory certiorariin aid established by the Ontario Court of
Appeal inR. v. Botting, [196612 O.R. 121; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 25; [1966] 3 C.C.C.
373; 48 C.R. 73 (C.A.). In Patterson, the Supreme Court of Canada had held that
review of a committal for trial on certiorarialone was restricted to questions of
jurisdiction. This distinction has been maintained by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297 at 303-05; 31 C.R.N.S. 239 at 244-47.
See also Re Barnes and Witter and the Queen (1977), 35 C.C.C. (2d) 329
(B.C.S.C.) for a recent decision in which the Nova Scotia and Ontario position is
contrasted with that of British Columbia. However, it must also be noted that
Patterson itself has been under attack recently. See e.g. R. v. Hubbard, [1976] 3
W.W.R. 152 (B.C.S.C.), where Bouck J. allowed review of a committal for trial
on the basis of error of law on the face of the record, notwithstanding Patterson,on
the argument that this was a clearly-established general ground of review. See also
Re Ward and The Queen (1976), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 466; 35 C.R.N.S. 117 and Re
Nichols and The Queen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 153, two decisions in which Cory
J. avoided Patterson'sseeming ruling that breaches of the rules of natural justice
were not subject to attack by certiorarialone where a committal for trial was in
issue. He did this by pointing to specific provisions in the Criminal Code with
respect to certain guaranteed procedures and described failure to adhere to these as
leading to jurisdictional error. The same tack was taken by the Quebec Court of
Appeal in Re Cohen & The Queen (1977), 32 C.C.C. (2d) 446. This decision is
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Until Lapierre, it was generally believed that statutory habeas
corpus with certiorariin aid was an uniquely Ontario phenomenon
at least in criminal matters. 2 54 However, MacDonald J.A., on
examining an equivalent unrepealed Nova Scotia statute, the
Liberty of the Subject Act of 1864,255 held that it had the same
effect as the Ontario Act, though in this instance it required reading
two sections together. 2 56 These were sections 6 and 8 and they
provided:
6. Upon return to such order, the court or judge may proceed to
examine into and decide upon the legality of the imprisonment,
and make such order, require much verification, and direct such
notices on further returns in respect thereof as may be deemed
now on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. However, in other cases, the
integrity of Patterson has been upheld. See e.g. Re Mitchell and Maynes and The
Queen (1971), 31 C.C.C. (2d) 344, where McDonald J. specifically disagreed with
the judgment of Bouck J. in Hubbard; Re Depagie and The Queen (1977), 32
C.C.C. (2d) 88, in which the Appeal Division of the Alberta Supreme Court
applied Patterson in similar circumstances to where Cory J. had managed to
distinguish it in Ward and Nichols. For a comment on Patterson, see (1970), 19
Alberta L. Rev. 141. See also L6tourneau, supra, note 244 at 148-52
253. In certiorarialone casses the tendency of the courts is still to applyR. v. Nat
Bell Liquors, [1922] 2 A.C. 128; 65 D.L.R. 1; [1922] 2 W.W.R. 30; 37 C.C.C.
129 (P.C.) (Alta.) and its perceived ratio that the courts have no concern at all with
the sufficiency of the evidence. See e.g. R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297;
31 C.R.N.S. 239 (Ont. C.A.); Re Martin, Simard, Desjardens and The Queen
(1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 453 (Ont. H.C.); R. v. Botting, [1966] 2 O.R. 121; 56
D.L.R. (2d) 25; [1966] 3 C.C.C. 373; 48 C.R. 73 (Ont. C.A.). Note however, the
contrary authorities listed by Jessup J.A. in Pickett: 28 C.C.C. (2d) 305; 31
C.R.N.S. at 246-47. See also R. v. Pickett: 28 C.C.C. (2d) 305; 31 C.R.N.S. at
246-47. See also R. v. Amero (1974), 8 N.S.R. (2d) 615; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 228 (sub
nom. Re Amero & The Queen); 29 C.R.N.S. 381 (S.C., A.D.); R. v. Rothberg
(1976), 33 C.C.C. (2d) 56. See also Salhany, supra, note 244 at 33; Haines, supra,
note 244 at 144-50; Hartt, supra, note 244 at 320-2 1; Koroway, supra, note 244 at
169; Sharpe, supra, note 244 at 77-74; Harvey, supra, note 244 at 20-21 and
103-24; L~tourneau, supra, note 244 at 151-52. See also Woodward Stores
(Westmount) Ltd. v. Alberta Assessment Appeal Board (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d)
456; [1976] 5 W.W.R. 496 (Alta. S.C., T.D.), for a general reaffirmation of the
Nat Bell Liquors decision. In particular, see the judgment of McDonald J. at 462;
[1976] 5 W.W.R. at 509
254. See Harvey, supra, note 244 at 108-09, where he anticipates the arguments
accepted inLapierre, both in relation to Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. See also
L&ourneau, supra, note 244 at 300-01
255. R.S.N.S. 1864, c. 153. The successor of this statute still governs the
availability of habeas corpus in civil matters in Nova Scotia. See R.S.N.S. 1967,
c. 164. Sections 5 and 7 of the present statute are virtually the same as sections 6
and 8 of the 1864 Act. TheHabeas Corpus Act of 1816 (56 Geo. 3, c. 100 (U.K.))
may also be in force in Nova Scotia. This only covered civil matters (s. 1).
256. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 at 372-76
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necessary or proper for the purpose of justice;
8. In all cases whether under statute or at common law or under
the provisions of this chapter, it shall be lawful for the court or
judge to require the production of all such proceedings,
documents and papers, relating to the matter in question before
whomsoever and in whosoever possession as to the court or judge
may appear necessary for the elucidation of the truth, and may
also examine into the truth of the return to any writ of habeas
corpus, or rule or order granted under this chapter, in the same
manner as such examination is provided for in cases under the
before mentioned act of parliament, passed in the fifty-sixth year
of the reign of King George the third.
The warrant for inquiring into the sufficiency of the evidence, as
opposed to whether there was any evidence at all, is not nearly so
clear in these two provisions as it is in the Ontario statute.
Nevertheless, the reference to an inquiry "into the truth" is
suggestive.
MacDonald J.A., after a reference to the provisions of the new
Nova Scotia Civil Procedure Rules as to the documents that have to
be returned upon the service of an application for an order in the
nature of certiorari,2 5 7 then proceeded to consider the role of the
reviewing court on an application for statutory habeas corpus with
certiorari in aid. 2 58 In doing so, he discounted cases which involved
habeas corpus or certiorari alone 2 59 and, eventually, relying on
Ontario authority, 260 he formulated the following test:
The day is long gone when a mere scintilla of evidence will
justify a committal for trial. . . . [O]n an application for criminal
habeas corpus with certiorariin aid. . . [t]he evidence should be
found sufficient if the reviewing court can say that on such
evidence a jury, properly instructed and acting judicially could
convict; any doubt on this question must be resolved in favour of
the Crown. In so examining the evidence the superior court is not
really substituting its discretion for that of the magistrate but
determining whether the magistrate
applied proper principles in
2 61
ordering committal for trial.
257. Id. at 373-74, referring to Rule 58.07
258. Id. at 377-80
259. In particularR. v. Cowden, [1948] 1 D.L.R. 682; 90 C.C.C. 101; 5 C.R. 18;
[1947] O.W.N. 1018 (H.C.) and Re Martin & The Queen (1973), 11 C.C.C. (2d)
224; 21 C.R.N.S. 149 (sub nom. R. v. Martin) (Ont. H.C.)
260. R. v. Botting, [1966] 2 O.R. 121; 56 D.L.R. (2d) 25; [1966] 3 C.C.C. 373

(C.A.)

261. (1976), 15N.S.R. (2d) 361 at 379
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This statement clearly would seem to involve the reviewing court in
going a good way into the merits of the matter before the presiding
magistrate and is certainly a much stronger statement of the scope
for judicial review than is usually found in cases where courts are
prepared to go as far as admitting the possibility of review for an
absence of evidence. 262 For the most part, they are very
circumspect indeed about the scope that that much-debated ground
of review involves. Indeed, we can question whether MacDonald
J.A. is not going too far here in the test that he is proposing and is
not only assuming too much of the role of the presiding magistrate
but also the subsequent task of the grand jury. Are three potential
reviews of the evidence really necessary to protect the legitimate
interests of the accused in not having to stand trial unjustifiedly on
an indictable offence?
Of course, it may be argued that the statute makes provision for
such a review on statutory habeas corpus with certiorariin aid and
the judge cannot ignore the statute. This, however, brings into
question the wisdom of a situation where the scope of review is
potentially much wider in the provinces of Ontario and Nova Scotia
than elsewhere in Canada. Given the responsibility of the
Parliament of Canada for matters of criminal procedure under
section 91(27) of the British North America Act, confirmed in
relation to habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of Canada in In re
Storgoff,2 63 there would seem to be a strong argument for the repeal
of both these statutes and the creation of a uniform method and
scope of review of committals for trial. Indeed, there are extremely
strong arguments for statutory codification of the whole law of
judicial review relating to criminal proceedings. The confusion that
is often thought to exist in the area of general judicial review is
multiplied tenfold in this area where meaningless technicalities and
distinctions abound, as does conflicting authority.
However, one final point deserves to -be mentioned in passing
before I leave this topic. The practical reality of the situation may
well be that, since the Bail Reform Act, 26 4 the scope for review of
262. See D. W. Elliott, supra, note 247 at 67-80. See, however, the discussion of
Cape Breton Development Corporationv. Penny (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292; 76
D.L.R. (3d) 186 (sub nom. Cape Breton Development Corporationv. Penny (No.
2) (S.C., A.D.), infra at footnote 308 and accompanying text.
263. [1945] S.C.R. 526; [1945] 3 D.L.R. 673; 84 C.C.C. 1. Discussed by
MacDonald J.A., 15 N.S.R. (2d) 361 at 371
264. Sections 448-459. 1 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as inserted
by S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 37., s. 5 (R.S.C. 1970, c. 2 (2nd Supp.), s. 5)
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the type just discussed may become very rare in both Ontario and
Nova Scotia. Not only is bail more readily available but the
previous practice of surrendering into custody so as to be able to
seek the broader scope for judicial review provided by statutory
habeas corpus may no longer work. According to Gilles Ltourneau
in The Prerogative Writs in Canadian Criminal Law and
Procedure:
The common practice, prior to the Bail Reform Act, was for an
accused to surrender himself into custody on the morning of the
hearing so as to be entitled to habeas corpus. Such practice could
be justified at that time since the pre-trial release expired with the
committal for trial: a committal for trial by a judge meant a
committal to jail unless a new bail was granted. However, the
committal for trial does not involve that result any longer. It
originates from one judge while the release order emanates from
another and remains valid and unaffected by the committal.
Therefore, an accused can hardly be said to be in detention for the
purpose of challenging a committal for trial by habeas corpus
when a valid order shows he was released
and that such order of
release is still valid and legally effective. 2 65
Ltourneau also goes on to question whether even an accused in
custody at the time of his committal can resort to habeas corpus to
question the committal, basically on the same ground of the
different source of authority; this time for his detention. 26 6 There is,
in fact, recent Ontario authority to support the former of these two
arguments. 26 7 Thus another source of considerable confusion has
been injected, albeit unconciously, into this whole area and either
legislative intervention or a Supreme Court of Canada decision or
both will be needed to clarify the matter.
III. JudicialReview in Nova Scotia -Substantive Grounds
(a) Review for Inconsistency
In Re Burgess Transportand Storage Ltd., 2 6 8 already discussed in
265. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1976) at 254
266. Id. at 255-56
267. See Exparte Pickett (1976), 12 O.R. (2d) 195; 28 C.C.C. (2d) 417 (H.C.
and C.A.). Pennell J., in ajudgment approved by the Court of Appeal held that "the
writ of habeas corpus should be sufficiently elastic so that the Court may, in the
exercise of its proper jurisdiction, deal effectively with any and all forms of illegal
restraint": id. at 199; 28 C.C.C. at 42 1. That there are still considerable procedural
difficulties is evidenced, however, by Re Martin, Sinard, Desjardeins and The
Queen (1977), 34 C.C.C. (2d) 453 (Ont. H.C.).
268. (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 231 at 241 (S.C., T.D.)
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the context of the availability of judicial review in the face of a
statutory appeal provision, one of the arguments made by the
applicant for certiorariwas that the grant of the licence should be
set aside on the ground of inconsistency. This argument was based
on an assertion that a differently-constituted panel of the Board,
twelve days after the Burgess hearing, but long before the decision
in Burgess, had disallowed "a very similar" application for a
licence.
The Court did not dwell long upon this allegation:
In the Chapple case cited by counsel for the applicant herein, the
Board found that the applicant had not proven its case. In the case
at bar, the Board apparently found that the applicant had proven
its case. I would conclude that it was a question of the weight of
the evidence. 269
In other words, the Court found that there was in fact no
inconsistency between the two decisions. Whether this is accurate is
impossible to assess at least from the judgment since no details of
the Chapple case are given. However, the more interesting point is
to speculate upon what the Court would or should have done if it did
find inconsistency between the two decisions.
In Re Burgess, the allegation of inconsistency formed part of a
broader argument that the Board had "exceeded its jurisdiction
through an abuse of its discretionary power by reaching a decision
so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could [have] come to
[it]". 270 This ground of review had achieved acceptance in Nova
Scotia in Nova Scotia Forest Industries Ltd. v. Nova Scotia
Pulpwood Marketing Board, notably in the judgment of Coffin
J.A., 27 1 and this was referred to by Morrison J.272 However,
despite the availability of review for manifest unreasonableness, I
think it is clear that the courts are going to be most reluctant to grant
judicial review for this reason. After all, what it involves is court
scrutiny of the actual merits of the decision, something which the
courts have been very reluctant to do, at least directly, in judicial
review proceedings. This is in fact supported by the real paucity of
269. Id. at 245
270. Id. at 240
271. (1975), 12 N.S.R. (2d) 92 at 117; 61 D.L.R. (3d) 97 at 127 (sub norn. Re
Stora, Kopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag and Nova Scotia Woodlot Owners'
Association) (S.C., A.D.). Discussed in the first survey in this series, supra, note I

at 883-90
272. (l976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) at 240-41

Administrative Law 533

cases in the Commonwealth where this type of allegation has been
successful despite its seemingly universal acceptance. 273
Nevertheless, insofar as it is a ground for judicial review, one
indication of manifest unreasonableness may arguably be inexplicable or unexplained inconsistency between cases with identical facts.
Of course, whether the difference is inexplicable raises great
problems. For example, is a statement to the effect that the tribunal
has changed its policy since deciding the previous case an
explanation? Furthermore, should inconsistency alone be a basis for
judicial review? Rather, should the reviewing court generally not
have to go further and consider whether, in the light of the
inconsistency, it is the first decision or the one under review which
is unreasonable? Indeed, it is also possible to argue that an
unexplained inconsistency between two decisions does not render
either of the decisions manifestly unreasonable. Persons acting
reasonably frequently differ in the solutions they adopt to problems.
Difference in itself does not mean that one result is necessarily
unreasonable and the other reasonable.
In this light, it is interesting to consider a recent English Court of
Appeal decision HTV Ltd. v. Price Commission,. 74 in which

inconsistency was one of the grounds of judicial review. Indeed,
this is the only Commonwealth authority I have been able to find
where there has been review on this basis. Not surprisingly, one of
the judges sitting on the Court of Appeal was Lord Denning M.R.
The case involved the Price Commission acting contrary to its past
practice in requiring the applicants to omit certain amounts from its
costs calculations in trying to justify a price increase under price
control legislation. 2 75 Lord Denning M.R. rejected a technical
argument to the effect that there had been a change in character in
the amounts in question, justifying different treatment. He then
went on to say:It is in my opinion, the duty of the Price Commission to act with
fairness and consistency in their dealings with manufacturers and
traders. Allowing that it primarily is for them to interpret and
apply the code, nevertheless if they regularly interpret the words
of the code in a particular sense - and regularly apply the code
273. Supra, note I at 889-90, n. 72. See also de Smith, supra, note 15 at 303-I1,
particularly at 310
274. [1976]2 C.R. 170 (Q.B. and C.A.)
275. The Price Code contained in the Schedule to the Counter-inflation (Price
Code) Order 1974, promulgated under the Counter-Inflation Act 1973
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in a particular way - they should continue to interpret it and
apply it in the same
way thereafter unless there is good cause for
2 76
departing from it.
Scarman L.J. was somewhat more guarded, stating that "inconsistency is not necessarily unfair" ,277 but then going on to find that the
new policy was in fact an unfair one in itself without reference to
any inconsistency with past practice. 278 Goff L.J., however, was, if
anything, stronger than Lord Denning M.R.:
It is of the utmost importance that statutory tribunals should be
consistent and this is a very clear instance on which the279
facts call
for the exercise of [the courts] supervisory jurisdiction.
The interesting feature of Lord Denning's judgment is that he
seems to treat the arguments about inconsistency not from the point
of view of whether the particular result is in isolation manifestly
unreasonable but rather from the point of view of whether
inconsistency is just to those affected by it. In other words, it is an
appeal to a widely held notion of justice that, all other
considerations being equal, like cases deserve to be treated alike.
Putting it another way, the decision is unreasonable, not because of
considerations internal to the reasons given and result reached but in
the much broader sense that unexplained inconsistency is always
unreasonable.
What this analysis suggests is that it might be more appropriate to
describe review for inconsistency under the rubric of breach of the
rules of natural justice than abuse of discretion. However, even if
this is not accepted, what is clear is that review for inconsistency, if
adopted as a ground of review to blur considerably the line between
review for lack of natural justice and review for abuse of discretion.
Indeed, what really is involved here is an extension of judicial
review into the area of a lack of substantive due process.
In fact, Lord Denning M.R. has given other indications of his
intention to move the law in this direction, notably in the case of R.
v Barnsley Metropolitan Borough Council, Ex parteHook. 280 Here
a person lost his market stall licence for urinating in a street near the
market. Among the grounds of judicial review advanced by Lord
Denning in this decision was the excessive nature of the penalty; the
276. [1976] 1 C.R. 170 at 185
277. Id. at 192

278. Id.
279. Id. at 195
280. [197611 W.L.R. 1052; [197613 All E.R. 452 (C.A.)
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loss of livelihood for a trivial offence. 281 Reference was also made
to the fact that others found to have performed the same act had not
282
been punished in this way; inconsistency again.
2
83
In Hook, Lord Denning purported to find support for this type
of review in an older authority, unnamed, but said to be found in his
1952 judgment in R. v Northumberland Compensation Appeal
Tribunal, Ex parte Shaw.2 84 The example he gives in Hook is that
of commissioners of sewers having their decisions quashed by the
Court of King's Bench on the grounds that their fines were
excessive. In Shaw,2 85 this is supported by a reference to Commins
2 87
v. Massam2 86 and textbook authority.
Commins v. Massam, a 1642 decision, is one of the very famous
decisions in the development of the remedy of certiorari2 8 8 and, to
be sure, Bramston C.J. does say in that case:
* I conceive in some clearness that [certiorari] may be
granted where any fine is imposed upon any man by
commissioner, which they have authority to by their commission,
as appeareth
by the statute to moderate it in case that it be
289
excessive.
However, that was not the ground of review being considered
there2 90 and no mention is made of this basis of review by any of the
other judges. Indeed, the following statement appears in the
281. Id. at 1057-58; [197613 All E.R. at 456-57
282. Id. at 1057; [1976] 3 All E.R. at 456. Scarman L.J. expressed no opinion on
this ground of review, resting his decision to quash on Lord Denning's primary
basis for review (taking evidence in the absence of the applicant) (id. at 1062;
[1976] 3 All E.R. at 461). Sir John Pennycuick did however rely on the
excessiveness of the penalty (id. at 1063; [1976] 3 All E.R. at461.
283. Id. at 1057; [1976]3 All E.R. at 456-57
284. [1952) 1 K.B. 338; [1952] 1 All E.R. 122 (C.A.)
285. Id. at 350-51; [1952] 1 All E.R. at 130
286. (1666), March N.R. 196; 82 E.R. 473 (K.B.)
287. The reference to the textbook authority is omitted from the official reports
version of the judgment. However, it does appear in the All England Law Reports
version. It is Callison Sewers (4th ed.: 1824) at 203, 204 and 342-44 and 2 Chito,'s
General Practiceof the Law (1836) at 379. Only the second of these references was
available to me and at 379 the general jurisdiction of the Court of King's Bench
over Commissioners of the Sewers is discussed but without any reference to the
ability of the Courts to quash on the grounds of an excessive penalty.
288. See the extensive discussion of this decision by Edith G. Henderson in her
invaluable study, FoundationsofEnglish AdministrativeLaw (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1963) at 101-106.
289. (1666), March N.R. 196 at 202; 82E.R. 473 at475
290. Basically, the case involved the jurisdiction of the commissioners to levy
someone for the cost of rebuilding a sea wall destroyed in a storm.
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judgment of Heath J.:
.... [T]hey are enabled by the statute to proceed according to
their discretions, & therefore if they proceed secundum aequm &
bonum, we cannot correct them; but if they proceed where they
have no jurisdiction, or without commission, or contrary to their
commission, or not by jury, then they are to be corrected here
291

While ambiguous, this statement seems to be more in accord with
traditional notions of judicial review. It is also, of course, worth
noting that, according to Edith Henderson, in Foundations of
English Administrative Law,2 92 the modem principles of judicial
review did not emerge clearly till the eighteenth century. Indeed, up
till 1702, the normal procedure on certiorariwas for the court to
retry the matter itself if it thought the inferior tribunal had
committed a reviewable error. 293
Thus, it would seem that the precedents supporting review for
inconsistency and excessive penalties are not strong and must
realistically be seen as an outgrowth of the theory of the duty to act
fairly, developed originally by Lord Denning and other English
judges as a procedural doctrine to circumvent some of the
difficulties in the traditional law governing the application of the
rules of natural justice. 294 Now it seems as though the duty to act
fairly is being converted into a substantive doctrine.
291. (1666), March N.R. 196 at 197-98; 82 E.R. 473 at473
292. Supra, note 288 at 144
293. Id. at 107
294. 1 discuss this in detail in Fairness:The New National Justice? (1975), 21 U.
Toronto L.J. 281. See also D. H. Clark, NaturalJustice:Substance and Shadow,
[1975] Public Law 27; G. D. S. Taylor, Natural Justice: The Modern Synthesis
(1975), 1 Monash U.L.R. 258 and Fairness and Natural Justice - Distinct
Concepts or Mere Semantics? (1977), 3 Monash U.L.R. 191; D. L. Matheson,
Executive Decisions and Audi Alteram Partem, [1976] Public Law 242. It must
however be noted that there is considerable American authority supporting review
in some situations on the basis of inconsistency. See K. C. Davis at Ch. 17.07 in 2
Administrative Law Treatise (St. Paul: West, 1958); Administrative Law Text (St.
Paul: West, 1972); Administrative Law of the Seventies (Rochester: Lawyers'
Co-operative Publishing Co. 1976). Another question raised but not discussed in
the text is whether in the event of a favourable inconsistency, a court would be
prepared to entertain an application for review from someone who was the subject
of an earlierinconsistent decision. There would appear to be no reason in logic for
denying standing in such a case once inconsistency is accepted in principle as a
ground of judicial review. Note, also, the earlier discussion of abuse of process as a
ground of review (supra, notes 25-27 and accompanying text). This emerging
ground of judicial review may also be classifiable as a type of substantive due
process.
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The dangers in this approach are obvious. I have already noted
the traditional reluctance of the courts to review for manifest
unreasonableness because of the fact that it involves intermeddling
with the merits of tribunal decision-making. The language of the
test used is also used to determine whether the Court will intervene
on that ground to discourage too ready an intervention. However,
fairness in a substantive sense is arguably a much more vague
criterion for intervention and, because of that, may be more easily
seen as inviting review. A consideration of inconsistency as a
ground for judicial review makes this clear. The creation of
administrative tribunals is frequently justified on the basis that they
will be able to perform tasks unhampered by the comparatively rigid
rules of precedent that characterize the oridinary courts. Indeed, the
common law has developed rules of judicial review that may be
seen as designed to safeguard administrative tribunals from
court-like tendencies with respect to precedents. It has been held to
be an abuse of discretion to lay down policies in advance by which
all future matters will be decided mechanically. 29 5 To then suggest
to tribunals that they will be subject to judicial review if they are
inconsistent may be at odds with this and push them in the direction
of being concerned with adhering to past practice in all cases at the
expense of other considerations that we think are desirable.
Of course, the value that like cases be treated alike is one that has
a considerable claim to recognition even in a broadly discretionary
regime. The law, after all, does insist that virtually all forms of
statutory discretion be principled and consistent, clear-headed
treatment of individuals is of a high order of principle. However,
the difficulty is in recognizing when a claim for review on the
grounds of inconsistency is legitimate. As noted already, there may
be great difficulty in even ascertaining whether there has been
inconsistency. Secondly, once recognized, inconsistency is often
capable of quite ready explanation in a discretionary decisionmaking context. . . "We have been wrong up until now"; "We
want to try another approach to this matter"; "Our policy has
changed". These, of course, are all claims that are readily
understandable in the context of most decision-making by statutory
authorities and to assess these claims fully for the purposes of
second-guessing them will involve the court in a virtually total
295. Re Hopedale Development Ltd. and Oakdale, [1965] 1 O.R. 259; 47 D.L.R.
(2d) 482 (C.A.)
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reconsideration of not only the matter under review but also the
whole area being regulated by the particular authority. This, it
seems to me, is the kind of judicial review that we do not want. If
inconsistency is to become a separate ground of judicial review I
suggest that it only be available in the most flagrant case and that the
reviewing court be prepared to accept very readily the explanations
of the tribunal for the inconsistency in issue. Of course, it may well
be that both inconsistency and excessive penalties will be relevant
as evidence supporting other grounds of judicial review such as lack
of good faith, bias or, as in Burgess Transport, as part of an
argument of manifest unreasonableness. In such contexts, there
cannot be quite the same concern since they will seldom, if ever, be
treated as sufficient in themselves to justify judicial review on one
of those bases but will generally be linked to other persuasive
evidence before review is granted.
(b) Scope for Intervention by the Courts in Statutory Appeals
At the outset of consideration of the issues in this appeal I should
make it clear that Michelin is before us pursuant to the statutory
right of appeal given by S. 19(7) of the Health Services Tax Act
and not by way of certiorari to review the discretionary
Ministerial powers. I do so because I sensed, perhaps wrongly,
some misapprehension at the hearing before us as to the
principles we are to follow for the determination of this appeal.
As I have already said we are, by S. 19(7) restricted to points of
law alone; questions of fact are not to be decided by us. Insofar as
any exercise of discretion is concerned we are not to review such
exercise de novo but interfere with it only if in its exercise some
principle of law was disregarded or a wrong principle of law was
applied. 296
This statement was made by Cooper J.A. of the Appeal Division
in Re Michelin Tires Manufacturing (Canada)Ltd. and it suggests
that the scope for judicial intervention in an appeal on questions of
law is quite different from and narrower than that where the remedy
being sought is certiorari. The accuracy of this statement is
questionable. At the very, least it is deceptive.
The grounds on which certiorariis available are for the most part
uncontroversial; traditionally, jurisdictional error, including breach
of the rules of natural justice, and error of law on the face of the
record. The second of these grounds obviously raises questions of
296. Re Michelin Tires Manufacturing (Canada)Ltd. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150
(S.C., A.S.) at 164-65, rev'g (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 587 (S.C., T.D.)
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law and it has generally been accepted that all varieties of
jurisdictional error, including breach of the rules of natural justice
and errors on jurisdictional facts, raise issues of law also. If this is
so, then there would seem to be a clear overlap between appeals on
questions of law and review by way of certiorari. Indeed,
theoretically, an appeal on a question of law might be seen as
broader in scope than review by way of certiorariin that, on appeal
intra-jurisdictional errors of law do not have to appear on the face of
the record. In practice, however, it is hard to imagine a situation
where an appeal on a question of law would ever be successful
except on the basis of the record. If this is so, then, for all practical
purposes, review by way of certiorariand an appeal on a question
of law may be identical in scope. 297
The only possible flaw in this argument is that a right of appeal
purely on a question of law, as opposed to an appeal on a question
of law explicitly including jurisdiction, or an appeal on questions of
law and jurisdiction, does not permit the raising of jurisdictional
issues. This matter has never, as far as I am aware, been determined
in Canada, though in other jurisdictions there has been acceptance
of the argument that you cannot appeal from a nullity and, as
jurisdictional error nullifies a decision, it is not included within the
scope of an appeal on questions of law. 298 Of course, if this
argument is valid, it may explain why some courts have held that
review is always available for jurisdictional error notwithstanding
the existence of a statutory right of appeal, or, at least,
297. Quite the best discussion of the scope for judicial intervention in statutory
appeals and the relationship between judicial review and statutory appeals is to be
found in K. J. Keith, Appealsfrom Administrative Tribunals:The Existing Judicial
Experience (1968-70), 5, V.U.W.L.R. 123. See, particularly, 153-159. On
statutory appeals in Nova Scotia, see David Mullan, The Scope and Principlesof
Statutory Appeals from Administrative Action in Nova Scotia in H. N. Janisch, ed.,

Government Regulation and the Law (Halifax: Faculty of Law, Dalhousie
University, 1975). See, particularly, 86-90, where I discuss the decision of Hart J.
In Re Michelin Tires at first instance.
298. See the discussions of this problem by G.D.S. Taylor, Wizen is an Appeal No
Appeal? (1969), 3 N.Z.U.L.R. 442 and John Alder, Appeals and Nidlity (1975),
38 Mod. L.R. 573. I also discuss it in The Scope and Principles of Statutory
Appeals, id. at 87; Administrative Law - Universities - Judicial Review of
AdministrativeAction -Natural Justice (1971), 49 Can. B. Rev. 624; The Federal
Court Act: A Misguided Attempt at Administrative Law Reform? (1973), 23 U.
Toronto L.J. 14 at47. See, however, ReLudford (1972), 5 N.B.R. (2d) 155 (S.C.,
A.D.) for a decision in which the Court held that the particular wording of a
statutory right of appeal made it clear that there was no right of appeal from
decisions made without authority. There, judicial review was the only possibility.
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notwithstanding a statutory right of appeal that does not mention
specifically jurisdictional error. 29 9 However, in so far as the
argument depends on a word of such uncertain meaning in
Administrative Law as "nullity", it is dubious at best, nor was it
suggested by Cooper, J.A. as a limitation on the statutory right of
appeal in Re Michelin Tires.
Rather, Cooper J.A., by reference to de Smith, 30 0 went on to
elaborate the scope for judicial intervention in an appeal on
questions of law. 30 1 Quoting de Smith's analysis of three Canadian
tax appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 30 2 he
gave approval to the following grounds:
.. .[T]he discretion.

. .

was not to be interfered with unless he

had disregarded some principle of law, as by acting 'manifestly
against sound and fundamental principles' or by acting in bad
or under the influence of irrelevant
faith, arbitrarily
303
considerations.
Interestingly, these bases for intervention on appeal are phrased in
the same language as the grounds of review for abuse of discretion,
a ground of review which nowadays tends to be regarded as giving
rise to a jurisdictional error. 304 This classification has recently been
questioned in England 30 5 but even there it was recognized that such
errors were reviewable by certiorarias appearing on the face of the
record. 30 6 So whether regarded as jurisdictional or not, the grounds
299. See the discussion of this issue, supra, note 123 and accompanying text.
300. Supra, note 15 at 250-51
301. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150 at 165
302. Minister of National Revenue v. Wrights' CanadianRopes Ltd., [1947] A.C.
109; [1947] 1 D.L.R. 721; [1947] 1 W.W.R. 214; [1947] C.T.C. 1 (P.C.) (Can.);
Pioneer Laundry & Dry Cleaners Ltd. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1940]
A.C. 127; [1939] 4 D.L.R. 481; [1939] 3 W.W.R. 567 (P.C.) (Can.); Fraser
(D.R.) & Co. v. Minister of National Revenue, [1949] A.C. 24; [1948] 4 D.L.R.
776; [1948]2 W.W.R. 1119; [1948] C.T.C. 297 (P.C.) (Can.)
303. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150 at 165, quoting de Smith, supra, note 15 at
250-5 1.Interestingly, de Smith himself then goes on to suggest that, at least in one
respect, these three decisions meant that the scope for intervention in statutory
appeal was wider than that in judicial review at that time.
304. This seems to have been accepted by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. International Union of Operating Engineers,
Local 796, [1970] S.C.R. 425; 11 D.L.R. (3d) 336 when approval was given to the
decision of the House of Lords in Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation
Commission, [1969] 2 A.C. 147; [1969] 2 All E.R. 208 (H.L. (E.)). See [1970]
S.C.R. at 435; 11 D.L.R. (3d) at 344
305. See R. v. Southampton Justices. Ex parte Green, [1976] Q.B. 11 at 22;
[1975] 2 All E.R. 1073 at 1080 (C.A.) (per Browne L.J.)
306. Id. Lord Denning M.R., who had earlier delivered his judgment on the basis
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for a statutory appeal on questions of law suggested by Cooper J.A.
would clearly seem to be grounds on which certioraricould also be
sought, meaning of course that the arguments to be advanced in
either context would not in fact differ, notwithstanding Cooper
J.A.'s prefatory remarks. Despite his conception that the scope for intervention was
narrower than in certiorari proceedings, Cooper J.A. with the
support of the other members of the Court went on to allow the
appeal in Re Michelin Tires on the basis that a tax assessment under
the Health Services Tax Act was incorrect in that it depended upon
an ultra vires criterion. 30 7 This is an issue to which I will return
308
later.
Re Michelin Tires was not however the only case in which the
question of the proper scope of a statutory appeal was raised in the
period under review. Another was Cape Breton Development
Corporationv. Penny, an appeal by an employer from a decision of
the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board. 30 9 This was one of a
series of four decisions 3 10 in which the Court of Appeal was faced
with the question of whether employers had a right to apply for
leave to appeal from the Appeal Board's decisions. As we have seen
already, the Court had previously held that the Workmen's
Compensation Board itself did not have such a right to apply for
leave to appeal. 3 11 Therefore, it was perhaps not surprising to find
the Appeal Division according such a right to employers,
nothwithstanding the fact that they were held at the same time not to
be parties entitled to be heard by the Appeal Board. 31 2 All this
of jurisdictional error, id. at 21; [1975] 2 All E.R. at 1079, then said, id.:I would like to say that I agree with the alternative way in which Browne L.J.
put it
Brightman J. agreed (id.) with both Lord Denning M.R. and Browne L.J.
307. (1976), 15 N.S.R. 150 at 165-68 (per Cooper J.A.) and (per MacKeigan
C.J.N.S.) at 173-76. Coffin J.A. (at 177) concurred in both judgments
308. Infra, see notes 346 ff and accompanying text.
309. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 (sub nom. Cape Breton
Development Corporationv. Penny (No. 2) (S.C., A.D.)
310. Cape Breton Development Corporation v. Penny, Berry and Buckingham
(1977), 19 N.S.R. (2d) 474; 75 D.L.R. (3d) 471 (S.C., A.D.). All three were
consolidated on this issue.
311. See Re Workmen's CompensationBoard of Nova Scotia and Treige (1976),
14 N.S.R. $2d) 693; 72 D.L.R. (3d) 246 (S.C., A.D.), discussed, supra, at
footnote 87 and accompanying text.
312. (1977), 19 N.S.R. 474 at 488-91 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.) and 493 (per
Cooper J.A.); 75 D.L.R. (3d) 571 at 578-82 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.) and 584-85
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creates a very weird structure but at least it ensures that a decision of
the Appeal Board, favourable to an injured employee, is not
immune from attack.
Having reached this conclusion, the Court in Penny then went on
to consider some general questions relating to the scope of a
statutory appeal, which in this case was "upon any question as to
[the Appeal Board's] jurisdiction or upon any question of law".313
The allegation made by counsel for the appellant in Penny was
that the Appeal Board's decision
•. .is entirely contrary to the preponderance of evidence and is

one that no reasonable men acting judicially could have reached;
314

The Appeal Division quickly dispatched the first part of this
allegation as not raising a "question of law" 3 15 and, given the
courts' traditional attitude that deciding against the weight of
evidence does not raise an error of law, 3 16 this was not surprising at
all. However, the way in which the Appeal Division defined what is
excluded from its ambit of consideration was somewhat surprising:
If we interfered, we would be reviewing questions of fact and
evidence or mixed law and fact which are not subject to review
unless, which
is not the case here, they involve matters of
3 17
jurisdiction.
The surprising part of this statement is the exclusion of questions
of mixed law and fact from the abmit of a statutory appeal on
questions of law. 3 18 However, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. then goes on to
make it clear that, while he would exclude the question of whether
(per Cooper J.A.). MacDonald J.A. at 494-500; 75 D.L.R. (3d) at 585-89,
dissented on this issue
313. Section 159(N) of Workmen's Compensation Board Act, S.N.S. 1968, c. 65,
as amended by S.N.S. 1975, c.43, s.13
314. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292 at 294; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 at 188
315. Id. at 294-95; 76 D.L.R. (3d) at 188
316. For a recent decision on the scope of review of the evidence in judicial review
proceedings, see Woodward Stores (Westmount) Ltd. v. Alberta Assessment Appeal
Board (1976), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 456; [1976] 5 W.W.R. 496 (Alta. S.C., A.D.). See
also D. W. Elliott, supra, note 247 at 67-80; de Smith, supra, note 15 at 111-20
317. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292 at 295; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 at 188
318. In some instances legislatures would seem to make this clear by referring in
the statutory appeal provision to questions of law alone. See e.g. Re McCann,
[1970] 2 O.R. 117; 10 D.L.R. (3d) 103 (C.A.). However, if this is not done there
will normally be seen to be some scope for intervention in the area of mixed law
and fact. See K. J. Keith, supra note 297 at 128-53; de Smith, supra, note 15 at
111-120
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the law and facts have been integrated correctly from the scope of an
appeal on questions of law, there is still some room for judicial
intervention in the area of fact or law/fact application.
Thus, it is an error of law to decide a point on no evidence, which
in this context I take as meaning no evidence of any material
weight or value. It is nearly the same thing to say that it is an
evidence no
error of law if the decision is one
3 19 that on the
reasonable man could have reached.
The second part of this formulation is of course the second part of
the appellant's allegation set out above and what the Court seems to
be saying is that they will not ask specifically: "Do the facts as
found actually fall within the rule of law as established (a question
of mixed fact and law)?" Rather they will restrict themselves to the
question: "Are the facts as found reasonably capable of falling
within the rule of law as established?" Obviously, though, the line
3 20
between these two questions is a very narrow one indeed.
Looking at the alternative formulation, there is also a very narrow
line between what constitutes a legitimate finding of no evidence to
support a decision and an illegitimate weighing of the evidence.
Indeed, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. quotes 3 21 Robert F. Reid in his
Administrative Law and Practiceas saying that the question of how
far the court should go in reviewing the evidence in an appeal on a
3 22
question of law is "in any general sense unanswerable".
Formulations such as that used by MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in this case
("no evidence of any material weight or value") tend to be for the
most part question-begging and open-textured. In fact, much the
same can be said of the other recent attempt by the Appeal Division
to formulate the scope for intervention on the basis of "no
3 23
evidence". This was in the case of Lapierre v. The Queen,
discussed earlier, and was stated by MacDonald J.A. in the context
319. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292 at 295; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 at 188-89
320,. See, once again, K. J. Keith, supra, note 297 at 128-53
321. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292 at 295; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 at 189. He also refers
to the famous statement of Lord Radcliffe in Edwardsv. Bairstow, [1956] A.C. 14
at 36; [1955] 3 All E.R. 48 at 57 (H.L. (E.)); the judgment of Lord Denning M.R.
in Ashbridge Investments Ltd. v. Minister of Housing and Local Government,
[1965] 1 W.L.R. 1320 at 1326; [1965] 3 All E.R. 371 at 374 (C.A.); de Smith,
supra, note 15 at 111-20, 118-20 and 360; and the judgment of Huges C.J.N.B. in
Re Lanteigne and Workmen's CompensationBoard (1973), 7 N.B.R. (2d) 36; 41
D.L.R. (3d) at 764 (C.A.)
322. Supra, note 57 at 306

323. (1976), 15N.S.R. (2d) 361
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of proceedings seeking habeas corpus with certiorari in aid to
quash a committal for trial. To repeat that test:The day is long gone when a mere scintilla of evidence will
justify a committal for trial; thus on an application for criminal
habeas corpus with certiorariin aid ..... .the reviewing court
should examine the evidence taken on the preliminary inquiry to
determine its sufficiency to deprive the applicant of his liberty.
The evidence should be found sufficient if the reviewing court
can say that on such evidence a jury, properly instructed and
acting judicially could convict; any doubt on this question must
be resolved in favour of the Crown. In so examining the evidence
the superior court is not really substituting its discretion for that
of the magistrate but rather is determining whether the magistrate
324
applied proper principles in ordering committal for trial.
Obviously, there is little or no difference in principle between this
statement by MacDonald J.A. and that by MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in
Penny despite the point made earlier that the statement of law by
MacDonald J.A. in Lapierre represents a wider formulation of the
"no evidence" basis of review than is normal in other contexts.
What is, however, significant about both statements is that, by
linking the "no evidence" test to a test relating to the
reasonableness of the decision-maker, both judges are at least
making it clear that for them anyway a "no evidence" inquiry
involves at least some assessment of the weight of the evidence. It
does not mean "absolutely no evidence at all" but rather a
"complete absence of reasonable evidence". This injection of
reasonableness into the test, while not obviously opening the
floodgates of judicial intervention on this basis, may at least result
in this ground for judicial intervention becoming slightly more
common in future3 25 What is even clearer is the fact that there will
be little difference in attitude on the part of the Appeal Division
whether this question is raised in the context of a statutory appeal on
questions of law or in a judicial review application. This of course
provides further support for the argument developed previously
that, notwithstanding Cooper J.A.'s statement in Re Michelin Tires,
there is a very close correlation between the scope of judicial review
and the scope of an appeal on questions of law.
324. Id. at 379
325. For a list of Canadian cases up to 1972, where this ground of judicial review
has been invoked successfully, see D. W. Elliott, supra, note 247 at 65-66. Since
then most of the action in this area has been in the area of judicial review of
criminal proceedings. See note 253, supra.
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(c) ErrorofLaw on the Face of the Record
In the statutory appeal decision just discussed, Cape Breton
Development Corporationv. Penny, MacKeigan C.J.N.S. refused
to categorize questions of mixed fact and law as questions of law for
the purpose of a statutory appeal. This issue of what constitutes an
error of law also arose in the period under review in the context of
an attempt to quash the decision of a board of inquiry appointed
under the Nova Scotia Human Rights Act 32 6 for error of law on the
face of the record.
There was no privative clause in the Human Rights Act so clearly
this was a permissible basis for judicial review 327 and MacIntosh J.,
at least by the use of a quote from Robert F. Reid, Administrative
Law and Practice,3 28 appears to have acknowledged as much in
Ryan v. Eaton. However, he then went on to find that at least some
of the errors alleged did not raise reviewable issues
With deference to counsel for the plaintiff, whether questions
involving height and weight qualifications, the plaintiff's ability
to perform the night shift work required, etc., are discriminatory
to the female sex, in the sense of being prejudicial, is not for the
Court's consideration. These issues involved the question
submitted to the Board for a finding. This is not an appeal. This
with the validity of the Board's finding,
court is "only concerned
29
not its wisdom". 3
Whether this amounts to an assertion that the issues involved are not
ones of law or that they are not reviewable whether they are issues
of law or not is quite unclear. However, the former interpretation is
obviously the one more favourable to the judge since the latter
involves a rejection of a well-established ground of review and also
contradicts the extract for Reid which the Judge had quoted earlier.
Why then are the issues that are described not issues of law? The
question: "What constitutes discrimination for the purposes of the
statute?" clearly would seem to be one that is capable of
classification as an issue of law, albeit that primary or initial
responsibility for answering that question lies with the Board of
Inquiry. In the context of an assertion that certain admitted acts do
not constitute discrimination, the role of the Board is to articulate
326. S.N.S. 1969, c. 11
327. Supra, note 322 at 331-33
328. Unreported decision of Macintosh J.of the Trial Division of the Supreme
Court of Nova Scotia, delivered: August 24, 1976 (S.H. No. 09674) at 11-12
329. Id.
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general principles as to what discrimination involves and then to
decide whether the acts in question fit into that legal framework.
This of course is the area of law/fact application and it may well be
that, as MacKeigan C.J.N.S. was to do later explicitly in the Penny
case 3 30 in the context of a statutory appeal, MacIntosh J. is adopting
implicitly a definition of error of law that excludes law/fact
application from the ambit of review for error of law on the face of
the record.
There is also a further correlation between the judgment of
MacIntosh J. in this case and that of MacKeigan C.J.N.S. in -the
subsequent Penny decision. MacIntosh J. quotes 33 ' from the
judgment of Dickson J. in Service Employees' Union v. Nipawin
District Staff Nurses Association and the pertinent part of this
extract is the following:But if the Board acts in good faith and its decision can be
rationally supported on a construction which the relevant
legislation may reasonably
be considered to bear, then the Court
3 32
will not intervene.
As with MacKeigan C.J.N.S.'s statement in Penny, what this
amounts to is a statement of review for error of law based on a
principle of deference to the tribunal's decision "We will not
intervene unless there is manifest or clear error" rather than "We
will decide the question of law for ourselves and, if our answer is
different from the tribunal's, we will intervene".
Such an approach to review for error of law on the face of the
record provokes a number of comments. First, it is significant that
Dickson J.'s statement about the principles of review was uttered in
the context of developing a theory of judicial review in the face of a
privative clause. 333 As Macintosh J. himself acknowledged that was
not the case in Ryan 334 Secondly, the courts normally do not accept
a principle of deference when it comes to review for error of law on
the face of the record. Rather, they pride themselves in their ability
to deal de novo and authoritatively with all questions of law. 3 35 The
330. (1977), 20 N.S.R. (2d) 292 at 295; 76 D.L.R. (3d) 186 at 188. Discussed
supra at footnote 309 and accompanying text
33 1. Supra, note 328 at 12-13
332. [1975] 1 S.C.R. 382 at 389; 41 D.L.R. (3d) 6 at 11; [1974] 1 W.W.R. 653 at
657
333. Trade Union Act, S.S. 1972, c. 137, s. 21, a standard "no appeal" - "no
certiorari" clause, which is accepted universally as preventing review for errors of
law within jurisdiction or intro-jurisdictional error of law.
334. Supra, note 327 at 12
335. See e.g. Baldwin & FrancisLtd. v. Patents Appeal Tribunal, [1959] A.C.
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following extract from the judgment of Scarman L.J. in H.T.V. Ltd.
v. PriceCommission exemplifies this:
These two paragraphs are - in truth as well as literally - the
alpha and omega of the code. Their width lends credibility to the
assertion of the commission that the interpretation and
application of the code are very largely its business, and not the
business of the courts. The commission says that the issue in this
case is for it, and not the courts, to determine. I find the assertion
acceptable, but only within short limits. Undoubtedly questions
of fact and policy arising in the course of implementing the code
are for the commission, not the courts. But the interpretation of
statutory language (including the language of delegated legislation) is a matter of law . . .But at the end of the process of fact
finding, which, when appropriate will include the application of
common sense and knowledge, of ordinary English usage to
ascertain the meaning of common words and the meaning of
technical words, the interpretation of legislative language
remains a question of law. It is, therefore, a matter for
the courts,
33 6
unless their jurisdiction has been expressly excluded.
Nevertheless, there are sound arguments for the principle of
deference in some, if not all, situations, and some recognition of
these arguments can be seen in the courts' narrow approach to
review for error of law on the face of the record in arbitrations
involving the interpretation of collective agreements. 337 Normally
there will not be intervention unless the construction of a document
is one that it will not reasonably bear. The legal meaning of
technical words may well be something on which the generalist
court should be prepared to acknowledge the greater expertise of the
designated statutory authority except in the case of manifest error. It
is also true that words take their meaning from the context in which
they are used; therefore, what may be the "ordinary" meaning of
particular statutory language for a court may be quite different from
the meaning quite legitimately attributed to it in a particular context
by a statutory tribunal. Finally, and perhaps most importantly the
language in which the mandate of a statutory authority is expressed
663; [1959] 2 All E.R. 433 (H.L. (E.))
336. [1976]I.C.R. 170 at 188 (C.A.)
337. This court will only intervene if the decision is one that the tribunal could not
reasonably have reached. See e.g. FordMotor Co. of CanadaLtd. v. International
Union, United Automobile Workers of America, [1972] S.C.R. 625; 25 D.L.R.
(3d) 180; Re Taylor and FordMotor Co. of CanadaLtd. (1973), 1 O.R. (2d) 398;
40 D.L.R. (3d) 486 (H.C.). It is noteworthy, of course, that the courts take this
stance notwithstanding the ad hoc nature of a board of arbitration c.f. my
comments, infra.
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will often be left deliberately vague because of a desire on the part
of the drafters that the expert authority will develop a meaning for
that language as part of its ongoing and growing experience with the
regulated area. In other words, there will be a type of subdelegation
of legislative authority.
Arguably, this last point justifies deference in a case such as Ryan
in relation to the meaning and ambit of a term such as
"discrimination". The word invites tribunal development. However, the crucial point may well be that what the court was dealing
with in Ryan was not a standing tribunal but an ad hoc board of
inquiry. In such contexts, the arguments about the role of the
authority in relation to the development of a meaning for a word or
language or even for deference to expertise are not nearly so
convincing. Indeed, one might go further and argue that the real role
of the statutory authority in the area of human rights legislation is to
break through the very real evidential difficulties in the way of
establishing discrimination and to develop special measurement
tests and criteria for that purpose. On the question of what in law
constitutes "discrimination", the generalist court may be seen as
just as expert as the statutory authority. While this latter argument is
not wholly convincing to me, it at least gains some strength from the
absence of any privative clause in the relevant legislation, the most
common and readily available device to prevent judicial review for
error of law.
However, even if the need for deference to the decisions of the
statutory authority on questions of law is accepted, the judgment of
MacIntosh J. in Ryan is unsatisfactory in that it fails to pay any
attention to the question which even he acknowledges can be asked
by the reviewing court in this context. Is the construction placed on
the word "discrimination" by the board one that the language or
word can reasonably bear? That question at least deserved some
detailed attention given the controversial nature of some of the
matters alleged in this case; first, that a height and weight restriction
did not involve sexual discrimination and, secondly, that Ms. Ryan
was not hired because of the difficulties that the presence of a
woman would cause on the night shift and consequent reluctance to
have her work only days. The argument that discrimination is
involved in both these matters is, to say the least, quite strong and
the judge should have considered explicitly whether the word
"discrimination" reasonably construed could rationally support an
interpretation which did not include either of these matters. This
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seems particularly so "as no bona fide occupational qualification
was indicated by the employer". 338
(d) Abuse ofDiscretionand Elected Officials
In 1975, the Town Council of the Town of Yarmouth decided to
disband its police force and to enter into a contract with the RCM
Police for the provision of police services in the Township. Before
this decision, a plebiscite was held which indicated that a majority
of those voting were in favour of the proposed step. Subsequently,
the Deputy Chief of Police sought a declaration that the relevant
resolution of the Town Council was null and void and an injunction
restraining the town from entering into a contract with the RCM
Police. 3 39
One of the interesting arguments made on behalf of the Deputy
Chief of Police was that the resolution was invalidated by virtue of
the fact that two members of the majority voting for the
disbandment of the police force did so because they wrongly
considered themselves bound by the result of the plebiscite.
Morrison J, however, found against the facts on which this
allegation was founded:
I accept their evidence as they gave it, that is, that they did not
vote as they did because they felt they were bound by the results
of the plebiscite but rather on their own conscience and on their
assessment of the feelings of the town, which was reached by a
consideration of a number of factors of which the plebiscite was
only one. 34 0
It is, however, interesting to speculate upon what the result would
or should have been had it been clear that the councillors did
consider themselves bound by the vote on the plebiscite.
In the course of his judgment, Morrison J. cited a number of
authorities to the effect that the courts should be reluctant to
interfere with the actions of duly-elected municipal councils
whether exercised by resolution or by-law. 34 ' Typical is the
following statement:
What is or is not in the public interest is a matter to be
determined by the judgment of the municipal council; and what it
determines, if in reaching its conclusion it acted honestly and
338.
339.
340.
341.

Supra, note328 at 14
Canty v. Town of Yannouth (1975), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 590 (S.C., T.D.)
Id. at 596
Id. at 593-94
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within the limits of its powers, is not open to review by the
Court. 342

However, such general statements do not assist very much in
dealing with the particular question save that they establish a
principle of great deference or reluctant interference.
Of course, considering oneself bound by the plebiscite might
involve one of two states of mind; either an understanding that the
law required you to adhere to the result of the plebiscite or,
alternatively, a decision in advance that in this particular matter the
vote of the populace rather than your own personal judgment
should, as a matter of fact, govern the outcome.
Both these situations or states of mind can be viewed as having
the potential for judical review for abuse of discretion. In the first, it
could be argued that there was a failure to exercise a discretion
because of a misperception of the law as to voting obligations after
the particular plebiscite. The second situation could be seen as
giving rise to arguments about a wrongful delegation of authority
or, even once again, of failure to exercise the discretion that the
ability to vote on council resolutions involves. In Rogers, The Law
CanadianMunicipal Corporations, the following statement would
appear to support this contention, albeit that it is made in the context
of the corporate actions of councils rather than the individual votes
of councillors:
Phrased conversely, it means that political power can be
exercised only by those who are responsible in law for its
execution. In terms of municipal law, this means that, in the
absence of express statutory authority, a municipal council, as
the recipient of delegated authority itself, cannot assign to an
official or any other agency any legislative or discretionary
authority vested in it. Moreover, it cannot deprive itself of a
power conferred on it by requiring by by-law, as a preliminary
step to the exercise of its powers, a petition3 4of
the ratepayers
3
where the governing statute does not require it.
Nevertheless, it may well be argued that, while the concillors of
Yarmouth obtain their powers from the Towns Act 3 44 and
personally have to exercise the functions conferred on them by that
342. Id. at 594, citing Master J.A. in Re Howard and City of Toronto (1928), 61
O.L.R. 563 at 575; [1928] 1 D.L.R. 952 at 965 (C.A.)
343. (2d ed. Toronto: Carswells, 1971) at 368-69 (para. 63-41) (footnotes omitted)
344. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 309. See section 208 particularly in relation the
establishment of a police force. See also Police Services Act, S.N.S. 1969, c. 17,
ss. 6-7

Administrative Law 551

statute, the Act itself is designed to facilitate a certain kind of
municipal democracy and that, against this background, the
decision to return a particular issue to the theoretically original
delegators of the power to govern, the voters, is of a quite different
order from delegation of authority to a small committee or some
private organization.
As against this, it can of course be said that the true nature of the
democratic process at the municipal level is that the will of the
electorate can only be determinative at the relatively frequent
elections and that, in the period in between, those elected are
expected to act personally in what they consider to be the best
interests of the municipality.
Perhaps fortunately for the Court, it did not have to face this
fundamental question about the nature of the democratic process in
the Canty. Indeed, it may well remain an issue for debate at the
theoretical level. After all, even if the theory that the councillors are
supposed to vote on the basis of their own decision about a
particular matter is accepted, the opinion of the electorate as
expressed in a plebiscite is obviously not an irrelevant factor in the
making of that decision and, given that, it is always going to be
45
relatively easy for a court to say, as Morrison J. did in Canty, 3
that the result of the vote was just one factor that the councillors
took into account in deciding which way to vote on a particular
resolution.
(e) Re Michelin Tires ManufacturingCo. Ltd. 346
Comment has already been made on this decision in the section
dealing with the scope for judicial intervention in the case of a
statutory appeal on questions of law and jurisdiction. However, the
case is also highly significant because of the grounds on which the
appeal was allowed.
Michelin Tires claimed to be entitled to an exemption from sales
tax with respect to goods and materials used in the construction of
an electrical sub-station which supplied electricity to its manufacturing plant. This exemption was said to arise under section 10 (h) of
the Health Services Tax Act 34 7 which provided:
345. (1975), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 590 At 596 (S.C., T.D.)
346. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150 (S.C., A.D.). On this aspect of the case, see also
H. N. Janisch, Secret Law Condemned (1976), 3 Nova Scotia Law News, No. 2 at

19
347. R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 127
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10. The following classes of tangible personal property are
specifically exempted from the provisions of this Act:
. (h) machinery and apparatus as defined by the Minister and
parts thereof, which in the opinion of the Minister are to be used
directly in the process of manufacture and production of goods
for sale.
The company's appeal to the Minister from the initial assessment of
sales tax was rejected in principle, though a discount of
twenty-eight per cent was allowed, and this decision was affirmed
348
by Hart J. of the Trial Division on further appeal.
The "definition" by the Minister which was relied upon in
assessing sales tax was contained in a letter, dated July 9, 1969 and
addressed to the Commissioner of the Hospital Tax Commission
and it purported to change an earlier 1963 definition. The relevant
part of the letter was as follows:
As stated in my letter of June 3, 1969, I concur in your
recommendation that we exempt from tax only that portion of the
machinery and apparatus that is used exclusively and directly in
the process of manufacture or production of goods for sale. 349
*

The only other facts that relate to the issues discussed by the Court
in the case are those relating to the date of purchase of the goods that
were the subject of the assessment and the "promulgation" of this
order. To quote from the judgment of Cooper J.A.:
Most of the electrical machinery and apparatus was ordered for
delivery in the Fall of 1970 and 95 per cent of it had arrived on
the site by November or December, 1970.350
The new "definition" was not, however, published in any sense till
early 1971 when all manufacturers listed in the Nova Scotia
Directory of Manufacturing were notified by the Director of Health
Services Tax Administration. As Michelin had not at that time
started production, it was not listed and did not receive a copy.
Indeed, despite attempts to secure information, it was not until a
1972 audit by the Commission that anyone at Michelin saw a copy
of the "definition".
There were two substantial judgments delivered by members of
the Appeal Division in this case, one by Cooper J.A. and one by
MacKeigan C.J.N.S., with Coffin J.A. concurring in both as he
348. (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 587 (S.C., T.D.)
349. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150 at 160
350. Id. at 154
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saw them as being in no sense contradictory. 3 51 Read together these
two judgments produce a melange of reasons for allowing the
appeal and they can be stated briefly:
(a) The new "definition" was not a definition in terms of the Act
because it simply restated the language of the section and
unlawfully delegated the making of a real definition to the
Commission.352

(b) The new "definition" was ultra vires, notwithstanding the
wide discretion given to the Minister ("in the opinion of"),
because it added a requirement of "exclusivity", which is in no
sense 35a 3test or definition of "directly" but a narrowing of that
term.
(c) The "definition" had not been published at the time that the
purchase were made and publication is a requirement of
effectiveness. 354
(d) The "definition" had not come into effect till after the
purchase because the Minister's delegate in the Commission had
the
delayed the implementation of the new "definition" and
3 55
Minister was estopped from setting up a want of authority.
As a result, the Court found that the 1963 definition applied to
Michelin's situation and under this definition, it was entitled to an
exemption.
The first two grounds of review are relatively uncontroversial and
easy to understand. The only doubt that might be raised is in relation
to the Court's intervention in the obviously broad power of
definition given to the Minister. 356 Should the courts be involved in
a review of the Minister's opinion? Of course, the form in which the
definition was issued by the Minister made it relatively easy to say
that he was not so much defining as adding another requirement to
the provisions of section 10(h), that of exclusivity of use. The
conclusion reached by the Court may, however, have been a little
more difficult to justify if the Minister had said "For the purposes of
section 10((h) 'directly' means 'exclusively"'. Nevertheless, even
351. Id. at 177
352. Id. at 175-76 (per MacKeigan C.J.N.S.)
353. Id. at 168 (per Cooper J.A.) and 173-75 (per MacKeigan.C.J.N.S.)
354. Id. at 170-73 (per Cooper J.A.)
355. Id. at 168-170 (per Cooper J.A.)
356. For recent discussions of the effect of subjective empowering formulae on the
scope of judicial review, see D. E. Paterson, The Subjective Construction of
Statutory ProvisionsAuthorizing Action by Public Officials (1974), 6 N.Z.U.L.R.
101; R. C. Austin, Judicial Review of Subjective Discretion - At the Rubicon;
Whither Now?, [1975] Current Legal Problems 150
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if that device had been used, it would seem that the Court should be
able to analyze the definition as opposed to an attempt to amend the
section. In a slightly different context, the Ontario Court of Appeal
recently expressed this same principle:
• . . even such a broad conferring of power to act on what the
Board considers relevant would not extend to authorize the Board
to make relevant a consideration which is patently irrelevant,
simply by the
act of Board expressing that it considers it be
57
irrelevant. 3
What is evident from the first two reasons, but particularly from
the latter two, is an understandable concern with the operation of the
subordinate law-making processes in the province of Nova Scotia
and an attempt to impose strict requirements as to regularity before
that law will become effective.
According to de Smith, 3 58 statutory instruments are effective
once made in the absence of some statutory provision to the
contrary. Quite obviously, the rigid application of such a rule can
give rise to considerable injustice and in the first Dalhousie Law
Journal survey of Nova Scotia law, Professors Goode and Ortego
commented on the development of the defence in criminal
proceedings of ignorance of the law in relation to "secret" law. 359
While the Michelin Tires case is concerned not with criminal
liability, but tax liability, some of the same considerations are
obviously relevant in this context. People are constantly planning
their affairs on the basis of matters such as tax liability and to allow
the government to rely upon undiscoverable law to frustrate those
planning efforts is in most instances quite contrary to our sense of
what is involved in the notion of the Rule of Law.
In Michelin Tires, the Court was able to respond to the challenge
first by presuming from the facts that the Minister had delegated the
determination of the effective date of the new definition to the
Commission, though this was arguably quite invalid. 360 Secondly,
357. Re Sheehan and Criminal Injuries CompensationBoard (1975), 5 O.R. (2d)
781 at 786; 52 D.L.R. (3d) 728 at 733 (C.A.) (perKelly J.A.)
358. Supra, note 15 at 127
359. Jim Ortego and M. R. Goode, Recent Developments in CriminalLawin Nova
Scotia (1976), 2 Dalhousie L.J. 744 at 776-90, commenting on R. v. MacLean
(1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 564; 17 C.C.C. (2d) 84; 27 C.R.N.S. 31 (N.S. Co. Ct.).
See also H. N. Janisch, Regulations:Publish or Perish (1974), 1 Nova Scotia Law
News, No. l at 11
360. On the basis that the date of the effectiveness of the new definition is an
integral part of the defining power itself and that, therefore, any subdelegation
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the Court seemed prepared to reject, at least in this context, the rule
stated by de Smith that subordinate legislation is valid when made
and instead to require some kind of publication. 36 1 What
publication involves did not however need to be developed by the
Court. The machinery had all been purchased not only before the
manufacturers in the Directory were notified but before the date
which the Director had decided would be the effective date of the
new "definition".
A much harder case for the Court would have been one in which
the directive was considered effective by the Director and after he
had notified the manufacturers listed in the Directory, but before
Michelin had found out about it. Cooper J.A. hinted that even in
that situation he would have decided in favour of Michelin. 3 62 He
cited with approval the following statement from R. v. Ross:
I think it hardly compatible with justice that a person may be
convicted and penalized, and perhaps lose his personal liberty by
being committed to jail in default of payment of any fine
imposed, for the violation of an order of which he had no
knowledge or notice at any material time. 363
He then transferred that reasoning to the present context:
We are here dealing with a defining power given to the Minister
of Finance in the very important area of taxation and, in my
opinion, it is of great importance that the exercise of that power
364
and the terms of that exercise be made known to the public.
The last part of the statement is, however, ambivalent. What does
making something known to the public involve in this context?
Notifying all manufacturers listed in the relevant trade document?
Publication in the Gazette? Publication in the local newspapers? Or,
actual notification to all affected? MacKeigan C.J.N.S. obviously
was not prepared to go as far as the last of these alternatives:
Where such formal issuance is not required, I would like to think
that effective issuance involves some reasonable minimum
publication, the nature and degree of which will depend on the
kind of order and the persons to whom it is directed. I must
offends the delegatus non potest delegare principle. See de Smith, supra, note 15
at 263-72
361. Supra, note 15 at 127. The "normal" rule was not in fact dealt with by the
Appeal Division
362. (1976), 15 N.S.R. (2d) 150 at 171-73
363. Id. at 172, citing Harrison Co. Ct. J., [1945] 3 D.L.R. 574 at 576-77 (B.C.

Co. Ct.)
364. Id. at 172-73
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respectfully question, however, whether the Crown must prove
that the person to be bound has actual knowledge or notice of an
order, as seems to be suggested by Harrison, Co. Ct. J. in R. v.
Ross...

365

This in fact seems obvious given the impossibility of anticipating
all who will be affected in the future by the new "definition".
There are, of course, two separate questions that may be involved
here. First what publication, if any, is actually needed to make the
new definition effective? Secondly, assuming it is effective, will a
defence be available to anyone who does not actually have
knowledge of the definition? The answer to the second question
will, of course, be largely conditional by the answer to the first. The
more strict the publication requirement that is imposed, the less
scope there will be or should be for a defence of ignorance of law.
For example, if publication by writing to all persons listed in the
Nova Scotia Directory of Manufacturers, as took place here, was
considered to be effective, the court should perhaps be prepared to
excuse someone who was not so notified from the effects of the new
definition if, before purchase, they were unable to secure any
information from the Commission as to whether the definition had
been changed since 1963. On the other hand, if the change were
listed in the new Directory itself and this was considered publication
for the purposes of bringing the new definition into effect, it may
well be that ignorance should not excuse the company from
liability, particularly if the Directory is a common place for such
information.
Obviously, major difficulties are involved in the answering of
such questions and generally this would seem to be the type of issue
that should be clarified by legislation rather than having to be
developed by the courts on a case by case basis. However, in Nova
Scotia, the new Regulations Act 3 66 which attempts to deal with
some of these problems remains unproclaimed some four and a half
years after its enactment. It must also be noted that it is doubtful
whether the Regulations Act, even if proclaimed, would serve to
answer the issue posed by Re Michelin Tires, if it arose again. By
virtue of section 4(6) and (7), Regulations have to be filed with the
Registrar before they become effective. There is then a general
publication requirement and for the most part, non-publication in
365. Id. at 176-77
366. S.N.S. 1973, c. 15
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the Gazette provides an excuse unless other
• . . reasonable steps had been taken for the purpose of bringing
the purport of the regulation to the notice of the public or of the
persons likely to be affected by it or of the person charged.
There are obvious difficulties with this section. What is
reasonable may give rise to great problems in particular cases. Also,
is the section saying that a person may be charged if he is in fact
affected and if reasonable steps have been taken to bring it to the
attention of persons likely to be affected, if he was not in the class of
those who were likely to be affected? However, even more
pertinent, is the definition of "regulation".
(g) . . . a rule, order, proclamation, regulation, by-law, form,
resolution or tariff of costs or fees made in the exercise of a
legislative power conferred by or under an Act of the Legislature
(ii) by the Minister presiding over any department of the
public service.
Is a "definition" capable of being fitted within one of those words
used to describe the type of instrument by the statute? Hopefully, a
broad reading of the Act would ensure that it was.
IV. Conclusion
The decisions commented upon in this survey have concerned many
facets of judicial review of administrative action as well as statutory
appeals from administrative action. Because of this variety it is
very difficult to generalize and encapsulate in a few words the
general quality of the judgments of the Nova Scotia courts in this
area. The picture presented here is also somewhat deceptive in that
the decisions selected for comment are by and large ones that raise
controversial and novel points and for that reason may not be
representative.
However, a few comments of a general nature can be made.
Many of the decisions discussed in this survey have looked at the
issues involved from far too narrow a perspective or, putting it
another way, without a full consideration of all the competing
interests involved. At times, for example, the position and the
concerns of the statutory authority were either ignored or dealt with
quite superficially. In other cases, judgments were cryptic and little
attempt was made to relate the rules of law accepted to an overall
philosophy of judicial review and its perceived role. Of course,
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pressure on judicial time and inadequate presentation by counsel
may explain a lot. Nevertheless, if the judicial review is to cease to
have some of its bad name in this country, the judicial articulation
of reasons for decisions is going to have to be fuller and more
principled in a greater number of cases. This was a matter on which
I commented in the first of these surveys and it is difficult to detect
any general improvement in this regard, though one has to
acknowledge the sensitive treatment given by the Appeal Division
to the issues raised in the Michelin Tires Ltd. case. Perhaps not
unexpectedly, there has been little evidence in the judgments
surveyed of this degree of refinement in the Trial Division.

